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Abstract 
Economics plays a significant role in decision-making in contemporary western societies, but its role 
is increasingly questioned. A recurring topic among the challenges raised by critics is that economics 
as a discipline lacks sufficient pluralism. That is, it fails to enable, encourage, and respect the use of 
different ontologies, methodologies, theories, and/or schools of thought to study economic reality. Has 
this been a productive critique? Does talk about pluralism help identify genuine problems in the 
discipline? Pluralism in economics could draw support from the current consensus in philosophy that 
pluralism in science is a good thing. I argue, however, that the claim that economic research is 
insufficiently pluralist is unlikely to convince economists who believe economics is already pluralist 
enough and that it does not offer unambiguous recommendations for change. This is because there are 
too many legitimate ways to interpret how pluralism maps to practice. There are numerous variables 
that pluralist ideals might focus on—the things that they seek multiple rather than one of—and 
different interpretations of how many of those variables economics has in practice. Yet, as I go on to 
argue, this does not mean that talk of pluralism is entirely beside the point, since the reasons pluralists 
offer for their ideals do help to identify genuine problems in economics. The social epistemic 
strategies that arguments for pluralism recommend point us to three concrete issues in the way 
economic research is organised: gender imbalances, a steep internal hierarchy, and a dismissive 
attitude to outsiders. I show that economic research could be more progressive, representative of the 
interests of those in society, accepted, and legitimate and less likely to fall into bias if the discipline 
alleviated its gender imbalances, if it were less hierarchical, and if it had a healthier relationship with 
outsiders. 
In chapter 1, I outline the debate about pluralism in economics and explain how my thesis utilises 
a novel approach to social epistemology to offer a way out of the impasse in which that the debate 
presently resides. In chapter 2, I explain the different philosophical arguments for pluralism in science 
and categorise them using the variables they focus on and the reasons they give for pluralism. In 
chapter 3, I argue that interpreting pluralism as a particular arrangement of variables for economics to 
attain does not lead to unambiguous recommendations for change because it leaves too much open. 
Yet, I go on to argue, in chapter 4, that drawing on the reasons for pluralism can provide a set of 
heuristics for piecemeal evaluations of the social epistemic practices in economics. In chapters 5, 6, 
and 7, I apply these heuristics to economics. I provide evidence that [a] women are outnumbered in 
economics and face an adverse environment in the discipline, that [b] economics is steeply 
hierarchical, and that [c] economists form an in-group that assumes superiority and frequently 
dismisses outside voices. I argue that these three features of economic research block avenues for 
productive forms of feedback (mechanisms that help to challenge, justify, and refine scientific 
knowledge), block the interests of certain perspectives being heard, and block public scrutiny of the 
decisions made by economists. 
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1 Why a social epistemology of economics? 
Is there anything wrong with the way that economic research is organised? If so, what are the issues? 
These are the questions that this thesis seeks to answer. 
Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis economics has repeatedly come under attack. One common 
criticism is that it is not pluralist enough. A popular critique of economics argued, for example, that: 
Pluralism is necessary because, by providing different ways of thinking about economics, it 
forces people to question how they think and brings issues that are often taken for granted 
back into the sphere of political discussion. (Earle, Moran, & Ward-Perkins, 2016, p. 80) 
Although pluralists touch on a range of issues—from economic expertise to specific aspects of 
economic knowledge—their central target is the organisation of economic research and teaching. 
Pluralists typically argue that research and teaching in university economics departments fail to utilise 
an appropriately broad range of ontologies, methodologies, theories, and/or schools of thought. Such 
criticisms have not gone unnoticed. They have stimulated a notable public debate and a range of 
rebuttals from economists who disagree that their discipline is overly narrow (see 1.2). 
Given that scientific pluralism has become popular among philosophers and historians of science 
as a description of and prescription for all scientific practice, it is reasonable to ask whether scientific 
pluralism can help determine who is correct in the debate about economics. Focussing on research, 
rather than teaching,1 I will use scientific pluralism to ask: are there any issues in the way that 
economic research is organised? And, if so, have pluralists identified them appropriately? 
I will argue that there are indeed issues with how economic research is organised, but that 
arguments that it is insufficiently pluralist focus on too high a level of abstraction to identify them. 
Arguments for pluralism typically target an ideal state, in which economics has multiple rather than 
one of certain variables (theories, methods, values, schools of thought, et cetera). But such arguments 
are unlikely to convince those that think there is sufficient variety in economics or to offer clear 
prescriptions for change because they leave too much open for interpretation. Where some see one of a 
given variable (schools of thought, for example), others see many, and pluralism does not offer criteria 
to rule either way. 
Pluralism can, however, still help identify issues in economics. Instead of comparing economics to 
a particular pluralist state, I will identify three concrete issues with economics and use the underlying 
reasons for pluralism to explain why these issues are problematic: [a] significant gender imbalances 
                                                             
1 Because it is not completely separate from research, I will also discuss some issues related to teaching, but my 
main concern will be the organisation of research in economics for two reasons. First, teaching has received 
much of the attention in the debate about pluralism to date. This is in part because students have played a central 
role in driving the argument for pluralism (see 1.2). Research in economics deserves equal scrutiny. Second, 
Davis has argued "the direction of causation for change in economics has been from research to instruction, with 
content of instruction generally emerging with a lag as a summary or set of summaries of earlier research that 
has gained general acceptance" (Davis, 2006, pp. 4-5). This makes the debate about pluralism in economic 
research potentially more consequential than the debate about pluralism in teaching. 
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within economics limit the range and strength of critical feedback and block the uptake of female 
interests in the discipline. [b] Economics is overly hierarchical, this creates perverse incentives and a 
concentration of power that undermines critical feedback and the interests of socially marginalised 
perspectives being heard in the discipline, as well as limiting avenues for public scrutiny. [c] 
Economists form an in-group that assumes superiority and frequently dismisses outside voices, which 
prevents the discipline from taking advantage of productive feedback, limits the range of perspectives 
it considers, and undermines important conditions for public scrutiny of the discipline. 
In this introductory chapter, I will describe three background factors that shape the above 
argument and highlight why it is important. Firstly, economists and economic research play a 
significant role in decision-making in contemporary western societies. In 1.1, I will document the 
numerous important positions that economists have come to occupy and the outsize influence the tools 
and ideas developed by economists have had on the development of institutions all over the world. 
These factors make the way that economic research is organised highly consequential and amplifies 
the issues I will describe in this thesis. Secondly, the debate about pluralism in economics is hotly 
contested but shows no signs of closure. I describe this debate and the stalemate in which it currently 
sits in 1.2. By moving from a focus on ideal states of pluralism to concrete social epistemic issues 
within economics, my argument offers a way out of this stalemate. Thirdly, although social 
epistemologists have developed a number of tools for evaluating the social features of scientific 
practice, their focus has been on ideal models of research, translating questions in epistemology from 
individuals to social bodies, or looking at small cases. In 1.3, I argue that my thesis offers an 
alternative approach. By starting from existing rather than ideal practices in economics, and by 
focussing on the discipline as a whole rather than examples within it, I offer an example of how to 
extend the ideas and tools of social epistemology to new kinds applications (non-ideal, large scale). In 
1.4 I outline the structure of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 Economics is important 
In this thesis I will investigate a range of questions about the way that research in economics is 
organised. Given the significant power that economists, economic thought, and economic institutions 
wield, these questions are not purely academic. They also lie at the heart of a number of debates about 
the role of economics in society. Some see economics as a unified project that narrows political 
debates, legitimises neoliberal polices, and undermines social democratic institutions.2 Others contend 
that economics is a patchwork of quantitative social science techniques and ideas that is under-
appreciated by the public and too frequently ignored by politicians: 
Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Murray Weidenbaum, when asked directly what 
weight of influence, on a scale of one to ten, economists had enjoyed in drafting the original 
                                                             
2 See Harvey (2007), Mirowski and Plehwe (2009), Offer and Söderberg (2016), and Offer (2017). 
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tax program of the [Reagan] administration, replied, ‘zero.’ (Galbraith, 1988, p. 224; cited 
Reay, 2012, p. 45) 
Because the power economics has in society also plays an important role in what I will say in the rest 
of this thesis, I will use this section to highlight some aspects of it. I describe two reasons to believe 
that economics has outsize societal influence, compared to other social sciences, and note how this can 
be squared with cases in which economists are ignored. 
First, economists are demanded and influential in a number of key political roles all over the 
world. The demand for economists in the United States increased dramatically as a result of the role 
they played in coordinating the war effort during World War II (Bernstein, 1995). The United States’ 
Council of Economic Advisors was created in 1946, and the number of economists in directly political 
or important advisory roles has increased ever since (Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014). Economists 
are now represented in every part of the executive and legislative branches of the US government and 
they also control the Federal Reserve (as well as having their own office in the White House). 
Bob Coats (2005) summarises a similar growth in employment opportunities for economists in 
Europe since 1945. Capable economic administration was a condition for many states to receive aid as 
part of the Marshall plan. The same was true for nations hoping to join the European Community or 
Union (as it became), and later the monetary union. Even when states did not join these institutions, 
economists were typically involved extensively in deciding whether to do so or not.3 Moreover, the 
institutions of the European Community/Union have seen large growth and employed many 
economists. All of this has increased the demand for economists in policy and in public and private 
bureaucracy across Europe. 
John Markoff and Veronica Montecinos (1993) documented a similar trend in Chile. They argued 
that economists' methods and universalistic rhetoric (see below) made them technical experts that 
could lend legitimacy to policy in a wide variety of areas. This legitimising role led to the appointment 
of economists to powerful roles, particularly in the ministries of finance, in successive Chilean 
governments (both before and after the 1973 coup). The legitimacy economists brought helped these 
governments face down internal challenges and satisfy the requirements of international organisations. 
The debtor nation may not be able to meet the IMF's goals, but it can at least show its serious 
participation in the correct ritual by appointing accomplished economists to draw up new 
plans and excuse the failure of the old ones. (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993, p. 47) 
According to Markoff and Montecinos this led to economists replacing lawyers as the generalist policy 
experts. 
Similar trends exist elsewhere too. Trond Bergh (1981) points to the displacement of lawyers by 
economists in Norway, Justin Fox (2014) has noted a similar trend on the US Federal Reserve board, 
and with Tiago Mata I argue that we are now witnessing a similar rise of behavioural economics 
trained policy makers (Wright & Mata, Under review). Moreover, economists have come to take up a 
                                                             
3 In Sweden, for example, a commission of economists was set up to evaluate the case for joining the Euro. 
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significant portion of the influential roles in the International Monetary Fund (Clift, 2018), and 
Cathrine Holst and Johan Christensen (2018) show that economists have massively increased their 
representation on Norwegian ad hoc commissions (committees set up to investigate the effects of 
possible policy and other changes). 
Despite all of the social sciences expanding since 1945, the extent to which economists have been 
employed in politically consequential roles is unique. The White House does not have a Council of 
Sociological Advisors and Whitehall does not have a Government Sociological Service. Economics is 
far and away the social science (and possibly academic discipline in general) whose graduates and 
PhDs are best represented in powerful social positions (Christensen, 2017; Earle et al., 2016; 
Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014). 
Marion Fourcade (2006) argues that the universalistic rhetoric of economics has played an 
important role in creating this state of affairs. Many of the tools and techniques of economics abstract 
away from the messy aspects of social interaction and utilise simplified models of human decision-
making. This has made economic concepts, theories, measurements, and knowledge seem ahistorical 
and completely transferable.4 This is highlighted by the fact that economists often point to technical 
areas as their locus of expertise (econometrics, game theory), rather than specific places or periods. 
Because of this the policy prescriptions and explanations common in economics often seem 
universally applicable. The increasing use of economics’ universal concepts and measurements in 
policy and public life snowballed and increased demand for translatable or similar measurements and 
concepts in spaces in which economic thinking was not yet dominant (Coats, 2005). It also increased 
the necessity for policy makers and political elites to be able to talk in terms of the universal 
measurements and concepts of economics. Both of these factors aided the extraordinary growth in 
influence of economists in the second half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
In addition to helping further increase the demand for economists, the increasing role of economic 
concepts, measures, interventions, ideas, and policy tools has reconfigured the world in the image of 
economics. This is the second aspect of economics’ societal significance. Three components of this 
can be picked out: the effects of economic policy devices and models, the influence of economic ideas, 
and the expansion of economic styles of reasoning (Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014). 
Firstly, economists have developed a variety of sociotechnical tools that influence the decisions of 
policymakers and large organisations. These range from the often criticised but nonetheless ubiquitous 
and important metrics of productivity (Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Product) to the 
more contingent bill scoring practices in the United States’ Congressional Budget Office. 
Sociotechnical tools from economics proliferate in a variety of specialist domains too. Through the 
adoption of Quality-Adjusted Life Years economic thinking has become central to many health policy 
decisions, most notably by the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. 
Through cost-benefit analysis and payment for ecosystems services economic thinking has come to 
                                                             
4 For an example of this universalistic rhetoric in public see ‘Are the poor different?’ in the Economist (No 
author, 1996). 
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dominate environmental policy decisions and disputes. And, more recently the United States’ Office 
for Information and Regulatory Affairs have mandated that other government offices follow specific 
information assessment and disclosure mechanisms that are directly inspired by behavioural 
economics (Wright & Mata, Under review). 
The full list of influential tools developed by economists is extensive and includes the idea of ‘the 
economy' itself, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and growth (Miller & Rose, 1990; Mitchell, 
2002b). As Daniel Hirschman and Elizabeth Popp Berman (2014) note, even though some of these 
tools are often criticised, once they take hold and are followed by many—more than a hundred 
countries in the example of Gross Domestic Product—their influence is very difficult to dislodge. 
Some of these sociotechnical tools are more secure than others, but the power of economics comes 
from the fact that it is in a position to develop such policy devices, including some that last and shape 
how policies are viewed for decades. Moreover, once policy devices take hold the moral debates that 
occur in their development tend to recede into the background (Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014). 
Some sociologists have argued that particular economic tools have even helped create the 
behaviour they are predicated on (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006). MacKenzie (2006), for example, 
notes that as the Black-Scholes-Merton asset pricing model came to be adopted by financial market 
actors the behaviour predicted in the model became more common. And, Edward Nik-Khah (2008) 
has documented how the US Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision to hire game 
theorists to design auctions was met with telecommunications companies hiring their own game 
theorists, resulting in the companies behaving in exactly the ways the FCC’s theorists predicted. 
Secondly, a number of authors have pointed to the influential role of economic ideas. These 
include large macro-scale paradigms or ideologies—like Keynesianism or neoliberalism (Amadae, 
2015; Blyth, 2002; Mirowski, 2013; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009)—as well as more specialist policy 
ideas—like expansionary fiscal contraction (Blyth, 2013; Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014). Avner 
Offer and Gabriel Söderberg (2016) argue, for example, that the foundation of the Nobel prize in 
economics was used to lend authority to anti social democratic economic ideas in Sweden. Elsewhere, 
Offer (2017) also argues that similar economic ideas were key to the shift from social democratic to 
individual market-based approaches to lifetime saving in the UK. One needs to be careful not to 
overplay the deterministic nature of these ideas or the conspiratorial intent behind them. The ideas 
generated by economists can have varied results and the national contexts in which they become 
realised can be crucial in determining their actual impact (Fourcade, 2009; Fourcade-Gourinchas & 
Babb, 2002). Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that the ideas generated by economists do matter and 
have mattered. 
The third aspect of economics’ influence has been its role in shaping the ways topics are viewed 
and the ways that issues are approached. In the wake of increasing demand for economists post-World 
War II, a number of significant foundations, organisations, and government bodies adopted the 
assumption that economics offers a rigorous analysis of the social world and proceeded to introduce 
economic methods into policy analysis and recommendations. Methods and modes of analysis 
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originating in economics expanded across policymaking, from military strategy to public 
administration (Amadae, 2003; Amadae, 2015). Hirschman and Popp Berman use Ian Hacking (1992) 
to argue that economic methods and modes of analysis define a particular style of reasoning that: 
[I]ncludes basic concepts such as incentives, growth, efficiency and externalities. It includes 
economic ways of approaching problems: by using models, systematically weighing costs and 
benefits, analysing quantitative empirical data, considering incentives, and thinking 
marginally. It suggests causal policy stories… linked to economic theories… [and] makes 
certain methodological assumptions: about the importance of quantification and the possibility 
of using monetary value as a means of commensuration, for example. (Hirschman & Popp 
Berman, 2014, p. 794) 
Even if the idea that economics has a consistent or separate style of reasoning is rejected5, it is clear 
that aspects of economic thinking—from cost-benefit analysis, to econometrics, to the centrality of 
efficiency—are significantly prevalent in law, business, and policy schools (Lazear, 2000). This has 
resulted in a whole generation of policymakers, business managers, and lawyers leaning on the 
methods, theories, and tools developed in economics. 
In summary, economists have been and continue to be employed in numerous significant policy 
positions, with the institutional roles for them expanding since 1945; and, through the tools they 
create, the proliferation of their ideas, and an expansion of economic ways of approaching problems, 
economists recreate the world in their own image. These points can be summarised by saying that 
economics is powerful, and given that these points cannot be attributed to sociology, anthropology, or 
political science, more so than other social sciences. 
In contrast to this, many economists feel that their policy influence is limited. They point to events 
like Brexit or the pursuit of austerity throughout the European Union in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis, both things that economists almost unanimously advised against, as evidence that 
politicians and populations frequently reject their advice. Hirschman and Popp Berman (2014) argue 
that this contrast can be squared by close attention to the different mechanisms through which 
economics and economists can be influential. Economists that decry their lack of influence focus on 
different kinds of questions and situations to those that see unassailable dominance. It is undoubtedly 
true that economists are not always listened to and they might be particularly frustrated when giving 
specific policy recommendations. But they are often successful in gaining influence in situations that 
are not directly in the public eye, or in areas thought to be technical or ill-defined (for example, in 
situations of crisis and in framing issues early on in the policy process6). Moreover, their influence has 
been significant in defining the boundaries of topics, in creating tools for policy analysis, and in 
shaping the space of policy ideas. If their access to positions of power and standing within academic 
hierarchies are also considered (see chapter 7), it is hard to argue that economists are undervalued 
even though some significant pieces of their advice are rejected. 
                                                             
5 As those that argue that economics is more varied than critics give it credit for might do (Coyle, 2018; Oliver, 
2018; Smith, 2018). I will return to this in chapters 2 and 3. 
6 Examples of framing might include economists in government presenting an, as yet, undefined issue to 
politicians in terms of a cost-benefit calculation. 
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The powerful role economics plays in society makes the organisation of research in the discipline 
a critical case for philosophers of science interested in the social dimensions of science to study. Given 
economics’ societal significance, whether or not it is beholden to particular interests or adequately 
scrutinised are societally significant issues. The power economics wields amplifies and reinforces the 
three issues with the way that economic research is organised that I will point to later in this thesis—
gender imbalances, hierarchy, dismissive of outsiders. The significance of economics in policy 
making, for example, makes the poor representation of women within the discipline more problematic 
than it would be in other disciplines (see chapter 5). 
 
1.2 Pleas for pluralism in economics 
In part because of the role of economics in shaping many facets of political life, the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis was interpreted by many as a failure the discipline. The crisis resulted in a raft of 
public criticism of the research, teaching, and advice of economists. A common criticism from 
commentators in the United States and Europe has been that economics is insufficiently pluralist. In 
2014, the International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, for example, argued that: 
[The] lack of intellectual diversity [in economics] does not only restrain education and 
research. It limits our ability to contend with the multidimensional challenges of the 21st 
century. ... Pluralism will not only help to enrich teaching and research and reinvigorate the 
discipline. More than this, pluralism carries the promise of bringing economics back into the 
service of society. (International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, 2014) 
Despite the recent re-rise to prominence, calls for pluralism in economics are not actually new. 
The Foundation for European Economic Development, for example, funded the placement of “A Plea 
for a Pluralistic and Rigorous Economics” as a full-page advert in the American Economic Review 
back in 1992.7 Calls for pluralism are also not uniform. They have come from a variety of sources—
students (International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, 2014; Post-Crash Economics 
Society, 2014), policy makers (Haldane, 2015a; Haldane, 2015b), journalists (Elliott, 2017; Halligan, 
2013; Halligan, 2018), historians (Davis, 2014b; Morgan & Rutherford, 1998), and economists 
themselves (Chang, 2014; Foundation for European Economic Development, 1992; Netzwerk Plurale 
Ökonomik, 2016)—and they understand pluralism in a variety of ways. 
The post-2008 calls for pluralism have resulted in some changes.8 But many of the pluralists’ 
demands have been met with annoyance and rejected as misunderstood. Many economists have argued 
that their discipline already contains many different approaches, theories, and models (Coyle, 2018; 
Deaton, 2011; Rodrik, 2015). A cycle of claim and counter claim has played out in full public view 
                                                             
7 Also see Wade Hands (1997), who argues that calls for various forms of pluralism were frequent throughout 
the twentieth century. 
8 Take, for example, the development of a new ‘pluralistic’ ‘CORE’ undergraduate curriculum (Bowles, 2018). 
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through the pages of the Guardian, Financial Times, Economist, Telegraph, and New York Times.9 This 
debate shows no signs of closure, frustrating both critics and defenders of present practices. 
In this thesis I offer a way out of this debate by changing the focus of pluralism. Instead of 
interpreting pluralism as a particular state (a given arrangement of certain variables, which can be 
methods, theories, schools of thought, et cetera) for economics to attain I will use the arguments for 
pluralism to point to three concrete social issues in how economic research is organised. To understand 
the context of this argument I will use this section to outline the debate in economics. I will describe 
four arguments for pluralism in economics—those coming from Tony Lawson, Post Keynesian 
economists, Ha-Joon Chang, and student critics of economics. I will note the different aspects of 
economics they focus on, outline the fraught back and forth between critics and defenders of 
economics, and point to an impasse: how can what counts as sufficient pluralism in practice be 
judged? 
A number of critics have argued that the nature of economics’ subject matter makes pluralism 
necessary. Tony Lawson (1997; 2003), for example, has argued that mathematical modelling is 
inherently unsuitable for the social world because modelling requires a base of consistent event 
regularities (x reliably following y); regularities that he thinks are rare in the social world. According 
to Lawson, the social world contains multiple levels of analysis which each require different 
ontologies (understood as classifications of what exists) and different methodologies (none of which 
involve mathematical modelling). To study the social world, economics, thus, needs a pluralism of 
ontologies and methodologies. Lawson argues that the rejection of mathematical modelling is likely to 
lead to just such a state. This is because he thinks that it is adherence to mathematical modelling that 
restricts the levels of analysis that economics investigates. Once modelling is out the way economists 
will be freer to analyse features of the world that do not require the assumption of consistent event 
regularities (Lawson, 2009). 
A number of self-defined Post Keynesian economists have similarly argued that the nature of 
economics’ subject matter should imply pluralism. Philip Arestis (1996) and Sheila Dow (1990) have 
argued that the “economic system” is an intersection of multiple social systems, each with their own 
dynamics, and that our knowledge of it can only ever be incomplete and uncertain. The study of such a 
system, therefore, requires analysis using a variety of approaches.10 Rather than focussing on 
ontologies and methodologies, Post Keynesians typically couch this variety in terms of ‘schools of 
thought’—understood as a mixture of community association and shared theoretical, methodological, 
and ontological commitments. Historian and Post Keynesian Fred Lee (2009) has argued that Post 
Keynesianism’s own community makeup exhibits a good archetype for the required variety. Lee 
argues that, although it started as a set of theoretical commitments, Post Keynesian economics 
developed into a community of economists from a variety of organisations and social networks united 
by critical stances to what they saw as the dominant school of thought in economics: ‘neoclassical’ 
                                                             
9 See, for examples, Oliver (2018), Bowles (2018; 2016), Halligan (2013), and Elliott (2017). 
10 Norgaard (1989) also makes a similar argument. 
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economics.11 This led the Post Keynesian community to be populated by economists with different 
ideas—drawing from Keynesianism, but also from other areas like institutionalist economics—but 
overlapping topics of inquiry.12 Both Lee and Arestis (1996) argue that this mixed community 
composition has led to fruitful developments and lines of inquiry. Thus, because of the way that the 
economic system is and because variety can help develop research, economics should aim for a 
pluralism consisting of the interaction of multiple schools of thought. 
Ha-Joon Chang (2014) also argues for a pluralism of schools of thought. He starts by arguing that 
economics should be defined around the study of ‘the economy’. Unlike Lawson and the Post 
Keynesians, H.-J. Chang does not think that the dominant neoclassical school is fundamentally flawed, 
just that it is limited. Neoclassical tools cannot address all the important issues that arise in analysing 
the economy, and the same goes for other schools of thought. H.-J. Chang outlines nine important 
schools of economic thought and discusses the benefits they each bring to the analysis of the economy 
in different contexts.13 
[No school of thought] can claim superiority over others and still less a monopoly over 
truth.… All theories, including natural sciences like physics, necessarily involve abstraction 
and thus cannot capture every aspect of the complexity of the real world. This means that no 
theory is good at explaining everything. (Chang, 2014, p. 111) 
H.-J. Chang argues that epistemic limitations involved in studying humans and of studying a varied 
entity like ‘the economy’ mean that it makes sense to utilise multiple approaches. Economists and 
policy makers can never know which approach will produce the most effective interventions and 
different approaches are likely to suit different contexts. Thus, rather than running with any one school 
of thought, economists and policy makers should draw on a variety of schools, choosing between them 
in different contexts. For this to work the discipline of economics needs to keep a variety of schools 
actively alive and ready for use (rather than simply treating them as objects of historical study). 
Although this conclusion is similar to the Post Keynesians’, H.-J. Chang’s argument is subtly different 
to the two above. Rather than arguing that certain schools of thought are required for different levels 
of description, H.-J. Chang is simply arguing that it should not be assumed that any one school will be 
useful for all economic problems. His argument comes from the perspective of use rather than 
                                                             
11 Colander (2000) traces the term 'neoclassical economics' back to Thorstein Veblen (1900), who used it as a 
way of attacking Alfred Marshall's synthesis of the marginalism of Jevons and Menger with broader themes in 
classical economics (from Smith, Ricardo, and Mill). Hicks and Stigler extended the term neoclassical to include 
other marginalists (not just Marshall), resulting in it referring to a combination of marginal thinking, relative 
prices, and the use of calculus. But others have also used the term differently. John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
lumped the classicals into the neoclassical framework to contrast them with his own thinking. When parts of 
Keynes's own work were synthesised with marginalism, those parts became known as the neoclassical synthesis 
of Keynes, in contrast to the Keynesians who developed his work in a different way (eventually becoming the 
Post Keynesians). This brief history shows that the term neoclassical is difficult to pin down. For this reason, I 
will avoid the term except when referring to others that use it. In the case of the neoclassicism Post Keynesians 
marshal themselves against, there is not one clear definition. Hicks and Stigler’s understanding comes closest. 
12 Lee uses publication and professional membership patterns to support this claim by showing that Post 
Keynesian events and publications involve a number of economists that also self-identify with other non-
neoclassical schools of thought. See Lee (2009, pp. 91-95) for the details of this argument. 
13 H.-J. Chang’s nine schools are: Austrian, behavioural, classical, developmentalist, institutionalist, Keynesian, 
Marxist, neoclassical, and Schumperterian. 
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metaphysics. 
A similar pragmatic motivation is found in the arguments of university students, who have also 
taken a central role in debates about current practices in economics.14 On numerous occasions it has 
been student action and protest that has stimulated debate in newspaper comment pages. Despite 
differences between activist groups, the views of the student campaigns can be characterised. Student 
groups share the belief that economics degrees (both undergraduate and graduate, but with emphasis 
on the former) do not provide students with the tools they need to understand economic events (with 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis looming large). Student critics typically point to the large number of 
repetitive models they are taught during their degrees, the lack of problem directed education they 
receive, and the micro, macro, metrics-based focus of their education as the source of the problem. 
Student critics typically conclude that teaching in economics should be changed in four ways: to be 
more application focussed, to include more history of economic thought, to be more interdisciplinary, 
and to include a wider variety of schools of thought. They argue that these four changes would amount 
to a pluralism of pedagogy. 
Pluralism in economics has, thus, been argued for on the grounds that it offers the most suitable 
way to study economics given the nature of its subject matter (Lawson; Post Keynesians), and given 
the uncertainty and context dependence involved in the problems economics should be directed to 
solve (H.-J. Chang). It has been argued for as the most effective way to organise a community of 
inquirers (Post Keynesians). It has been argued for as a way of ensuring that economics provides the 
tools policy makers and students need to understand and intervene on economic processes (students; 
also see Turner, 2012). Finally, it has been argued that it is required to provide space for new forms of 
thinking (Lawson). These arguments have been used to prescribe pluralisms of ontologies and 
methodologies (Lawson); of schools of thought (interacting with each other—Post Keynesians; to 
draw on for problem solving—H.-J. Chang); and for pedagogy (students). 
Many of those that defend against the need for pluralism in economics have countered these 
arguments by listing the range of things that economists do. Tim Harford, for example, lists auction 
theory, externalities, national accounts, measurements of growth and inequality, field experiments for 
policy experimentation, and a number of other tools developed by economics that have been useful for 
policy (Oliver, 2018). Noah Smith (2017; 2018) makes a similar argument about the range within 
economics and also attacks the idea that economics fails to deal with the ‘real world’. He argues that 
empirical work in economics, like quasi-experimental work, is becoming more policy relevant and less 
reliant on unrealistic assumptions, and that work driven by real world data is becoming more 
                                                             
14 See the student-written reports from Manchester (Post-Crash Economics Society, 2014), Cambridge (full 
disclosure: I was one of the authors of this report, Cambridge Society for Economic Pluralism, 2014), and more 
recently Durham (Svenlén, Sargent, Tyler, & Pedersen, 2018) for examples of student positions. I focus on 
students in the United Kingdom, but student movements exist in other countries too (for examples, see the list of 
signatories on the open letter from the International Student Initiative for Pluralism in Economics, 2014). 
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common.15 Moreover, he argues that contemporary economists study a much wider variety of topics 
than their predecessors—“gender relations in the workplace, racial gaps, changes in labor contracts, 
early childhood education, minimum-wage policy, regional opportunity gaps, automation and the 
future of jobs, and a vast array of other highly important, immediately relevant topics” (Smith, 2018). 
Three points are implied by Smith’s and Harford’s arguments. The subject matter of economics is 
more varied than critics give it credit for. The domain economics seeks to understand may be 
complicated and difficult to get a handle on, but economists do, nonetheless, engage with it; they are 
not just the abstract model builders they are made out to be. And, by engaging with real world data 
economics has managed to devise useful and important interventions. If correct, these points 
undermine the pluralists’ arguments that the present practices in economics cannot deal with the 
complex nature of economics’ subject matter, and that economics does not provide the necessary tools 
to understand and intervene in the economic domain. 
Critics are, however, likely to dispute the significance of Harford’s and Smith’s lists. Such an 
argument might follow four lines. First, critics might argue that, although useful, the tools and 
techniques listed by Harford and Smith don’t provide what is required. None of the techniques, for 
example, explain the causes of financial crises or how their ills can be mitigated. Second, critics might 
argue that Harford’s and Smith’s lists only provide anecdotal evidence of what is going on in 
economics. The useful applied tools listed are not representative of what most economists do. Third, 
and relatedly, critics could argue that Harford’s and Smith’s lists neglect the counterfactual (to use a 
trope often heard in economics). Maybe economics has started to develop some useful tools, but it 
could be doing so much more if only it were more pluralist. Lastly, critics might accept Harford’s and 
Smith’s arguments but argue that they all come from a single approach to economics and that the other 
reasons pluralism is needed—as the right way to organise a community of inquirers, and to provide 
space for new thinking—are still valid.16 
Other defenders of economics have argued head on against the claim in this last response, 
assumed by most of the arguments for pluralism, that economics is dominated by a single approach. 
Diane Coyle (2018) makes just such an argument. Responding to a recent attack by Howard Reed 
(2018), Coyle rejects the idea that everything economists do is influenced by one theoretical 
framework—defined by Reed as the combination of individualism, profit maximisation, and 
rationality. She argues that economists employ all sorts of approaches to tackle all sorts of problems, 
many of which explicitly reject parts of the framework that Reed claims is dominant. As examples, 
Coyle lists work from complexity on environmentally beneficial innovation, and empirical work on 
how railroads affected the development of Indian districts.17 Coyle argues that things like complexity 
                                                             
15 The idea that economics was all theory and is now more empirical is common and backed up by some 
evidence (Hamermesh, 2013). Roger Backhouse and Beatrice Cherrier (2017) have, however, argued that this is 
more a question of significance than quantity. They argue that empirical economics gets more attention in the big 
journals now, but that there is no more of it overall. 
16 In addition to these four responses, critics might argue that the tools Harford and Smith list are not useful; 
maybe because they are mathematical models unsuited to examining the social world. Because such an argument 
leads directly to an almost impassable disagreement, I leave it to one side. 
17 Both of which reject the combination of individualism, profit maximisation, and rationality. 
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and empirical economics (as well as behavioural economics and game theory) have changed the 
discipline so that it already offers a variety of approaches that can be applied to a variety of problems 
and towards a variety of contextual and political goals. Thus, something like a pluralism of schools of 
thought, goals, ontologies, and methods already exists in economics. Coyle does accept that student 
pluralists may have a point that economics curriculums require change. But, she argues, there are 
changes afoot (see the ‘CORE’ curriculum cited above, Bowles, 2018), and it would be unfair to judge 
the research in economics based on the flaws in its textbooks. 
Critics might respond in three further ways. They might argue, first, that as with Harford’s and 
Smith’s lists, Coyle’s argument only provides anecdotal evidence. Second, they might add that even if 
economics is genuinely populated by a number of new approaches, this need not imply that the models 
common in economic textbooks do not continue to play a dominant role in the way economists think. 
Many empirical papers that defenders of economics point to, for example, contain important 
sections— normally the sections suggesting explanations for the results found—that draw on 
theoretical constructs from textbook models (utility maximisation, human capital, et cetera). 
Moreover, in 2005 David Colander found that 94% of (American) economics graduate students agreed 
that “the neoclassical assumption of rational behaviour” is important (2005, p. 188). Third, critics 
might argue that, although the new approaches listed by Coyle differ from the caricature of economics 
painted by Reed, they are just variations of what is still fundamentally a unitary approach. Esther-
Mirjam Sent (2004) argues, for example, that the behavioural economics that has been incorporated 
into economic practice is intentionally less threatening to textbook forms of economics than earlier 
iterations. She argues that the behavioural economics of recent Nobel prize winners Richard Thaler, 
Robert Shiller, and Daniel Kahneman always had ambitions to become part of the ‘mainstream’18, 
rather than offer a separate framework in the way that the behavioural economics of another Nobel 
prize winner, Herbert Simon, did. 
Coyle is likely to deny all three of these points, but it is not clear how to measure who is right. It is 
plausible that the education of economists does indeed impact how they interpret their empirical 
results, but Coyle might be correct that there is also a lot more to economics than what is in the 
textbooks. Very few people deny that the methods within economics have changed in the last thirty 
years, but it is not clear if this has led to a proliferation of genuinely new approaches, or the evolution 
of one dominant approach. We reach an impasse. How do we judge between a discipline containing 
some different methods and approaches within a unitary environment, and a discipline that exhibits a 
genuine plurality of different approaches? 
John B. Davis (2006) attempts to answer to this question. He argues that in the 1980s economics 
began importing a number of new ideas and techniques from neighbouring fields. Game theoretical, 
behavioural, and experimental approaches began to be used in economics (coming from mathematics, 
psychology, and the medical and biological sciences respectively). As the significance of these new 
                                                             
18 I borrow Sent’s terminology here. Throughout I interpret ‘mainstream’ to mean whatever is published in the 
top 20, and particularly the top 5, economics journals. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the importance of the top 
5 journals in economics. 
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approaches within economics gradually grew, they were also joined by ideas from Darwinian biology, 
neuroscience, and physics and computer science (leading to evolutionary economics, neuroeconomics, 
and complexity theory respectively). Davis argues that because these new approaches came from 
outside economics, they should be considered genuinely new and different to what was on offer in the 
1970s. This is because when things are imported from other fields, they are likely to come from 
conceptual and theoretical foundations different to those in the importing field. For the same reason, 
the imported ideas should also be considered genuinely different from each other. Davis adds that 
because these new approaches make up a significant portion of what recent cohorts to economics 
PhDs work on, economics looks to be developing in a pluralistic direction. 
However, the fact that ideas come from different fields is not sufficient to guarantee different 
theoretical and conceptual foundations for two reasons. First, different fields might use approaches 
that develop in parallel from similar foundations. It might be argued, for example, that game theoretic 
approaches have the same roots as the mathematics used in economics prior to the 1980s. Even though 
game theoretic scenarios differ from the scenarios of consumer choice, they both draw from 
mathematical theories of optimisation. Fixed point theorems (both Kakutani’s, 1941,  and Brouwer’s19) 
are, for example, an important component in the proofs of both game theoretical Nash equilibria 
(Nash, 1951; Nash, 1950) and the more traditional Arrow-Debreu models of general equilibria (Arrow 
& Debreu, 1954). A critic might thus argue that the uptake of game theory is an update to the basic 
mathematical optimisation tools used by economists, which allows them to analyse new scenarios, 
rather than a new approach. 
Second, even where ideas come from fields that have genuinely different foundations, the actual 
ideas imported might be selected to fit with the foundations of the importing field. Critics might note, 
for example, that the aspects of psychology used in behavioural economics are still fundamentally 
about the optimisation of individual choice (Colander, 2000, p. 356; Rabin, 2002). The possibility that 
selection bias plays a role in what gets imported is evidenced by what has not been imported. Other 
ways of doing economics that might offer more radical departures from economics as it was practiced 
in the 1970s—the schools of thought critics would like to see more of: Marxian economics, ecological 
economics, Post Keynesian economics, et cetera—are notably absent in the new developments Davis 
points to. Moreover, citation analysis shows that the highest ranked journals in economics largely 
ignore contributions from some of these other fields (Cronin, 2010; Kapeller, 2010; Dobusch & 
Kapeller, 2012). 
This debate could run and run. As Davis (2014a, p. 477) later points out, those that defend the 
ideal of pluralism and argue that economics does not live up to it typically want to see more 
‘heterodox’ schools of thought within economics, and those that either ignore pluralism or defend 
                                                             
19 Brouwer was not the only person to prove this theorem, but his name stuck. He first proved the theorem in 
German in Brouwer (1911). I first encountered it in Franklin (1980). 
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economics against it typically do so to secure the authority of mainstream theory.20 Those who are 
sympathetic to the current dominant methods of economics see it as pluralist enough, and those that 
are more critical of current practices typically see a lack of pluralism (Dutt, 2014). Thus, claims that 
economics is or is not pluralist seem to be driven as much by agenda as by clear principled 
differences. How should we judge who is correct; does economics need more pluralism or not? 
Independently of the debate in economics, pluralism has developed into a popular interpretation of 
and recommendation for all scientific practice. Historians and philosophers of science have responded 
to early and mid-twentieth century calls for unity in science by pointing to multiple ways in which 
science is inherently pluralist, and scientific pluralism has become a popular prescription for scientific 
practice. In chapters 2-4 I will attempt to make headway into the debate about pluralism in economics 
by using philosophical accounts of pluralism to tackle four key questions: [1] What does/should 
pluralism entail? [2] Why is pluralism desirable? [3] Is economics pluralist? And, [4] what should be 
inferred from pluralism for practice in economics?  
In chapter 2, I will answer [1] and [2] by explaining the different versions of scientific pluralism 
that philosophers have offered. I will categorise the plurality of pluralisms available using the 
variables they argue should be multiplied and the reasons they give for pluralism. In chapter 3, I will 
tackle [3]. I will argue that the range of variables that pluralism can focus on, and the fact that it is 
difficult to determine how much of each variable is required for pluralism and how much of each 
variable a discipline has in practice, makes it hard to answer [3] either way. This means that arguments 
that economics should be more pluralist, which typically claim that economic research does not match 
a particular arrangement of certain variables, are unlikely to convince those that think economics is 
pluralist enough and do not offer unambiguous recommendations for change. The indeterminacy of 
plural variables makes it hard to conclude the debate either way. 
 
1.3 Social epistemology 
Rather than comparing economics to states of pluralism I will evaluate some important existing social 
epistemic practices within economics. I understand social epistemic practices as the social 
arrangements and practices within a given scientific community that bear on knowledge acquisition, 
retention, assessment, and transmission.21 The social arrangements of a scientific community include 
the community makeup (who is involved) and institutional features of that community (how does one 
become a member, how is the community governed, et cetera). Examples of social arrangements are 
                                                             
20 Like ‘neoclassical’, ‘heterodox’ can be defined in many different ways. For this reason, I will avoid the term 
except where others use it. In this case, I take Davis to imply the schools of thought that have typically not been 
prominent in economics text books and the big economics journals. That is, Marxian, Post Keynesian, 
ecological, evolutionary, Austrian, Institutionalist, and Schumperterian schools of thought. 
21 This is based on Goldberg’s definition of social epistemology as “the study of the social dimensions of 
knowledge acquisition, retention, transmission, and assessment.” (Goldberg, 2018, p. 1) 
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the kinds of people that are members of an experimental laboratory and how decision-making 
capacities are distributed in such a lab. Social practices are the ways that the inputs from more than 
one individual are related to one another and combined. These include norms of interaction, forms of 
aggregation, and mechanisms for assessment. Put more generally, social epistemic practices can be 
any way of arranging interaction between one or more people that affects the knowledge they produce. 
Although I will argue that ideal accounts of pluralism cannot resolve the debate about pluralism in 
economics, pluralism can still be useful. There is a more concrete way to articulate many of the 
concerns that economic pluralists have. Instead of comparing economics to an ideal arrangement of 
certain variables, I will use social epistemic practices recommended by the reasons for pluralism to 
point to concrete issues in the way that economic research is currently organised. I make this argument 
in two steps. 
First, in chapter 4, I explain how the reasons for pluralism can be used to outline three heuristics 
for judging social epistemic practices. I use arguments that pluralism assuages some epistemic 
limitations involved in science to argue that social epistemic practices can be evaluated by looking out 
for ways that such practices block productive forms of feedback (H1). Feedback that can come in the 
form of empirical testing, practical applications, modelling, or social criticism, and which helps 
challenge, justify, and refine scientific knowledge and practices. I use arguments that pluralism is 
important to make scientific practice compatible with multiple goals to argue that social epistemic 
practices can be evaluated by looking out for ways that such practices block particular interests from 
being considered in decisions about which goals scientific communities should pursue (H2), and ways 
that such practices block public scrutiny of those decisions (H3). These heuristics are my answer to 
questions [4] from the last section (1.2). Rather than defining ideals, H1-H3 offer important 
considerations for evaluating existing social epistemic practices in economics. 
In chapters 5-7, I apply H1-H3 to a raft of empirical data social scientists have collected on how 
economic research is presently organised. This is my second step. In chapter 5, I will present evidence 
that economics has a very low ratio of women to men (particularly higher up the discipline) and that 
female economists face an adverse environment in the discipline. I argue that this blocks the feedback 
knowledge and practices undergo within economics, and that it also means that the interests of a 
particular segment of society (women) often fail to be considered in determining the direction of 
economics. 
In chapter 6, I use a range of evidence to argue that economics is overly hierarchical, and more so 
than other social sciences. I argue that the extent of the hierarchy in economics reduces avenues for 
critical feedback in the discipline by disincentivising innovation and communication with outsiders 
and causing a concentration of power that constrains the development of new ideas and criticism. It 
also disincentivises mechanisms that help make economic research consider a broad range of interests, 
and makes public scrutiny more difficult by constraining criticism, encouraging consensus, and 
disincentivising outside communication. 
Lastly, in chapter 7, I present evidence that economists form an in-group that assumes superiority, 
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forms barriers to the outside, and dismisses research and criticism from non-economists. This 
marginalises potential avenues for feedback, reduces the opportunities for those not well represented 
in economics to have their interests heard in the discipline, and makes public scrutiny of the discipline 
more difficult by lowering the prevalence of public debate. 
 
By shifting from pluralism as an ideal to the evaluation of existing social epistemic practices in 
economics my thesis highlights some of the issues that pluralists complain about (a lack of diversity, 
hierarchy, a lack of interdisciplinarity) without identifying an ideal way of organising economic 
research. By focussing on the reasons for pluralism and the social epistemic practices they 
recommend, rather than ideal pluralist states, my argument, thus, offers a new way of making progress 
in the debate about pluralism in economics. Moreover, by doing non-ideal normative analysis of 
existing social features of economic research as a whole, I offer a novel way to apply social 
epistemology to scientific practice. In doing so I speak to gaps in social epistemology, economics, and 
sociology, history, and philosophy of economics. I describe how below. 
Many social scientists have studied the social features of economic research. Those social 
scientists have, however, not discussed why the features they comment on are problematic. Normative 
commentary is either completely absent or the assumption is that what is described is obviously 
problematic.22 
Social epistemology does often do normative analysis. Social epistemologists have built 
sophisticated tools for investigating and evaluating the social features of knowledge and how social 
relations impact science. They, thus, seem well placed to comment on whether any social aspects of 
economic research ought to be changed. However, social epistemology has typically focussed on 
idealised models (Goldman, 2001a; Kitcher, 1993; Strevens, 2003; Zollman, 2007; Zollman, 2010) or 
ideal accounts (Kitcher, 2001; Kitcher, 2011; Wilholt, 2009) of how scientists interact, rather than 
starting from specific cases in which they do. 
Social epistemologists who use idealised models of interaction investigate different ways of 
organising scientific communities formally, usually using agent-based models drawing from game 
theory and network theory.23 There is a lot of interesting work in this area, and I draw on some of it in 
chapter 6. But, because formal models of scientific communities are difficult to apply to practice, I 
take a different approach.24 Rather than comparing different idealised community structures, I seek to 
do normative analysis of the existing features of economic research. 
                                                             
22 By invoking the word ‘normative’ I do not mean to contrast normative analysis with empirically founded 
(‘positive’) work. By ‘normative’ analysis I mean analysis that recommends particular norms or outcomes. Such 
analysis can be empirically grounded while also making claims about how research should be socially structured 
and why. 
23 Kevin Zollman’s (2007; 2010) work has been particularly significant in developing formal approaches to 
social epistemology. For other important formal studies, see Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks (2013), Holman 
and Bruner (2015), Rosenstock, Bruner, and O’Connor (2016), Rubin and O’Connor (2018), Thoma (2015), 
Bright, Malinsky, and Thompson (2015), and Bright (2017). 
24 The epistemic value of these formal models is also unclear (Frey & Šešelja, 2018). See also Alexandrova and 
Northcott (2013), Reiss (2012), and other critics of formal modelling in economics. 
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Social epistemologists who offer ideal accounts of scientific communities dictate ideal institutions 
or norms for interaction. Such accounts have similarities with what has become known as ideal 
political theory. By contrast, my aim is to suggest improvements to the present institutions and 
interactions in economics. My approach to social epistemology, therefore, mirrors that of non-ideal 
political theorists who focus on transitional improvements to present political circumstances, rather 
than theorising about perfect societal end-states.25 John Rawls (1999) argued that both transitional and 
end-states have a role to play in normative analysis, but that end-states must be first determined in 
order to identify transitional-states. For Rawls, non-ideal theory involves reasoning about how society 
should get to the end-states determined by ideal theory. Amartya Sen (2006), in contrast, rejects the 
priority of end-states. He argues that justice improvements from a given position can be determined 
independently of determining what counts as a perfect world—to know whether mountain X or Y is 
higher we do not need to know the height of the tallest mountain in the world. Furthermore, an end-
state could not guide evaluation of transitional-states without also defining a way of measuring how 
far potential transitional-states are from the ideal end-state. 
Sen thinks that political theorists should focus on determining transitional improvements to 
existing circumstances without worrying about optimum end points. Given that he is surely correct 
that ideal theory is neither necessary nor sufficient for non-ideal theory, and that many ideal theorists 
accept as much (Valentini, 2012), I side with Sen over Rawls, but with one caveat. The lack of 
necessity or sufficiency of ideal for non-ideal theory does not imply that thinking abstractly about 
ideal social arrangements is useless. The reasons for particular ideals highlight features of political 
systems that are desirable, which can then be used as heuristics for evaluating transitional-states. G. A. 
Cohen’s (2008; 2011) ideal discussions of justice might be used, for example, to say that other things 
being equal more equality (of opportunity, rights, income, or welfare) is a good thing. 
Thus, although my approach to social epistemology will mirror Sen’s non-ideal political theory, I 
will also utilise some of the arguments of those who develop social epistemic ideals (in particular 
those from Longino, 2002, and Kitcher, 2001) and arguments for pluralism (which might also be 
interpreted as a social epistemic ideal). I will draw on existing features of economic research and point 
out issues with and potential improvements to them, rather than ideals to aim at, but utilise the reasons 
that certain ideals seem desirable in doing so. 
Where social epistemologists do start from existing practices and relations, they typically draw on 
small examples of social interaction and case studies of particular disputes or developments. I strike 
out a different path. I will use ideas from social epistemology to comment on three features of 
economic research as a whole. That is, I will comment on three features of economic research that are 
visible in data on the discipline as a whole, rather than in small examples or studies of parts of the 
discipline. Economics has significant gender imbalances and offers an unfriendly environment for 
                                                             
25 In an overview, Laura Valentini (2012) notes two other interpretations of the ideal/non-ideal distinction: 
theorising about situations in which everybody fully complies with the demands of justice vs. theorising about 
situations in which they partially comply; and, theorising about ‘utopian’ accounts of justice vs. theorising about 
‘realistic’ accounts of justice. See Robeyns (2008) for another overview of the ideal vs. non-ideal debate. See 
Rawls (1971) and Cohen (2008) for two classic understandings of the value of ideal political theory. 
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women, is overly hierarchical, and is dismissive of outsiders. In chapters 5-7, I discuss each of these 
features in turn; I use data collected by sociologists, historians, and economists to describe them, and 
use my three heuristics (H1-H3) to explain why they are problematic. By describing why the specific 
gender imbalances, hierarchy, and dismissive attitude to outsiders exhibited in economics are 
problematic I link the empirical work of social scientists who study economics to theories in the 
philosophy of science and political philosophy and make it easier to see how these problems might be 
remedied. 
Despite intense debate among social scientists and those outside of academia, philosophers have 
been surprisingly mute on the societal and social features of economic research. Even those that work 
on the intersection of science and political considerations have largely ignored the issues thrown up by 
economics’ role in society, and have focussed on issues like climate change and genetics instead 
(Kitcher, 2001; Kitcher, 2011; Moore, 2017; Brown, 2009). Philosophers of science and economists 
who do provide normative analysis of economic research typically do not focus on the social features 
of economic research. Instead they focus on particular methods, assumptions, and measures used by 
economists. Luis Mireles-Flores’s (2018) recent overview of the literature in the philosophy of 
economics, for example, points to three main areas of research: modelling and explanation, causal 
inference and evidence, behavioural economics. Descriptions of and arguments about the discipline-
wide social determinants of economic knowledge—be they the social make up of economics' 
professional groups or the role economists play in politics—do not feature. This is a mistake. 
Sociologists, historians, and economists have mapped out interesting social features of economic 
research. These are features that philosophers should pay attention to because they affect issues 
philosophers typically care about: political representation, injustice, scientific progress, bias, trust, 
corroboration and empirical testing, and objectivity, to name just a few. Moreover, the power 
economics wields makes the discipline’s effect on these issues highly consequential. 
Thus, by focussing on non-ideal normative analysis of existing social features of economic 
research as a whole, this dissertation speaks to gaps in social epistemology, economics, and the 
sociology, history, and philosophy of economics. It supplements the important work of social scientists 
working on the role of economics in society by providing normative analysis of their findings. By 
developing tools to discuss discipline-wide social features of actual research communities rather than 
ideal, idealised, or small-scale cases, this dissertation offers a new way for doing social epistemology 
and provides an example of how that might be applied to scientific practice. Moreover, it adds an 
important case (economics) that is understudied by social epistemologists. Lastly, by focussing on the 
social determinants of economic work it also adds a new dimension to work in the philosophy of 
economics. 
Although this argument breaks new ground in social epistemology, economics, and the sociology, 
history, and philosophy of economics, there are two important things I will not do. First, limitations of 
space mean that I cannot comment on all important social aspects of economic research in detail. In 
highlighting gender imbalances, hierarchy, and a dismissive attitude to outsiders I have inevitably left 
other issues out. I will not discuss, for example, the facts that economics has been largely anglophone, 
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that it has often focussed on the west, or that its practitioners are predominantly white. I will also not 
discuss the structure of graduate education (except a few aspects that are relevant for my discussion of 
hierarchy) or research funding. I focus on the three issues that I do at the expense of other possibilities 
for four reasons. Firstly, there is more useful data available regarding these issues. There is much more 
data on male-female disparities than on the lack of racial diversity in economics, for example. 
Secondly, the three issues I focus on have begun to attract attention, both publicly and within 
economics. Although there is a growing awareness of their significance, thus far nobody has sought to 
bring the data available together, synthesise it and draw out concrete normative implications. Thirdly, 
the three issues I have chosen to focus on nicely balance three different kinds of social epistemic 
questions: Who is in economics? How are the social relations within economics structured? And, how 
do economists relate to outsiders? This allows me to talk about a range of topics that might be relevant 
to other features of the way that economic research is organised, while focussing on three concrete 
issues. This means that, fourthly, despite only analysing three issues, I provide a model for how we 
might also study other social features of economic research. Although what I will say is specific to the 
issues I focus on, some of the arguments I pursue can apply to others as well. For instance, the 
arguments I make about the importance of gender diversity can in part be applied to issues 
surrounding race and diversity in general. 
Second, although my reorientation from pluralist ideals to concrete social epistemic issues is 
designed to make the debate about how economic research is organised more practically relevant, my 
main focus will be on identifying and explaining the problems. This does not, however, detract from 
my goal of being practically relevant for two reasons. Firstly, by identifying concrete issues, rather 
than an ideal for economics to match, my argument gets much closer to solutions than those that argue 
that economics is insufficiently pluralist. It does not map out a complete path of change but offers an 
important reorientation that opens up avenues for other work to do so. Secondly, for many of the 
specific features of economics that contribute to the three issues I comment on the solution is fairly 
easy: stop it. In highlighting the hierarchy in economics, for example, I will point out that 71 percent 
of those in governing positions of the American Economic Association got their PhDs from just four 
universities. One way to alleviate the economics’ hierarchy would simply be to ensure its governing 
body comes from a more diverse background.26 
 
1.4 Overview of the thesis 
I will start from pluralism. As noted in 1.2, four questions remain open in the debate about pluralism in 
economics: [1] what does/should pluralism entail? [2] Why is pluralism desirable? [3] Is economics 
pluralist? And, [4] what should be inferred from pluralism for practice in economics? I will use the 
philosophical accounts of pluralism to answer these questions. In chapter 2, I will outline the range of 
                                                             
26 For instance, by creating posts that are only open to those not currently well represented. 
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answers to questions [1] and [2] by noting the different variables that can be targeted by pluralism and 
the different reasons for pluralism. 
I will tackle [3] in chapter 3. I will argue that the range of potential plural variables and the range 
of ways that those variables can be interpreted in practice makes it difficult to determine whether 
economics should count as pluralist or not. The philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism do not 
offer easily applicable states with which to compare economics. This means that arguments for 
pluralism are unlikely to convince those that think economics is currently pluralist enough and that 
they do not offer unambiguous recommendations for change.  
This does not mean, however, that philosophical accounts of pluralism are useless. In chapter 4, I 
use the arguments for scientific pluralism to suggest three heuristics for assessing the social epistemic 
practices in economics. Social epistemic practices can be evaluated by H1: looking for blocks to 
productive forms of feedback; H2: looking for blocks to certain kinds of interests being considered in 
decisions about which goals scientific communities should pursue; and, H3: looking for blocks to 
avenues for public scrutiny. 
In chapters 5-7 I will turn these heuristics towards present practices in economics. I use data to 
describe three issues and use my heuristics to explain why they are problematic: [a] gender imbalances 
and an adverse environment for women in economics limit critical feedback and block the uptake of 
female interests in the discipline. [b] A steep hierarchy within economics creates perverse incentives 
and a concentration of power that limits critical feedback and the uptake of marginalised interests in 
economics, as well as constraining the potential for public scrutiny of the discipline. [c] Economists 
form an in-group that is dismissive of outsiders, which also reduces the amount of feedback economic 
ideas are exposed to and diminishes space for public scrutiny of and for a range of interests to be heard 
in the discipline. 
I conclude that economics would be more progressive, representative of the interests of those in 
society, accepted, and legitimate, and less likely to fall into bias if it alleviated its gender imbalances, 
flattened its hierarchy, and developed a healthier relationship with outsiders. 
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2 A plurality of pluralisms 
Pluralism is very much in vogue in the philosophy of science.27 This is a remarkable turnaround 
considering that until the middle of the twentieth century unity was the dominant recommendation for 
science. The idea that science should be unified has a long history that runs at least from pre-Socratic 
Greece through Galileo, Descartes, Newton, Kant, and the early twentieth century logical positivists—
who called for the “unity of science without metaphysics” (Cat, 2017). In the middle of the twentieth 
century philosophical attempts to unify the logic, methods, and concepts of the sciences were 
common. Mid-century advocates of the unity of science sought to determine the methods of causal 
inference and mode of explanation for science, and one set of concepts, kinds, and laws for which all 
others in science could be derived.28 But in the middle of the twentieth century a number of currents 
also began to push against the idea that the sciences should aim for unity.29 In part inspired by Pierre 
Duhem, Gaston Bachelard, and later Thomas Kuhn, a movement away from universalism and 
uniformity and towards pluralism and disunity began. A collection of scholars affiliated with Stanford 
University between (roughly) the 1970s and 90s played a particularly significant role in this 
movement—what has become known as the Stanford School included Patrick Suppes, Ian Hacking, 
Peter Galison, Nancy Cartwright, John Dupré, and Hasok Chang. Under the auspices of scientific 
pluralism, philosophers have argued that the nature of the world is such that it cannot be characterised 
by any singular set of kinds30 (Dupré, 1993); that scientific laws are not universal (Cartwright, 1983; 
Cartwright, 1999); that the language of physics cannot be used to explain all features of the world 
(Fodor, 1974); that pragmatic interests play a role in determining scientific representations (Longino, 
2002; Kellert, Longino, & Waters, 2006; Kitcher, 2001); and, that maintaining different incompatible 
approaches to a science can be fruitful regardless of the aims of that science (Chang, 2012).  
In chapter 1, I noted four key questions that need to be answered to progress the debate about 
pluralism in economics: 
1. (1) What does/should pluralism entail? 
2. (2) Why is pluralism desirable? 
                                                             
27 A number of philosophers have suggested that pluralism is now the consensus view (Mitchell, 2003, p. 180; 
Brigandt, 2010, p. 296). While this may be an overstatement, the number of philosophers that accept some form 
of scientific pluralism is much higher than it was and continues to rise fast (particularly amongst more junior 
philosophers). 
28 For a famous example, see Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). 
29 In reality the unity-of-science movement contained many different ideas, some of which are compatible with 
contemporary accounts of scientific pluralism (Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, & Uebel, 2008; Cat, Cartwright, & 
Chang, 1996; Ruphy, 2017). Nonetheless, there has at least been a shift of sentiment from the idea that science 
can and should be unified in some way to exploring the ways that it is and should be characterised by pluralism. 
30 This is against the thesis that there is one single correct way of categorising the world, determined by the way 
the world is (rather than, for example, the pragmatic goals or epistemic limitations of investigators). The idea 
that there is one set of ‘natural’ kinds is commonly thought to originate in Plato who has Socrates, in discussion 
with Phaedrus, suggest a process of “dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are” (Phaedrus 
265e in Plato, 1925). 
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3. (3) Is economics pluralist? 
4. (4) What should be inferred from pluralism for practice in economics?  
In this chapter, I will use philosophical accounts of scientific pluralism to begin to answer these 
questions. In 2.1, I will detail some of the most popular forms of scientific pluralism to show that [1] 
pluralism can entail a variety of things, and [2] is desirable for a variety of reasons.31 To explain [1] 
what pluralism entails, and to later answer [3] whether an economics is pluralist or not (tackled in 
chapter 3), it will be helpful to distinguish accounts of pluralism based on the variables they focus on. 
The variables of pluralism can include: the presuppositions scientists make; the abstract and concrete 
goals of science; the products of science (explanations, models, representations); the methods, 
epistemic standards, and forms of explanation scientists use; and, compounds of all these things. To 
understand [2] why pluralism is desirable and to later explain [4] what can be recommended for 
economics from pluralism (tackled in chapter 4), it will be helpful to categorise the reasons for 
pluralism into three types: because of the way the world is, because of the epistemic limitations 
involved in doing science, and because science is and/or should be used towards variety of ends. In 
2.2, I will summarise the different plural variables and kinds of reasons for pluralism available. 
In chapters 3 and 4 I will use the distinctions drawn in this chapter to answer questions [3] and [4]. 
Although I will argue that scientific pluralism does not offer an easy answer to [3], my description of 
the plurality of pluralisms available is helpful for two reasons. Firstly, it highlights that disagreement 
about what should count as pluralism is not confined to economics and clarifies that the stalemate 
outlined in chapter 1 is in part caused by disagreement over the variables for pluralism and their 
boundaries. Secondly, highlighting the reasons why pluralism is desirable informs my discussion of 
transitional improvements in the social epistemic practices in economics, in the same way that ideal 
might aid non-ideal political theory. Even in the face of disagreement about what should count as 
pluralism in economics, the reasons given for scientific pluralism can help articulate concrete lessons 
for change. 
 
2.1 What does pluralism entail? Why pluralism? 
In this section I outline versions of pluralism that are: anti-reductive, metaphysical, based on the 
representations of science, and aimed at more general ways of grouping scientific practices (systems 
of practice). In describing each account, I will draw attention to their reasons for pluralism and their 
plural variables—the things that they argue should be plural rather than singular. 
                                                             
31 It has been suggested that there are as many pluralisms as there are pluralists (Chang, 2012, p. 268). My 
sample was selected with three things in mind: trying to represent the range of different accounts available (in 
particular, the range of plural variables and reasons for pluralism), trying to select the most popular accounts, 
and the accounts that seem the most applicable to economics. This means I will not provide a complete review of 
all the accounts of pluralism and I will leave out some popular ones. See Galison and Stump (1996), Feyerabend 
(1975), Giere (2006), and Ruphy (2017) for some accounts of pluralism missing here. 
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2.1.1 Resisting reductionism 
The idea that scientists should attempt to unite their languages, explanations, theories, and/or units of 
analysis has long been a goal of unity of science movements (Cat, 2017). Where this has meant 
professing the superiority of smaller units of analysis (the language of physics, for example), or 
converting propositions in terms of larger units into propositions in terms of smaller units, this has 
been labelled ‘reductionism’. In the second half of the twentieth century reductionism sustained a 
number of prominent attacks. 
Two forms of anti-reductionist arguments have been offered: local and global. Global anti-
reductionists make general arguments that certain kinds of reduction (translations from larger to 
smaller units) are inherently problematic and will always be so (Fodor, 1974; Jackson & Pettit, 1992). 
By contrast, local anti-reductionist arguments focus on particular reductions and articulate context 
specific reasons to believe that they are problematic (Sober, 1999). I focus on global anti-reductionist 
arguments, because it is these that give rise to accounts of pluralism (Ruphy, 2017). 
Jerry Fodor (1974) and Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1992) have both offered what have 
become canonical global anti-reductive arguments.32 Both arguments utilise a similar logic. First, they 
offer examples in which translating scientific propositions into smaller from larger units of analysis 
(moving from chemical to physical generalisations, for example) results in some epistemically 
significant loss. Second, they offer reasons for believing that such losses are not contingent on their 
examples, but are always likely to occur. 
Jackson and Pettit (1992) argue against preferences for explanations of phenomena in terms of 
physically smaller variables over larger ones (micro over macro variables). Such preferences seem to 
be justified by ‘causal fundamentalism’—the idea that causal processes act on different levels of 
description, but that the causal processes of some levels (dubbed the higher levels) are dependent on 
the causal processes of others (dubbed the lower levels). In this vein, Jon Elster (1985) argues that 
because the world is governed by local causality, our explanations of particular phenomena should 
strive to identify the mechanisms that account for that local causality. Jackson and Pettit endorse 
casual fundamentalism. But, although they think that a preference for explanations in terms of small 
variables implies causal fundamentalism—if there were higher level causal relations that are not also 
present in lower levels moving from larger to smaller variables would leave out something about the 
structure of causality—they deny that the implication goes both ways. Jackson and Pettit agree that 
there are circumstances in which macro-level explanations should be abandoned for micro-level ones. 
If a macro level explanation fails to “offer any distinctive information on the causal history of the 
thing to be explained” (1992, p. 10) over and above that offered by a micro level explanation, then the 
                                                             
32 Although most accounts of pluralism assume or argue for some form of anti-reductionism, I isolate Fodor’s 
and Jackson and Pettit’s arguments in this subsection because reductionism is all they focus on. Their accounts 
only imply a plurality of levels of description and not of representations on different levels or of other potential 
plural variables. Although Fodor and Jackson and Pettit are not the only philosophers who focus on anti-
reductionism, I focus on them because they are fairly representative of a wider literature, canonical, and utilise 
examples from the social sciences. 
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micro level explanation should be preferred. But they deny that this must always be the case. 
Jackson and Pettit argue that explanations are valuable where they provide information about 
relevant factors in the causal history of the explanandum, defined as factors that would have led to 
alternate outcomes if changed. Crucially, Jackson and Pettit then argue that there is a relevant kind of 
causal history information that macro level explanations can provide that is often missing from micro 
level explanations. They claim that micro explanations do better at providing contrastive 
information—information about how the actual world differs from other possible worlds—but that 
macro explanations do better at providing comparative information—information about how the actual 
world relates to other possible worlds. An explanation of a flask containing boiling water cracking in 
terms of individual molecules, for example, gives useful contrastive information: the flask breaks 
under the impact of a particular molecule rather than another. An explanation of the same event in 
terms of the fact that the water was boiling, provides useful comparative information, it teaches us that 
“in more or less all possible worlds where the relevant causal process is characterised by involving 
boiling water, the process will lead to the flask cracking” (Jackson & Pettit, 1992, p. 15). Because 
macro level comparative information can pick out relevant factors in the causal history of an 
explanandum that is lost when opting for more micro explanations, the assumption that lower level 
explanations always give more or better information than higher level explanations is false. 
Fodor (1974) argues, similarly, that something important is lost in reductions from higher to lower 
levels. Instead of explanations, Fodor focusses on theories and laws. He defines reductionism as the 
thesis that the antecedents and consequents of the laws of the ‘special sciences’ can be reduced to 
physical predicates that admit the same lawfulness. That means that if [A1 => A2] is a special science 
law, then there must exist some physical predicates B1 and B2 such that [B1 => B2] is a law in 
physics and some bridge principles that connect A1 to B1 and A2 to B2. Fodor suggests that many 
philosophers are drawn to reductionism because they assume it necessary to support the ‘generality of 
physics’—“the view that all events which fall under the laws of any science are physical events and 
hence fall under the laws of physics” (1974, p. 97). He thinks that this assumption is a mistake. 
Fodor argues that ‘token physicalism’—a position that asserts that every event that the sciences 
talk about is identical to a physical event, but that the properties in scientific laws and theories need 
not be identical to physical properties—is enough to support the generality of physics, without 
implying that all theories reduce to physical theories. Fodor argues that to go further than token 
physicalism and insist on the reduction of the theories and laws of the special sciences to physical 
theories and laws would imply that every special science natural kind must be identical to, or co-
extensive with, a physical natural kind. This is because Fodor thinks that natural kinds must be defined 
as predicates “whose terms are the bound variables in its [science’s] proper laws” (1974, p. 102), and 
if reductionism were true then every law would be identical to, or co-extensive with, a physical law. 
He goes on to argue that such a conclusion is undesirable because it creates too strong a constraint on 
special science kinds: 
(a) interesting generalizations (e.g., counter-factual supporting generalizations) can often be 
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made about events whose physical descriptions have nothing in common, (b) it is often the 
case that whether the physical descriptions of the events subsumed by these generalizations 
have anything in common is, in an obvious sense, entirely irrelevant to the truth of the 
generalizations, or to their interestingness, or to their degree of confirmation or, indeed, to any 
of their epistemologically important properties, and (c) the special sciences are very much in 
the business of making generalizations of this kind. (1974, p. 103) 
He suggests Gresham’s law—if there are two types of money in an economy that count as legal tender 
with one intrinsically more valuable than the other, then the more intrinsically valuable money will fall 
out of circulation as people save it and use the ‘bad’ money instead—as an example: 
The point is that monetary exchanges have interesting things in common; Gresham's law, if 
true, says what one of these interesting things is. But what is interesting about monetary 
exchanges is surely not their commonalities under physical description. (1974, pp. 103-104) 
He admits that some generalisations of the special sciences might eventually be matched to co-
extensive predicates in physics but doubts whether those physical predicates will amount to anything 
more than brute enumeration. Even if the set of physical events identical to the events in a special 
science generalisation can be listed (given an infinite amount of time) that list is unlikely to amount to 
anything more than a list. It is unlikely to be a natural kind itself, and unlikely to admit a physical law. 
Both Fodor and Jackson and Pettit, thus, conclude that reductionism is unnecessary and results in 
the loss of something important. For Jackson and Pettit, explanations that focus on different levels of 
detail may be interesting in different ways. Social explanations in terms of individuals should, for 
example, be seen as complements to, rather than replacements for, explanations in terms of social 
structures. For Fodor, interesting generalisations can emerge in the languages of different sciences and 
should not be constrained by generalisations in the language of physics. Both of these arguments 
amount to kinds of pluralism. Although their precise focus differs, Jackson and Pettit’s and Fodor’s 
anti-reductive arguments both argue that the sciences should retain multiple levels of analysis 
(different scales on which events can be explained for Jackson and Pettit, and different scientific 
languages that can be used to describe laws for Fodor). Within this are both pragmatic and 
metaphysical reasons for pluralism. Jackson and Pettit emphasise the contextual component in 
explanation: multiple levels are important because the sciences explain different kinds of events and 
different kinds of explanations can be used towards different kinds of ends. Both arguments also lean 
on metaphysical arguments for pluralism. The losses that occur in reductions are not contingent. They 
do not depend on the current organisation of science or on the epistemic limitations of investigators 
but are the result of how the world is organised. 
[W]hereas the higher level explanations do better in providing comparative information, the 
lower level ones do better in providing information of a contrastive kind. (Jackson & Pettit, 
1992, p. 16) 
[T]here are special sciences not because of the nature of our epistemic relation to the world, 
but because of the way the world is put together: not all kinds . . . are, or correspond to, 
physical kinds. (Fodor, 1974, p. 113) 
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The way the world is organised is such that the sciences should use multiple levels of analysis. These 
two arguments, thus, give us our first possible plural variable—levels of analysis—and first two kinds 
of reasons for pluralism—to satisfy different goals and because of the way the world is. 
 
2.1.2 Stanford disunity 
Despite implying a plurality of levels of analysis, the anti-reductionisms of Fodor and Jackson and 
Pettit are compatible with many aspects of the unity of science movement. By endorsing causal 
fundamentalism and token physicalism, Jackson and Pettit and Fodor assert the priority of physical 
properties, objects, and processes. Moreover, both of their anti-reductionisms are compatible with 
there being a correct way to divide up each level of analysis into kinds and with the existence of a 
single ordered set of laws governing the kinds of each level. Two members of the Stanford School, 
Cartwright and Dupré, deny both of these possibilities and argue against reductionism as part of wider 
ranging attacks on the unity of science.33 
Dupré argues that ‘compositional materialism’—the thesis that all things are made of physical 
entities—need not imply that physical entities (objects and processes) are is some way existentially 
prior to entities on other levels of analysis (cells, people, et cetera). He argues that if ontology were 
just a list of the contents of space and time, then compositional materialism would imply that ontology 
is just a list of physical entities. The problem is this would leave out: “what can be said about what 
exists…, facts such as a certain set of physical entities constitutes a leaf. … [I]f that is all there is to 
ontology, then there is a great deal more than ontology to metaphysics” (Dupré, 1993, p. 94). If, 
alternatively, we follow W. V. Quine (1960) and think of ontology as the entities needed to explain 
events, then compositional materialism would have to be combined with a form of reductionism for 
the propositions of science to assert that only physical things exist. Dupré rejects this possibility for 
similar reasons to Fodor. In addition to noting the interdependence of entities on different levels of 
analysis, he argues that the bridge laws that (he thinks) propositional reductionism requires would 
define necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership and so imply a form of 
‘essentialism’—the idea that over and above facts that refer to individual objects in the world there 
exists facts about the kind of thing each object is. He argues against essentialism by drawing on cases 
from biology. 
Dupré argues, for example, that species concepts fail to result in adequate essentialist kinds. He 
endorses Philip Kitcher’s (1984; 1989) argument that the ‘biological species concept’—a principle that 
classifies species as groups of freely interbreeding organisms that are reproductively isolated from 
other groups (Mayr, 1942)—is useful for some biological research, but because it is difficult to 
characterise a group without already assuming some kind of species concept and to draw clearly 
defined reproductively isolated species, is not useful for all. Botanists who deal with asexually 
                                                             
33 See Cat (2017) for some discussion of the ‘Stanford School’, and see the program of a 2013 conference 
celebrating the school for some of the people and work associated with it (Winther, 2013). I focus on Dupré and 
Cartwright in this subsection as they offer distinctly metaphysical accounts of pluralism. Others associated with 
the Stanford School will be discussed in the context of other forms of pluralism. 
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reproducing plants, for example, don’t find the biological species concept particularly useful and 
normally refer to morphological characteristics to determine species. Dupré adds that hybridisation 
makes it impossible to ground essentialist categories in terms of the biological species concept 
because it results in some individuals not being assigned to any species and in reproductive links 
across different species. After adding similar arguments against deriving essentialist categories from 
morphological and phylogenetic species concepts, Dupré asserts that: 
[T]here is no metaphysical guarantee that whatever accounts for the coherence of species and 
their distinction… from other species will be the same for all living things. (Dupré, 1993, p. 
51) 
Generalising from this and other examples, Dupré concludes that even where natural processes give 
rise to kinds, they provide no basis for non-arbitrarily picking out particular properties as essential to 
the resulting kinds. 
Dupré argues that if essentialism is wrong then there can be no bridge laws for propositional 
reductionism, and consequently that compositional materialism need not imply the ontological priority 
of physical entities. Cartwright reaches a similar conclusion via a different route. She argues that the 
common intuition that the category of properties studied by physics is in some sense complete leads 
many to infer that all other (macro) properties in the world either reduce to physical properties or 
come out of nowhere. She argues, however, that the completeness of physics only makes sense as a set 
of properties that are predictively closed, and that predictive closure among a set of properties need 
not imply that those properties describe everything there is. There are plenty of macro properties that 
“have been here in the world all along, standing right beside the properties of microphysics” 
(Cartwright, 1999, p. 33). We interact with such properties all the time. Just because they do not seem 
to be a result of a set of properties that together are predictively closed, does not mean that we are 
mistaken in thinking that they exist. 
Cartwright argues, similarly, that there are no laws with universal applicability. The laws that seem 
good candidates for universal coverage—the laws of classical mechanics for example—are in fact true 
of only a very limited set of circumstances. Circumstances in which the causal processes mentioned in 
the law are the only ones active. Such circumstances can arise from highly controlled environments, 
like experiments, but are not generally the case. Most real-life situations involve combinations of 
causes that laws treat separately (if at all). Where multiple causes covered by different laws interact 
together none of the laws involved typically describe what happens. Cartwright gives the example of a 
one-thousand-dollar bill swept away by the wind to illustrate her point.34 Classical mechanics can only 
offer a partial model of this situation. A defender of the universal applicability of laws may argue that 
the flight the bill takes can in principle be modelled using the laws of classical mechanics when an 
adequate (and complicated) model of motion due to wind is added. But Cartwright points out that the 
success of classical mechanics in more circumscribed situations does not support such an argument. 
There are likely to be many causal factors involved and interacting in ways not predicted by classical 
                                                             
34 This example is borrowed from Otto Neurath (1933). 
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mechanics and the assumption that the laws of classical mechanics can be incorporated into a bigger 
covering law including them all is just that, an assumption. If a particular kind of situation is important 
it may be studied in detail (as fluid dynamics is), but this will likely develop its own more detailed and 
local understandings of the causes involved that depart in some way from the laws of classical 
mechanics. 
By rejecting the universality of fundamental laws, Cartwright rejects what she calls ‘cross-wise’ 
reductionism as well as downward reductions (that she rejects by rejecting the idea that physical 
properties can describe all there is). What she means by this is that even on a given level of analysis, 
causal processes are not arranged in a nice ordered way or covered by universal laws. She thinks that 
the sciences provide lots of important and highly specific knowledge of the workings of particular 
systems (one example she gives is the behaviour of Superconducting Quantum Interference Devices), 
but that such knowledge is limited to specific domains. Although such knowledge might occasionally 
be said to define local laws, there are lots of phenomena that can be explained and understood without 
being covered by laws. This includes knowledge of highly specific circumstances that combine causal 
processes on many levels of analysis. The picture of the world that emerges from Cartwright’s 
argument is of a contingent patchwork of local laws and causal processes. This amounts to a rejection 
of the unity of science idea that the world consists in a pyramid of clearly defined levels with 
regulating laws. 
In addition to rejecting reductionism and essentialism, Dupré also adopts a disunified image of 
causal processes and our knowledge of them by rejecting what he calls ‘determinism’—the idea that 
all states of the world are necessitated by previous states. He argues that the determination of a state of 
the world from a previous state would require at least one level of analysis to be causally complete, 
otherwise all of the parts of the two states could not be linked. Moreover, he thinks that the causal 
closure of some level would necessitate reductionism. This is because if a particular level was causally 
complete nothing at higher levels would be required to bring about changes of things at that level. The 
movements of electrons in an individual’s thumb, for example, would be completely determined by 
causes at the level of atoms. This would mean that everything could be explained by micro level 
events. But since reductionism is false, according to Dupré, there cannot be any causally complete 
level of analysis. (The proposition [causal closure => reductionism] is equivalent to [not reductionism 
=> not causal closure], so [not reductionism] implies [not causal closure].) Dupré concludes that 
determinism must also be false. 
Both Cartwright and Dupré take their disunified metaphysical pictures to imply forms of 
pluralism. Dupré argues that his rejection of essentialism implies a pluralism of kinds; that his 
rejection of reductionism implies a pluralism of levels of analysis, both for propositions and in terms 
of existential priority; and, that the combination of anti-determinism, anti-essentialism, and anti-
reductionism necessitates a pluralism of ways of practicing science. Cartwright argues that the 
contingent nature of laws and the patchwork coverage of causal processes means that the world is 
“dappled”. It is made up of different things on different levels, with different natures, behaving in 
different ways. This suggests a metaphysical pluralism of kinds and levels of analysis similar to Dupré, 
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and also a plurality of causal processes. In part because of this picture of multiple overlapping causal 
processes, Cartwright points out that where science offers abstract theoretical models it offers variety. 
This amounts to a pluralism of theoretical models that focus on different causal factors and that can be 
applied to different situations and combined in different ways, with no single model or way of 
combining models serving all purposes and circumstances. Moreover, she argues that because most 
actual circumstances do not fall under the precise concepts of scientific theories, scientists do not 
normally deduce manipulations of the world from theory. More often they combine theoretical 
knowledge with technical knowhow of the local situation they focus on (which is not normally 
completely coded into theoretical models). She argues that the mix of causal processes, local technical 
knowledge, and theoretical models involved in science means that what counts as a causal relation 
also likely varies, with causal relations in different domains requiring careful and local skill to tease 
out and test. This implies a pluralism of causal inference for the practice of science. 
Together Cartwright and Dupré’s arguments, thus, give us five new potential plural variables: 
kinds, ways of practicing science, causal processes, models, and causal inferences. Like the anti-
reductionist arguments outlined in 2.1.1, pragmatic considerations play a role in both Cartwright’s and 
Dupré’s arguments. But their main focus is metaphysics. The practices, categorisations, theories, and 
applications of physics, economics, and biology provide evidence of metaphysical disunity. The 
resulting set of pluralisms is not a consequence of cognitive limitations on the part of scientists, it is 
the result of how the world is; it is a result of “the disorder of things” (1993) and the fact that the world 
is “deeply dappled” (Cartwright, 1999, p. 59). 
 
2.1.3 Maps and models 
In a similar fashion to Cartwright, Sandra Mitchell (2003; 2002a) argues that the complexity of the 
world necessitates that scientific theories and models of it must be partial. She argues that models 
capture particular causal processes and abstract from others. Different models capture different causal 
processes, and none are strictly true because no (or very few) circumstances exist in which the casual 
processes models identify are the only ones present. Explanations of particular scenarios require the 
integration of these different partial models. How they are integrated depends on the ends of the 
particular explanation (what is already known, what the explanation is to be used for). The facts that 
integrations occur to explain particular phenomena and that those integrations depend on pragmatic 
interests imply that there is no one way to integrate models for all uses. The plurality of models cannot 
be synthesised into one. 
Mitchell, thus, argues for a pluralism of models as the result of a combination of the way the world 
is (complex) and the idealised character of modelling. Mitchell thinks that such a pluralism already 
exists in the practices of contemporary science and should not be sacrificed in order to try to unify 
science. For similar reasons to those outlined above, Mitchell also thinks that reductionism is false and 
that the sciences should make use of different levels of analysis (this is part of what creates 
complexity). But the main factor in determining different models is different causal factors rather than 
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different levels. This means there can be plurality on any given level, and models on different levels 
can teach each other things and/or compete to replace each other. 
Although Mitchell’s pluralism has much in common with Cartwright’s, she puts more emphasis on 
epistemic reasons for pluralism, specifically limitations involved in representing the world. She is not 
the only one to do this. Kitcher and Helen Longino also develop arguments for pluralism focussed 
more on epistemic and pragmatic reasons than how the world is. 
Like Dupré, Kitcher (1993; 2001) thinks that there is no privileged way to sort the objects of the 
world (however labelled) into kinds. He argues that language can be applied to nature to divide it up 
into objects in uncountably many legitimate ways (2001). Moreover, because kinds are not universally 
applicable—his argument that the biological species concept is not useful for all situations (discussed 
in 2.1.2) is intended to show this—there is no privileged way to sort the objects of the world, however 
labelled, into kinds. 
Kitcher uses this to develop a pluralism of representations. He argues that the successful use of a 
representation should be taken to imply that it represents some aspect of the world accurately. Given a 
particular use, some representations can be better than others. But no representations are completely 
accurate because their accuracy is judged against how they are to be used, and they can be used in 
different ways. The kinds representations use and the things they focus on should be determined 
relative to human processes, capacities, and interests, and these can vary. Kitcher uses the example of 
maps to explain what he means. Map makers select certain features of a target to represent, normally 
with an intended use in mind. If a perfectly faithful representation was all that was desired, map 
makers would end up like those in Borges’s imaginary empire: 
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single 
Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. 
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a 
Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point 
with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their 
Forebears had been, saw that that vast map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness 
was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. (Borges, 1975) 
Where a map of something is the same size and has the same amount of detail as the thing it is 
supposed to represent it ceases to be useful for many purposes for which a map might be used (as a 
portable guide to the streets of a city, for example). In choosing what to include on a map, and what to 
leave out, trade-offs are made to facilitate particular uses. Kitcher notes that the London Underground 
map is an inaccurate depiction of many aspects of the geography of London, but that it does accurately 
depict the lines and connections of the Underground network in a way that is simple to understand. 
Even after throwing out completely inaccurate representations, there are many other ways of mapping 
London, each inaccurate on some features of the city but accurate on others. Context specific 
pragmatic reasons determine which maps will be useful in a given situation. 
Kitcher argues that something similar is true for the representations of science—these include the 
models that Cartwright and Mitchell talk about and also hypotheses, explanations, and more loosely 
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defined theories. Accuracy underdetermines how science represents the world, what is significant to 
those that develop and utilise scientific representations also plays a role. This means that the 
representations of science are shaped by the past and evolve in relation to pragmatic as well as 
empirical concerns. Because Kitcher thinks that the representations of science should track truth, they 
must be compatible with each other. But, because truth underdetermines scientific representations, the 
world (and even specific features of it) will be represented in a plurality of different ways. This 
pluralism is intended to be normative as well as descriptive. Because pragmatic concerns are context 
dependent, the sciences do and should use a plurality of representations. 
To this Kitcher adds the assertion that sciences should also pursue a plurality of different 
strategies towards specific problems (1993; 2001). Using a decision theoretic model, Kitcher argues 
that if there are diminishing returns to more scientists pursuing whatever strategy seems most likely to 
yield new successful scientific theories and results (as he suggests is often the case), then from the 
perspective of the whole scientific community it would be best to hedge, with different scientists 
pursuing different strategies. He argues that, taken together, these normative pluralisms of 
representations and research strategies have two further benefits. Firstly, because different 
communities will form different representations and research strategies (relating to their interests), 
pluralism allows science to better politically represent those differences and consequently the values 
and needs of diverse sets of communities (I will say more about why this is important in chapter 4). 
Secondly, a plurality of representations and strategies can help solve particular problems by giving us 
multiple ways of approaching them and can help us gain a wider understanding of specific issues by 
tackling different problems and sub problems that relate to them. 
Longino arrives at a similar recommendation via a different route. In The Fate of Knowledge 
(2002), she argues that knowledge is social and that this necessitates a form of scientific pluralism. 
Longino draws on Duhem’s (1914) argument that theory is underdetermined by evidence: because 
scientists postulate different entities and processes in explanations and theories of phenomena than 
those that occur in descriptions of phenomena, there exists a justificatory gap between evidence and 
hypotheses. This means that there is no way to formally specify precise evidential relations for a 
hypothesis, and data derived from observations cannot be determined to support one hypothesis over 
all others. In practice this justificatory gap is filled by background assumptions that determine 
evidential relations for specific hypotheses. These assumptions might themselves be justified using 
evidence and other background assumptions. But as the chain of justification goes backwards some 
assumptions will eventually be reached for which there can be no non-circular justification or 
evidence. 
Longino argues that underdetermination does not mean that observations, and reasoning from 
them, are irrelevant to science. Rather, factors other than observation and logic must also play a role in 
whether or not theories and hypotheses are accepted. These factors need not be reasonless, political, 
aesthetic, or arbitrary, simply because they are not purely logical. A myriad of contextually relevant 
factors might make background assumptions reasonable (maybe certain problems are seen as more 
significant because they help connect important theories, maybe certain assumptions fit better with the 
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scientific instruments at hand, et cetera). But, crucially, criticism and interaction between scientists is 
required in order to ensure that the assumptions relied upon in particular contexts are reasonable. Via 
criticism, social interaction has the resources to identify and correct falsehoods, inappropriate 
assumptions, biases, and other failings. Since, according to Longino, it is these kinds of corrections 
that warrant the attribution of knowledge to cognitive processes, knowledge must also be attributed to 
the results of social critical interaction. Knowledge is, thus, social. 
Longino argues that because knowledge is social, it must also be partial and plural. Because 
critical interaction in a particular community bounds the background assumptions used to develop it, 
knowledge is always conditioned by the preferred standards and goals of the scientific community it 
arises in. Moreover, Longino argues that it is rational for different communities to develop different 
standards by which to evaluate potential knowledge, or even for one community to develop different 
standards to evaluate beliefs in different contexts. Some of these standards might draw from the 
category of standards that philosophers often call ‘epistemic virtues’ (this includes things like 
simplicity, parsimony, et cetera). But, Longino argues that epistemic standards are neither universally 
applicable nor solve the underdetermination problem alone. This is because they either involve further 
substantive assumptions—a standard that prioritises simplicity, for example, assumes that the world is 
simple or amenable to simplicity—or are insufficient to bridge the gap. Furthermore, the epistemic 
standards often suggested for filling the underdetermination gap—simplicity, unification, parsimony—
sometimes pull in different directions and are not optimally satisfied by any single theory or method 
(Van Fraassen, 1989). That standards can vary across communities does not mean that anything goes. 
Knowledge must still be empirically adequate (as defined by the standards of the community) and the 
standards of the community must also be open to criticism and tested by use. If the community’s 
standards repeatedly fail to give rise to successful interventions, then interactive criticism should force 
change in those standards. That standards can vary does, however, mean that knowledge is partial. 
Knowledge must be developed within standards but because those standards are not universal 
knowledge is also not universal. 
The variety of standards of justification communities might have, plus likely variation in their 
goals, means that communities are likely to parse the world differently, to note different observations, 
and to produce different representations. Within the latter, Longino does not only mean that different 
communities will form different hypotheses and propositions, but that they will also produce different 
kinds of representations. Longino uses Cartwright’s (1983) argument that the laws of physics are false 
of most circumstances to argue that the sciences sometimes achieve something other than just true 
propositions (hypotheses, theories, et cetera) and that that philosophers should expand beyond 
propositions to include a whole range of representations (models, diagrams, maps, et cetera) as 
potential knowledge content. But since non-propositional representations do not have as easy a 
relationship to truth as propositions,35  Longino thinks that philosophers should consider other 
representation-world relationships as markers of success. She suggests relations of homomorphism, 
                                                             
35 See for example the debate about realism with respect to economic models (Alexandrova & Northcott, 2013; 
Mäki, 2005; Mäki, 2011; Reiss, 2012). 
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isomorphism, fit, approximation, and similarity should be added to truth, and proposes that this 
package of possible relations be labelled ‘conformation’. Like Kitcher, Longino then uses the 
metaphor of maps to highlight that different representations can emerge of the same phenomena.36 
Both the relevant features of a phenomena to emphasise in a representation and the appropriate 
conformation relation by which to judge that representation by will depend on the context in which it 
will be used and the standards of the scientific community it is developed in. This leads Longino to 
conclude that knowledge is plural: a plurality of acceptable representations can be generated by 
different considerations and standards in any inquiry (Longino, 2002, p. 184; Kellert et al., 2006). 
Thus, despite some disagreements, all three of Mitchell, Longino, and Kitcher describe and 
endorse the plurality of models and representations (and for Longino forms of representation) that 
already exists in science.37 The fact that the representations produced by science are partial plays a role 
in all three arguments. But while Mitchell sees this as a result of a combination of the way the world is 
and of the limitations involved in representation itself (in the form of the idealised nature of 
modelling), Longino sees this more as a result of the limitations involved in practicing science 
(underdetermination), and variety in the goals and interests of different communities. Kitcher’s 
position draws on a mix of all four of these factors. Longino and Kitcher also endorse pluralisms of 
epistemic goals, standards, and methods/strategies. These are based on a combination of the 
insolubility of epistemic virtues, the variety of goals for science, and the idea that some form of 
pluralism helps to mitigate against some of the limitations involved in scientific practice—different 
perspectives and different forms of knowledge critically interacting to overcome underdetermination 
(Longino), and different investigative strategies as the best way to approach the uncertainty involved 
in scientific inquiry (Kitcher). 
 
2.1.4 Systems and styles 
Hasok Chang offers a version of pluralism that includes many of the variables discussed above along 
with scientific abilities and applications. He argues for a pluralism of what he calls systems of 
practice—defined as “coherent and interacting set[s] of epistemic activities performed with a view to 
achieve certain aims” (2012, p. 260). Like Longino, H. Chang (2004) uses an insight from Duhem to 
question standard pictures of scientific justification. Duhem noted that empirical testing requires 
                                                             
36 As an example of this, Longino analyses the different approaches to neurophysiology that come from 
neuroendocrinology and brain physiology (1990; 2002). She argues that the competing approaches “are 
characterised by different questions, vastly different experimental and investigative strategies, and different 
models of brain structure and function”, and are based on different epistemological values. The different 
questions they address arise in different contexts and their results “provide (partial) knowledge of brain and 
neural processes… that conform to their different domains sufficiently to support further research” (2002, p. 
183). This results in two different inconsistent representations of neurophysiology. 
37 One of the main sources of disagreement is over the compatibility of different representations and to what 
extent they should be integrated. As noted, Kitcher thinks that the plurality of representations offered by the 
sciences should be compatible with each other. Longino disagrees with this and thinks that incompatible 
representations need not be problematic. Mitchell takes what might be seen as a middle position, arguing that 
incompatible models can be useful, but that models integrated to explain a particular event must be compatible 
and must result in a single explanation. This disagreement does not have an effect on what I will say in chapters 
3 and 4, so I will ignore it. 
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observations that are in part based on scientific theories. Scientific instruments, for example, are 
developed and calibrated using scientific theories (think of the models used to produce brain images). 
Those theories themselves need to be justified. Without solid foundation this chain of justification 
never ends. But, the best candidates for such a foundation have been found wanting.38 The upshot of 
this is that no observations (and consequently theories) in science can be completely justified. Yet, 
scientific observations are frequently taken to be sufficiently justified. H. Chang argues that this only 
works if we accept coherentism: if observations cohere with existing systems of practice that are as a 
whole successful,39 then scientists accept them as justified and they are entitled to do so because that is 
the best they can do. 
Despite arguing that scientists can only justify observations (and theories) within systems as a 
whole, H. Chang (2004) thinks that science can progress through iteration. To conduct experiments, 
scientists have to start somewhere, it makes sense for them to choose to work in what they judge to be 
the best available framework (system) even if they know it is imperfect. Scientists then work within 
that framework to produce results and theories that enrich or correct it.40 But if truth is internal to 
systems of practice then how are systems as a whole to be judged? H. Chang’s answer to this question 
is to look at what systems can do in the face of “resistance from reality” (2012, p. 215). For a scientific 
system to progress, scientists should aim to develop observations and theories that lead to enrichment 
of the system or corrections to maintain its coherence. To do so, they should arrange their 
investigations to maximise feedback from ‘external reality’—whatever is not subject to one’s own 
will—in a way that is likely to contradict their expectations. The iterative steps in the progress of a 
scientific system are driven by the incorporation of new observations from and interactions with 
external reality. Systems can then be criticised if they fail to expose themselves to feedback from 
reality. 
But what makes the enrichments and self-corrections progressive rather than ad hoc? To answer 
this, H. Chang draws on Carl Hempel, Kuhn, and Bas Van Fraassen to point to a range of epistemic 
virtues—accuracy, consistency, scope, and fruitfulness for Kuhn (1977); elegance, completeness, 
unifying power, explanatory power, and most importantly empirical adequacy for Van Fraassen 
(1980); and, simplicity, support by more general theories, ability to predict previously unknown 
phenomena, and quantity, variety, and precision of evidence for Hempel (1965). H. Chang argues that 
a combination of successfully using systems of practice in new situations and improving adherence to 
some of these epistemic virtues can determine whether a system improves or not. How scientific 
systems satisfy epistemic virtues and the ways that they can be used without resistance from reality are 
also the grounds on which to choose between them. But this is not likely to recommend one system as 
superior to others for all purposes. Because there are a variety of possible uses for scientific results 
                                                             
38 Supposedly self-evident theories like those of mathematics and logic don’t inform us much about nature. And 
the theory-ladenness of language means that only unarticulated experience can give us foundational 
observations, but as soon as we start building on such experience we rely on theory laden language. 
39 When discussing coherence, H. Chang also talks about “systems of knowledge” (2004, p. 224). To avoid too 
many different concepts, I will stick to the variable he focuses on for pluralism: systems of practice. 
40 H. Chang (2004) cites the development of temperature as a successful example of this process in action. 
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and because, as noted in 2.1.3, epistemic virtues cannot be combined into one scale, H. Chang’s 
understanding of progress and success of systems is pluri-axial. He, thus, advocates “the cultivation of 
multiple systems of practice in any given field of science” (2012, p. 260), i.e., a pluralism of systems 
of practice. 
In addition to supporting pluri-axial notions of progress and success, H. Chang argues that 
pluralism delivers four other practical benefits to science. Firstly, no matter what the ultimate aims of 
science are, pluralism will best serve them. If non-coherentist truth (as correspondence, for example) 
were the sole aim of science, pluralism would still be the preferred method to attain it because of the 
amount of unpredictability in science. The history of science is replete with reversals and revisions. 
The path that looks most likely to yield truth now may not in the end do so. Lines of inquiry that look 
unlikely to deliver success at any one moment can surprise us and should be retained. Secondly, 
different systems often partly satisfy aims in different ways (think, for example, of using both national 
statistics and interviews with citizens to understand the health of an economy).41 Given this, it makes 
sense to divide labour between different approaches to see which satisfy whatever goals one might 
have best. Thirdly, when integrated together in a specific context, different systems of practice might 
be more successful than one system can be alone: 
A nice cutting-edge high-tech example of such integration is the global positioning system 
(GPS): by means of satellites kept in place by Newtonian physics, and atomic clocks ruled by 
quantum mechanics and corrected by special and general relativity, this system maps the 
spherical surface of the round earth on a geocentric grid (or rather, a geostatic grid), and gives 
advice to people on the ground from a flat-earth point of view. (Chang, 2012, p. 266) 
Lastly, progress within systems can be spurred on by co-opting observations, methods, theories, 
representations, et cetera, from each other, and by competition between systems. 
H. Chang, thus, offers us a new variable for pluralism, systems of practice, that combines some of 
the others discussed above (including modes of causal inference, standards, representations, and 
kinds). He argues that both because science can be used toward different contextually determined 
goals, and because of a number of limitations involved in scientific practice (uncertainty, no one 
system covers all uses) we should encourage sciences to pursue a plurality of different systems of 
practice. 
Ian Hacking (1992) might be interpreted as offering a similarly mixed variable for pluralism, 
based on styles of reasoning. Drawing on an idea of A. C. Crombie’s (1988), Hacking notes six styles 
of reasoning: mathematical postulation, experimentation, modelling, comparison and taxonomy, 
statistical analysis, and historical derivation of genetic development. The details of each do not matter 
for present purposes. What matters is that styles of reasoning define conditions of possibility and 
admissible techniques for determining what is the case. Each style defines its own conceivable 
sentences, classes and categories, law-like sentences, objects, explanations, criteria of success, and 
methods of intersubjective comparison. Hacking argues, for example, that the sentence “the gross 
                                                             
41 This is, in fact, what the Bank of England will be doing to understand the impacts of Brexit. 
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national product of Württemberg in 1817 was 76.3 million adjusted 1820 crowns” uttered in 1817, 
before the invention of the statistical style of reasoning, would have had no truth value “because there 
was no procedure of reasoning about the relevant ideas” (1992, p. 143). As another example, Hacking 
argues that before the statistical style of reasoning, properties like standard errors and averages were 
not seen as features of objects in the world. 
Hacking thinks that traditional correspondence theories of truth can be applied reasonably well to 
certain simple sentences (he gives the example of “my shoes are black”, 1992, p.134), but that they 
cannot apply to all. Many complex sentences involve complex questions that can only be answered by 
a form of reasoning that does not marry easily to the correspondence theory of truth. For different 
kinds of questions and problems different methods of verification and reasoning have emerged and 
define their own conditions of truth (or success) and objectivity. These methods form styles of 
reasoning. Styles that emerge from historically specific combinations of people, needs, interests, 
ideology, and abilities, but that, once established, transcend these things and define a new way of 
determining truth and objectivity. These styles of reasoning are themselves justified using their own 
definitions of success or truth. This may be circular, but Hacking does not think that is an issue: 
I embrace it [circularity], I welcome it. For there is an odd way in which a style of reasoning 
and truth-conditions of some sentences are mutually self-authenticating (1992, p. 135). 
This circularity need not imply a kind of radical subjectivism or relativism. Styles define the 
conditions of truth and only in styles can such conditions exist. But whether or not a given sentence 
meets those conditions is determined by the world not the style. Hacking does not think that styles of 
reasoning need to be exclusive. Styles may need to fight to be established, but once mature they do not 
tend to exclude one another. Styles offer different ways to reason and can be called upon together in a 
given research project. 
Because truth as correspondence does not work for all kinds of statements and questions, different 
forms of truth have emerged as part of different styles of reasoning; styles that address different kinds 
of questions, that develop from different kinds of interests, and that can be used towards different ends 
or combined towards the same end. Thus, styles of reasoning add a final potential variable for 
pluralism, forming a kind of pluralism that is desirable because of how the world is and because of the 
variety of kinds of questions and issues scientists might want to tackle. 
 
2.2 The variables of and reasons for pluralism 
Recall the four key questions for the debate about pluralism in economics: [1] What does pluralism 
entail? [2] Why is pluralism desirable? [3] Is economics pluralist? And, [4] what does pluralism 
recommend for economics? 
The above gives partial answers to [1] and [2]. Pluralism can mean the preservation of different 
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levels of analysis for scientific propositions (Fodor, 1974; Jackson & Pettit, 1992). It can mean a 
radically disordered metaphysics without a simple set of kinds or causal processes (Cartwright, 1983; 
Cartwright, 1999; Dupré, 1993). It can affirm a variety of representations of science (Kitcher, 2001; 
Longino, 2008; Longino, 2013; Mitchell, 2003). And, it can be a description of science as composed 
of multiple methodologies, explanations, theories, systems of practice, and styles of reasoning 
(Cartwright, 1999; Hacking, 1992; Longino, 2002), or a recommendation that it be so composed 
(Chang, 2012; Kitcher, 1993). 
Below I categorise the accounts of and arguments for pluralism using their plural variables and 
reasons for pluralism with the aims of offering clearer answers to [1] and [2] and grounding my 
answers to [3] and [4]. To argue that economics is or is not pluralist one would need to pick a variable 
(or set of variables) for pluralism and show that economics does or does not attain a sufficient level of 
multiplicity for that variable (or set). In chapter 3, I will use the potential variables outlined in this 
chapter (summarised in 2.2.1) to argue that neither answer to [3] are obviously correct. In light of this, 
I will answer question [4] in chapters 4-7 by focusing on the reasons for pluralism (summarised in 
2.2.2). 
 
2.2.1 Plural variables 
Table 1 summarises the potential variables for pluralism.42 Many of the accounts of pluralism outlined 
above focus on the presuppositions of scientific investigation. Jackson and Pettit’s and Fodor’s anti-
reductionist arguments reject the notion that there is one privileged language or scale of analysis that 
should be preferred over others. They instead argue that the sciences should utilise a pluralism of 
levels of analysis. Explanations in terms of small objects (like particles) are not necessarily superior to 
those in terms of large objects (like social groups). Scientific laws can and should be made using 
generalisations in the languages of biology, chemistry, and economics, as well as the language of 
physics. Cartwright and Dupré agree but add that there can be disorder within and across levels. 
Cartwright argues that the causal processes of the world form a varied patchwork rather than an 
ordered system. Dupré argues against the idea there is one privileged way to parse the objects of the 
world (even given one level of analysis) and asserts a plurality of kinds. Different conceptualisations 
of things like species and sexuality can and should be used to develop different useful theories, 
hypotheses, and models. 
A number of the arguments described in 2.1 take the existence of different goals and uses for 
science as a given and use that to argue for pluralism. But both abstract and concrete goals might also 
be taken to be plural variables themselves. Longino, Kitcher, and H. Chang all suggest that science 
should be open to a variety of abstract epistemic goals. Some scientific communities might focus on 
detailed descriptions of events and testimonies (maybe those concerned with understanding the 
practices of a specific tribe of people) whereas others might focus on maximising generality and  
                                                             
42 Other ways of categorising pluralism have been offered by Dutt (2014), Koskinen and Mäki (2016), and Mäki 
(1997). 
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Kinds of variables Plural variables 
  
Presuppositions Levels of analysis 
Kinds 
Causal processes 
  
Abstract goals Values 
Epistemic goals 
  
Concrete goals Pragmatic constraints 
Questions 
Problems 
  
Epistemic base units Concrete standards 
Forms of representation 
Methods 
Causal inferences 
  
Products Explanations 
Representations (including models) 
  
Compound variables Styles of reasoning 
Systems of practice 
Ways of practicing science 
Strategies  
Table 1. The possible variables of pluralism. 
simplicity (maybe those trying to understand species population fluctuations). Although not noted 
above, implicit in Longino’s and Kitcher’s points that different scientists and communities might have 
different ends and make different judgements of significance is the idea that they are also in-part 
motivated by different values in general (not just epistemic ones). Values that can lead to different 
judgements about the amount of evidence required to accept or reject hypotheses (Rudner, 1953; 
Douglas, 2009; Wilholt, 2009), or to different things being emphasised when categorising the world. 
All of H. Chang, Longino, Kitcher, Mitchell, Hacking, Dupré, and Cartwright (and to a degree Jackson 
and Pettit) also suggest that it is legitimate for a plurality of concrete goals to also shape inquiry. 
Different abilities and contexts can give rise to different questions, problems, and pragmatic 
constraints, which can lead to different scientific representations. 
The epistemic base units of inquiry (the things used to organise inquiry) also form a category of 
potential plural variables. Longino notes that science produces a variety of useful forms of 
representation (models, diagrams, pictures, as well as hypotheses, and theories). Within 
representations there might be further distinctions. Michael Weisberg (2012) has, for example, noted 
the variety of different kinds of models, and Kitcher (2001) argues that part of the reason that 
epistemic goals cannot be synthesised towards the single goal of explaining the world is because there 
are multiple legitimate forms of explanation. Longino, Hacking, and H. Chang also note the variety of 
concrete standards that scientists and communities of scientists use. These are based on values and 
epistemic goals but are their concrete instantiations; examples include different relations of 
conformation and different standards of measurement. Most of the accounts of pluralism discussed 
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above also affirm a variety of methods (or causal inferences). Although what counts as a method 
varies, it normally includes some combination of techniques, sources of evidence (interviews, models, 
different forms of measurement, et cetera), and standards of success. 
The products of inquiry form another set of potential plural variables. The anti-reductionist 
arguments of Jackson and Pettit, Fodor, Dupré, Cartwright, and Kitcher all stress that a plurality of 
different explanations of a single event can be useful. Mitchell and Cartwright talk about different 
partial models covering different causal processes and parts of the world. And, Longino and Kitcher 
use the metaphor of maps to suggest that a plurality of representations (including models, theories, et 
cetera) can also be important. 
Lastly, a number of the accounts above suggest what we might call compound variables for 
pluralism. H. Chang advocates a plurality of systems of practice that incorporate many of the other 
variables noted in table 1—including methods, kinds, standards, forms of representation and 
explanation, and collections of theories and assumptions. Ways of practicing science (Dupré), 
strategies (Kitcher), and styles of reason (Hacking) also fit into this category, as would things like 
Thomas Kuhn’s paradigms (1962) and Imre Lakatos’s research programs (1970). 
 
(1) What does pluralism entail? 
Pluralism can, thus, entail assuming plurality in various presuppositions used in scientific 
investigations; approaching investigations with different goals in mind; utilising a variety of standards, 
causal inferences, methods, and forms of representation (i.e., having different epistemic base units); 
embracing multiple explanations and representations; and/or some mix of these things.43 
 
2.2.2 Reasons for pluralism 
The arguments for pluralism fit into three categories: (i) because pluralism is the correct description of 
the way the world is or the most appropriate way of arranging science given the way the world is; (ii) 
because pluralism provides an antidote to some of the epistemic limitations involved in science; and, 
(iii) because pluralism is the best way to make scientific practice compatible with the variety of goals 
involved in science. Some of the arguments in these categories relate to specific plural variables, but 
many apply to a number of variables. I will first describe how the arguments fit into the categories (i-
iii) without reference to the variables in table 1, and then note the plural variables associated with each 
type of reason in table 2. 
 
(i) The way the world is 
Although small metaphysical claims are present in most arguments for pluralism, some are more 
explicitly metaphysical. For Dupré, the practices, categorisations, and theories of science provide 
                                                             
43 Concepts like truth, objectivity, belief, and knowledge can also be the targets of pluralism. This kind of 
conceptual plurality will not be my focus, as it diverts attention away from what it means to be a plural science. 
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evidence that the world is such that it admits multiple levels of analysis and kinds and is not 
deterministic. Cartwright’s argument that the sciences are characterised by a variety of models and 
causal inferences rests on a metaphysical argument that the world is dappled (or disunified). Mitchell, 
similarly, has the metaphysical claim that the world is complex at the core of her argument. The 
complexity of the world makes it necessary (in most circumstances) to integrate a variety of models to 
explain particular events. Hacking’s idea of styles of reasoning is also self-consciously metaphysical. 
Styles make certain things possible and humans have developed and utilise a range of styles in part 
because truth as correspondence cannot cover all potentially truth-bearing sentences. Lastly, 
significant metaphysical claims are also part of Jackson and Pettit’s and Fodor’s anti-reductionist 
arguments outlined in section 2.1.1. The crucial step in their arguments is that moving from a higher to 
a lower level gives up something important, because of how the world is organised rather than because 
of the epistemic limitations of investigators. 
 
(ii) Epistemic limitations 
Many of the arguments discussed in 2.1 develop out of epistemic limitations involved in scientific 
practice. Underdetermination prevents the acceptance of hypotheses, experimental results, and 
measurements from ever being fully justified and necessitates a social dimension to knowledge 
production and, thus, pluralism. The nature of representation prevents the existence of one perfect 
representation for all uses; and even if a single fully justified perfect representation of a phenomena 
were possible, it is not clear how science would reach it. Scientists can’t tell in advance which 
strategies will maximise their goals or the goals of society (even if they were static and clearly 
defined). Moreover, no single fully justified method for science or way of combining epistemic virtues 
has been developed, despite many attempts. 
These limitations are epistemic in the sense that they are the result of limitations in what scientists 
do or can know and give rise to knowledge that is imperfect in some way (partial, not fully justified, et 
cetera). All of these epistemic limitations suggest that society at large (or science as a whole) should 
hedge by allowing for some form of variety in science. Kitcher’s argument for the efficacy of a variety 
of research strategies falls into this category. As does Longino’s argument that social critical 
interaction and the use of different representations helps overcome the justificatory gap created by 
underdetermination. Mitchell’s argument that models can only include some factors and that 
integrating many models together can give a better picture of a phenomenon also fits here. Lastly, H. 
Chang’s arguments that each science should hedge by containing a variety of systems of practice, that 
different systems can usefully satisfy aims in different partial ways, that integrating different 
approaches can be useful, and that different systems can benefit from interacting with each other all 
follow a similar logic. They rely on the insight that there is no perfect system of practice or that even if 
there could be, scientists are unlikely to be able to determine what that is. 
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Type of reason Reason for pluralism Plural variables implied44 
   
(i) The way the 
world is 
Propositions at higher levels of analysis cannot 
be reduced to lower levels without losing 
something 
Levels of analysis 
The world is not made up of a privileged set of 
kinds or a privileged level of analysis 
Kinds, Levels of analysis, 
Causal processes 
The world is not made up of an ordered set of 
laws or causal processes and/or is complex 
Levels of analysis, Casual 
processes, Representations 
The failure of essentialism, reductionism, and 
determinism suggests a radically disordered 
world 
Ways of practicing 
science, Causal inferences 
The correspondence theory of truth does not 
cover all sentences and representations 
Styles of reasoning, Forms 
of representation 
   
(ii) Epistemic 
limitations  
Underdetermination implies a social dimension 
to science and knowledge production 
Standards, 
Representations, Forms of 
representation, Goals 
Utilising a variety of strategies, methods, and 
systems hedges bets in the face of uncertainty 
Systems of practice, 
Strategies 
Integrating different approaches can provide 
more complete pictures of particular phenomena 
Systems of practice, 
Strategies 
Systems can be improved by co-opting ideas 
from others and through competition with others 
Systems of practice 
A single method for science is not forthcoming, 
there can be many epistemic virtues 
Abstract goals, Concrete 
goals 
There is no such thing as a perfect representation, 
different representations focus on different 
features of a target45 
Representations, Abstract 
goals, Concrete goals 
   
(iii) A variety 
of goals 
The sciences explain different events and use 
different explanations for different ends 
Explanations, Forms of 
representation, Levels of 
analysis 
Different communities have different capacities, 
processes, goals, and interests 
Kinds, Standards, 
Representations, Forms of 
representation 
Representations should be judged with particular 
uses and contexts in mind 
Representations, Kinds 
Basing science on a variety of goals allows for 
better political representation 
Strategies, 
Representations 
Different systems and styles can be used towards 
different goals and questions 
Systems of practice, 
Styles of reasoning 
Table 2. The three types of reason for pluralism. 
 
 
                                                             
44 If a compound variable is listed, then I have not listed variables that form part of that compound. 
45 This reason could also be placed in (iii). 
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(iii) A variety of goals 
A third set of arguments for pluralism are based on the idea that science can and should serve a variety 
of goals and uses (both epistemic and pragmatic). Because the specific goals of science shift with 
context, some form of pluralism that allows for a variety of one of the variables discussed above is 
desired. Such arguments often take some plurality as given—for example that the sciences use 
different levels of analysis and different representations—and justify it by noting the different 
legitimate epistemic and pragmatic goals that scientific knowledge can serve. Within this category we 
might place arguments that kinds or levels of analysis should be defined relative to human processes, 
capacities, and interests (Jackson and Pettit, Kitcher, Dupré), and that different kinds of explanations 
might be used towards different ends. Longino’s argument that the social dimension of knowledge 
implies that a variety of contextual goals and interests legitimately influence science also fits in here. 
As do Kitcher’s arguments that representations should be judged with particular uses and contexts in 
mind, and that basing science on a variety of goals allows for better political representation. Lastly, H. 
Chang’s and Hacking’s arguments that different systems of practice and styles of reasoning can be 
used to pursue different goals and questions also fits here. 
 
(2) Why is pluralism desirable? 
Pluralists have, thus, argued that pluralism exists or should be encouraged because of (i) the way the 
world is, (ii) the epistemic limitations involved in inquiry, and (iii) the fact that the sciences can be 
used towards a variety of goals (or some combination of (i-iii)). Table 2 offers a stylised summary of 
the individual arguments for pluralism and how they fit into the three categories (i-iii). 
 
 
2.2.3 Normative vs. descriptive pluralism 
Before explaining what these distinctions mean for economics, it is instructive to note an important 
source of disagreement between some accounts of pluralism. H. Chang explicitly labels his version of 
pluralism ‘active normative epistemic pluralism’ (my emphasis) to distinguish it from descriptive 
accounts of pluralism. His normative position argues that sciences should actively cultivate a variety 
of systems of practice. Descriptive accounts of pluralism, by contrast, take pluralism to be the correct 
description of science or the world: the variety exhibited in the sciences suggests that characterising 
science as a unified project or assuming it will tend towards a unified set of theories does not make 
sense. Longino’s pluralism is presented as descriptive. Her main argument is not that the sciences 
should be pluralist, but that pluralism is the best way of describing the practices of science. 
 [P]hilosophical appraisal of research should encompass the full range of research approaches 
pursued in order to evaluate any one of them… the question becomes not which is the best or 
better, but what each contributes—both in terms of positive results and in terms of critical 
perspectives on the others—to our overall understanding of a given phenomenon. (Longino, 
2013, p. 2) 
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Whereas H. Chang argues that pluralism is necessitated by coherentism and that it is the best way 
to arrange scientific investigations for multiple reasons, Longino focuses on showing that knowledge 
is developed by different communities with different results and that there is no reason to assume the 
different approaches should collapse into one. Whereas H. Chang aims to cultivate pluralist sciences, 
Longino wants philosophers of science to accept that the sciences already are pluralist. 
Despite clarifying the evidential bases and implications of competing accounts of pluralism, the 
normative/descriptive division will not be central in how I use pluralism for two reasons. Firstly, the 
precise line between normative and descriptive accounts of pluralism is not entirely clear. Although H. 
Chang takes the strongest normative position, most accounts of pluralism have some normative 
elements. Longino’s pluralism is based on descriptions of science but argues that philosophers should 
interpret science as a pluralist enterprise and this leads to other normative suggestions for science 
(democratised and representative institutions, for example). Although Dupré’s focus is on metaphysics 
he has normative goals in mind too. He thinks that it is only with the metaphysical assumptions that he 
affirms that an open and democratic science that he supports can develop. Secondly, the debate 
regarding pluralism in economics is largely normative. ‘Is economics pluralist?’ is a descriptive 
question but behind it is a debate about what economics should be. What is really intended is a 
discussion about whether economics should be pluralist of whether it is sufficiently pluralist. The bulk 
of this thesis will, therefore, focus on the normative implications of pluralism even where the 
arguments for pluralism are in part descriptive. 
 
Conclusion 
In response to early twentieth century calls for unity in science, philosophers and historians have 
argued that the sciences are and should be pluralist. Arguments to this effect have taken numerous 
forms and resulted in numerous understandings of pluralism. Pluralists have taken issue with the 
metaphysical positions associated with the unity of science (Cartwright, 1983; Cartwright, 1999; 
Dupré, 1993; Fodor, 1974; Jackson & Pettit, 1992), pointed out that pragmatic considerations can lead 
to a variety of overlapping representations in science (Kitcher, 2001; Longino, 2008; Longino, 2013), 
and advocated the cultivation of different ways of approaching science (Chang, 2012; Kitcher, 2001; 
Dupré, 1993).  
Pluralism can entail variety in the presuppositions used by science, the abstract and concrete goals 
of science, the epistemic aspects of investigation (standards, methods, forms of representation, et 
cetera), the products of science (the theories, representations, and explanations of science) and/or 
some compound of these things. Pluralists have argued for scientific pluralism for three collections of 
reasons: (i) because it is the right description of the world or the best way to organise science given 
how the world is organised, (ii) because pluralist scientific practices help mitigate some of the 
epistemic limitations involved in scientific practice, and (iii) because pluralism is the best way to 
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make the sciences compatible with the variety of different goals they do and should be used towards. 
Now, what does this all mean for economics? 
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3 Is economics pluralist? 
Much of the debate about pluralism in economics centres on disagreement about the answer to the 
question: ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’. Defenders of economics argue that the discipline admits more 
variety than critics notice, that it does better than critics think at investigating the real world, and that 
it does successfully develop many useful real-world interventions. Critics reject these points (see 1.2). 
Chapter 2 shows that if economists were to go to philosophers for clarity over what counts as 
pluralism, they would get a bewildering variety of options. What does this mean for the debate in 
economics? I will give two answers. First, the debate in economics runs into difficulties by focussing 
on comparing economics to ideal states of pluralism based on certain variables. But, second, the 
reasons for pluralism can offer concrete lessons for economics without going into the question of 
whether economics is (sufficiently) pluralist. In this chapter I make the first half of this argument—
that focussing on variables leads to problems. I will make the second half of the argument in the 
chapters that follow. 
Given the plurality of pluralisms available, disagreement about the status of economics is not 
surprising. Critics and defenders of the discipline might just have different accounts of pluralism in 
mind. The question ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ can be answered in different ways by focussing on 
different variables. Defenders of economics can, for example, argue that it admits variety in the range 
of answers it gives to problems,46 while critics could argue that it is overly reliant on methodological 
individualism (see 3.2). I will argue that the source of this disagreement is deeper still. Even if a 
specific variable (or set of variables) for pluralism were fixed, it would still not be clear whether 
economics should count as pluralist or not, because there are multiple plausible ways of mapping the 
plural variables onto the present state of research in the discipline. In addition to disagreement about 
which variables pluralism should focus on, there may be legitimate disagreement about the boundaries 
of specific variables and how much of each is required. Where some see multiple systems of practice 
in present economic research others see just one and the philosophical accounts of pluralism do not 
give us clear criteria to rule either way. 
To make this argument complete I would have to go through all plausible accounts of pluralism 
and show that neither ‘economics is pluralist’ nor ‘economics is not pluralist’ can be inferred from 
them. This is a large task that would distract from the main points of this thesis, which are the concrete 
diagnoses in chapters 5-7. Instead, I will try to convince the reader that even when a plural variable is 
fixed, answering ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ in a way that convinces anyone not already sympathetic 
to your answer is going to be difficult. I will do this by presenting a way of arguing that economics is 
not pluralist for two variables that prima facie offer the most promising routes to determinate answers 
                                                             
46 In an interview with the World Economic Association (WEA), the prominent Harvard economist, Dani Rodrik, 
argues that: “There are healthy debates in the [economics] profession today on the minimum wage, fiscal policy, 
financial regulation, and many other areas too. I think many critics of the economics profession overlook these 
differences or view them as the exception rather than the rule. …[E]conomics today is not a discipline that is 
characterized by a whole lot of unanimity.” (WEA, 2013, p. 10) 
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to [3]—compound variables (in 3.1) and presuppositions (in 3.2)—and showing that there is 
significant space for interpretation. I will then, in 3.3, briefly give reasons to believe that something 
similar is true for the other variables of pluralism. I will conclude that arguments that economics lacks 
sufficient pluralism are unlikely to convince those that think that economics is already pluralist enough 
and that they cannot offer concrete recommendations for change. 
 
3.1 Compound variables 
Many of the arguments about pluralism in economics, on both sides, focus on versions of pluralism 
defined around ‘schools of thought’—a compound variable involving a mixture of core theories and 
presuppositions, community association, and methods. A number of critics argue that economics 
should admit a broader range of schools of thought in order to better investigate the complex world 
(Arestis, 1996; Dow, 1990; Lawson, 1997; Lawson, 2003). On the other hand, Davis (2006) argues 
that the mainstream of economics should count as pluralist because it includes some important schools 
of thought that it did not 40 years ago (Colander, 2000, makes a similar point). As the debate in 1.2 
showed, just identifying schools of thought (or some similar compound variable) as the key variable 
for pluralism does not necessarily lead to a clear answer to ‘[3] is economic pluralist?’ There is still 
significant space for interpretation about when schools of thought count as separate from one another 
and about which schools need to be included for economics to count as pluralist. Perhaps scientific 
pluralism can help draw clearer boundaries between schools of thought and determine how many 
schools of thought are required of economics? 
H. Chang, Dupré, Hacking, and Kitcher all offer accounts of pluralism that have some role for 
compound variables. Kitcher (1993) argues that, given diminishing returns to more scientists pursuing 
a single strategy, scientific communities should aim to contain scientists pursuing a range of 
strategies. This is the case even if a community has a clear understanding of which strategy is most 
likely to be successful. If uncertainty about which strategies are likely to be successful is factored in, 
the rationale for pursuing multiple strategies seems even stronger. Something like this likely motivates 
some of the arguments for pluralism in economics. This does not, however, articulate what should 
count as different strategies or what should count as diversity and how much is necessary. Where 
Rodrik (2015) sees a diverse collection of different strategies in different models, Lawson (2003) sees 
one strategy (modelling). Dupré’s argument that disorder in the world should lead to a variety of ways 
of practicing science equally does not offer much guidance as to what might constitute different 
‘ways’. 
H. Chang’s (2012) systems of practice seem the best match for schools of thought accounts of 
pluralism. Like his brother H.-J. Chang’s (2014) argument for pluralism in economics, H. Chang 
argues that it is prudent for sciences to contain multiple systems of practice in the face of uncertainty 
and some of the epistemic limitations involved in science. Having different systems of practice is 
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important as they provide unexpected forms of resistance from reality. Resistance that helps sciences 
progress and helps justify coherentist systems. 
Although H. Chang discusses systems of practice in greater detail than Kitcher or Dupré discuss 
strategies and ways of practicing science, his description of them—“coherent and interacting set[s] of 
epistemic activities performed with a view to achieve certain aims” (2012, p. 260)—still leaves a large 
amount of room for interpretation. If the goal is to describe and argue for pluralism in broad strokes 
this suffices. But it does not offer us much guidance in how to diagnose economics. H. Chang does, 
however, emphasise another factor that might. He thinks that the sciences ought to cultivate as many 
‘incommensurable’ systems of practice as possible. Systems of practice are incommensurable when 
different standards of judgement—including the problems, epistemic values, and practice based 
metaphysical assumptions emphasised—prevent the evaluation of competing propositions across 
different systems.47 This means that incommensurable systems of practice are likely to note different 
observations, arrive at different explanations, and generally provide different angles on reality. 
Each system is conducive to revealing particular aspects of reality, and by cultivating multiple 
incommensurable systems we stand to gain most knowledge. (2012, p. 218) 
Mapping this over to economics, maybe the criterion of difference between schools of thought could 
be incommensurability? 
Unfortunately, this doesn’t solve the issue of identifying difference between schools, it just pushes 
it back one step. As noted in chapter 1, some see behavioural economics as a genuinely new way of 
practicing economics with new standards of judgement that have resulted in sharp disagreements with 
other parts of economics.48 As an example they might point to the contrasting approaches to finance 
espoused by Robert Shiller (using behavioural economics) and Eugene Fama (using rational 
expectations) in their lectures for their joint (also with Lars Hansen) Nobel prize in 2014 (Fama, 2014; 
Shiller, 2014). Shiller emphasises the importance of experimental results in constructing his model of 
decision-making, whereas Fama stresses the importance of more parsimonious models of decision-
making. Because of this Shiller incorporates behavioural findings that undermine the assumption of 
perfect rationality into his models of the housing and stock markets. This leads him to emphasise the 
‘irrational exuberance’ in such markets and directly contradict Fama’s work, which that purports to 
show that stock and housing markets incorporate all information into prices efficiently.49 
                                                             
47 H. Chang refers to this as ‘methodological’ incommensurability. This is in contrast to ‘semantic’ 
incommensurability, which refers to cases in which some of the terms used in different systems of practice 
cannot be translated into one another. The distinction between these two types of incommensurability is due to 
Paul Hoyningen-Huene and Howard Sankey (2001). Because he spends most of his book talking about 
methodological incommensurability (with the chemical revolution being a key case), I interpret H. Chang (2012) 
as arguing that the sciences ought to cultivate as many methodologically incommensurable systems as possible. 
48 New epistemic values, for example, in the greater importance behavioural economics gives to experimental 
results over parsimony in formal models. New problems that behavioural economics sees as relevant by 
focussing on, for example, what drives choices, rather than the effects of an assumed model of choice. 
49 Shiller even pointed to the difference between the two approaches in his lecture (following Fama’s) for their 
joint award: "I guess my attitude is, 'Why are we so interested in the efficient markets model?' We haven't seen 
any compelling evidence for it…Gene doesn't agree with this at all...I'm going to present evidence, though” 
(Wile, 2013). 
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However, others interpret the relation between behavioural and other forms of economics 
differently. Sent (2004) contrasts the ‘new’ behavioural economics that has become common in 
economics departments and journals with ‘old’ behavioural economics. Old behavioural economics 
was practiced between the 1960s and 1990s by groups at Carnegie,50 Michigan, Oxford, and Stirling.51 
Sent argues that old behavioural economists were very critical of the assumptions and methodologies 
in economics at the time, in particular the use of equilibrium-based analysis and the focus on utility 
and profit maximisation. They sought to build an alternative approach to understanding decision-
making by starting from empirical evidence and looking for laws that described behaviour as faithfully 
as possible. 
New behavioural economics grew out of the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Rather than starting from new theories of 
decision-making, work in new behavioural economics started from the same expected utility 
calculations common in economic theory and focussed on departures from that model. New 
behavioural economics sought to extend the explanatory power of economics by using heuristics, 
biases, and framing effects to explain why traditional rational choice models fail in certain 
circumstances, rather than replace it. Shiller is considered a new behavioural economist. 
Sent argues that new behavioural economics’ ability to fit side by side with standard economic 
models—including the utility and profit maximisation and equilibrium analysis rejected by old 
behavioural economists—rather than replace them was a crucial factor in its rise at the expense of old 
behavioural economics during the 1980s and 90s. She quotes Colin Cramerer, a prominent new 
behavioural economist, as arguing that: 
This sort of psychology provided a way to model bounded rationality which is more like 
standard economics than the more radical departure that Simon had in mind. Much of 
behavioral economics consists of trying to incorporate this kind of psychology into 
economics. (Cramerer, 1999) 
This suggests that the incommensurability between the behavioural economics now common within 
economics departments and journals and other aspects of economics is not as clear as it might seem. 
New behavioural economics has offered some different standards of judgement that have resulted in 
the elevation of results and studies that disagree with the results endorsed by other parts of 
economics—like the contrast between the behavioural finance of Shiller and the traditional finance of 
Fama mentioned above. But do some different standards of judgement and some disagreements count 
as incommensurability? Disagreements that arise from slightly different standards of judgement can 
arise within systems of practice, and there are many ways that new behavioural economics is 
continuous with existing economic theory. Moreover, had behavioural economics gone down the ‘old’ 
route, it might have marked a significantly greater contrast with other parts of economics. How much 
                                                             
50 Known at the time as Carnegie Institute of Technology, now part of Carnegie Mellon University. 
51 Carnegie included Herbert Simon and focussed on bounded rationality. Michigan was led by George Kantona 
and focussed on attitude research. Oxford included Jacob Marschak and G. L. S. Shackle and focussed on 
uncertainty and coordination. Stirling included Peter Earl and Brian Loasby and focussed on eclecticism and 
integration. 
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disagreement is required for incommensurability? Those that see behavioural economics as a radical 
departure from what went before are likely to emphasise the ways that it is different and see 
incommensurability. Those that see it as a mild modification on the rational expectations models are 
likely to see continuity.52 
This resembles the impasse discussed in the introduction. Moving the criterion of difference to 
incommensurability doesn’t resolve the issue of determining when schools of thought are genuinely 
different from each other. H. Chang makes a salient point that it is important for the sciences to be 
exposed to different angles on reality, but it is not clear how best to translate this across to a 
recommendation about what counts as a different angle.53 
Hacking’s (1992) styles of reasoning are similarly too abstract to demarcate clear differences 
between schools of thought. Styles of reasoning are intended to be broader and more cross-cutting 
than schools of thought. They define conditions of possibility for claims to truth and objectivity. They 
come with their own accepted kinds of statement, objects, explanations, criteria of success, and 
methods of comparison, but are less attached to particular thinkers, traditions, and theoretical 
commitments than schools of thought. Yet, styles of reasoning may still be applied to the debate in 
economics. Rather than arguing that economics consists of a narrow school (or set of schools) of 
thought, critics may instead argue that all of economics utilises a particular style of reasoning. As 
noted in chapter 1, Hirschman and Popp Berman (2014) argue that economics might be thought of as 
defining its own style of reasoning: 
The economic style of reasoning includes basic concepts such as incentives, growth, 
efficiency and externalities. It includes economic ways of approaching problems: by using 
models, systematically weighing costs and benefits, analysing quantitative empirical data, 
considering incentives, and thinking marginally. (Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014, p. 794) 
A critic of economics might buy this and argue that economics is not pluralist because it is dominated 
by a particular economic style of reasoning to the detriment of all others. But those that see pluralism 
in economics could have two responses. First, they could argue that the characterisation of economics 
as exhibiting its own style of reasoning rather than a mixture of the other styles is incorrect. They 
might argue that economics utilises modelling, statistical analysis, experimentation, and mathematical 
postulation, all separate styles of reasoning according to Hacking (and Crombie, 1988). Second, they 
may argue that even if economics can be said to define its own style of reasoning this need not exclude 
others. They may again point to the use of the modelling, statistical, experimental, and mathematical 
styles of reasoning in the discipline. Critics may respond to these points, but it’s hard to imagine either 
side establishing a knock-down argument. Styles of reasoning are vague, intentionally so. Like Kuhn’s 
paradigms and Lakatos’s research programs, Hacking does not define styles of reasoning but 
illuminates them with examples. This gives the idea broad applicability and likely helps broad brush 
                                                             
52 For examples of these different interpretations, see the contrasting opinions on Richard Thaler’s (a prominent 
new behavioural economist) 2017 Nobel prize win (Mata & Wright, 2017; Ritholtz, 2017; Shiller, 2017). 
53 In chapter 4, I will use this insight in a different way. Rather than trying to determine when angles count as 
different, I will suggest we look out for institutional blocks to particular kinds of angles coming into view. 
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historical descriptions of the development of science, but it makes it difficult to apply the idea of styles 
to cases of disagreement like the debate in economics. 
Thus, none of the arguments for pluralism that focus on compound variables provide a clear way 
of determining an answer to ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ They do not provide criteria for when schools 
of thought count as different amid dispute. Moreover, even if clear boundaries between schools of 
thought could be drawn, the philosophical accounts of pluralism do not give a clear way of 
determining how many schools are needed for pluralism or how the schools chosen should be 
determined. Without any of this it is going to be difficult to make an argument that economics is or is 
not pluralist to someone who is not already sympathetic to the idea. 
This does not mean that compound variables are useless in discussing the different kinds of work 
going on in economics (or any science). Schools of thought can be useful for framing the material that 
users of economics (like the policy makers and the public that H.-J. Chang targets) and designers of 
economic curriculums draw on, and for discussing historical trends. The problems arise when using 
schools of thought to mediate in disputes about how contemporary research practices relate to one 
another. The fact that schools of thought form loose categories that are open to interpretation is part of 
their strength when offering an overview of different fields to students, but it makes them ill-suited to 
convincing an opposing interlocutor in an argument about pluralism. 
 
3.2 Presuppositions 
Instead of mixed concepts like schools of thought and styles of reasoning, might focussing on 
presuppositions help determine whether economics should count as pluralist? I will argue that the 
answer is no. Beyond arguing that reducing all levels of analysis to one is problematic, the arguments 
against reductionism do not tell us what is required of pluralism. Similar things can also be said of 
causal processes and kinds. 
Economics has had a long history of debate about its basic units of analysis (Menger, 1871; 
Menger, 1883; Schmoller, 1873; Veblen, 1908). Some have defended approaches to economics that are 
based around one main unit (or type of unit)—normally individuals and their preferences (Elster, 
1982; Menger, 1871; Menger, 1883). If we assumed that such approaches were characteristic of the 
whole of economics, and that the discipline only utilised one unit of analysis, then it would seem that 
the pluralist argument would be clear. The anti-reductionist positions in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 argue that 
building from a single level of analysis gives up important generalisations, information, and kinds. 
But the case is less open and shut than it seems. The simple fact that economics exists as a 
discipline separate from physics (and chemistry, biology, et cetera) could satisfy the anti-reductionist 
arguments of Fodor (1974) and Jackson and Pettit (1992). The idea that economics should investigate 
economic phenomena and create propositions or explanations in terms of economic phenomena 
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without trying to reduce them to physical phenomena assumes the existence of an economic level of 
description separate from physics, even if all those explanations are in terms of individuals and their 
preferences. Indeed, it was the separate existence of special sciences like economics that Fodor sought 
to defend. Once economics exists as its own discipline in any form, some form of anti-reductionism 
seems assured. 
A pluralist may reject this line of reasoning by arguing that the things Jackson and Pettit and Fodor 
argue are sacrificed by reductionism need not just occur when reducing economics to physics and also 
occur when reducing different kinds of propositions in economics to a single economic level of 
description.54 They might argue, for example, that focussing on individuals and their preferences 
obscures the visibility of other important causal factors—aggregate dynamics from the decisions of 
heterogenous agents (Kirman, 1992), social norms (Lawson, 1997), links between finance and the real 
economy (Wren-Lewis, 2018), and so on. Such arguments rest on specific examples. To highlight how 
they play out I will briefly explain one set of arguments: those against microfoundations in 
macroeconomics. 
In 1976, Robert Lucas famously argued that econometric models devised using only historical 
data cannot in principle be used to predict the effects of changes in economic policy.55 
[G]iven that the structure of an econometric model consists of optimal decision rules of 
economic agents, and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with changes in the 
structure of series relevant to the decision maker, it follows that any change in policy will 
systematically alter the structure of econometric models. … [I]t appears that policy makers, if 
they wish to forecast the response of citizens, must take the latter into their confidence. 
(Lucas, 1976, pp. 41-42)  
To be accurate, predictions of the effects of macroeconomic policy need to be grounded in analysis of 
the decision processes of individual agents. Macroeconomic models, thus, need to be microfounded; 
that is, they need to incorporate microeconomically determined models of individual agency. 
Microfounded models can be calibrated using aggregated historical data, but their functional form 
should be determined by the aggregation of individual behaviour consistent with microeconomic 
theory. Given the trends in microeconomics at the time, this meant that macroeconomics had to utilise 
well-specified optimisation problems.56 
Since Lucas’s critique, microfounded macroeconomic models have proliferated (Kosnik, 2015). 
These include new Keynesian models, real business cycle models, and the models of dynamic 
                                                             
54 Pluralists could also use this argument in circumstances in which economics assumes more than one base level 
of analysis (relaxing our assumption that assumes just one). 
55 As he acknowledges, the arguments in Lucas’s critique were not new. Lucas and others (notably Edmund 
Phelps, who Backhouse and Boianovsky (2012) credit with laying the foundations for Lucas’s approach) were 
already developing microfounded macro models in 1976, when Lucas’s critique was published. But the timing 
and force of the 1976 paper is taken to be the determining factor in shifting macroeconomic practices. 
56 This was not always inevitable. As Backhouse and Boianovsky (2012) document, there was once a movement 
to develop disequilibrium microfoundations from Keynesian macroeconomics instead of using equilibrium 
microeconomics to change the macro theory. This movement, however, slowly collapsed after Barro, Grossman, 
and Howitt announced the end of the disequilibrium approach at the 1979 meetings of the American Economic 
Association (Grossman, 1979; Barro, 1979; Howitt, 1979). 
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stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) theory. Microfounded models now dominate macroeconomic 
theorising and forecasting (Blanchard, 2016; Hoover, 2001; Romer, 2016). So much so that those that 
challenge the most popular microfounded models (those based on DSGE) were recently labelled 
“dilettantes”.57 
The dominance of microfounded models in macroeconomics is seen by critics as stifling and 
insufficiently pluralist. A number of critics have argued, in a fashion similar to Pettit and Jackson and 
Fodor, that even if macroeconomic processes are causally determined by or token identical to 
microeconomic properties, reducing the theories, generalisations, and explanations of the former to the 
later forces some important relations and properties to be ignored (Hartley, 1997; Hoover, 2001; 
Kirman, 1992; Wren-Lewis, 2018). Most arguments of this form attack the use of ‘representative 
agents’. In order to fruitfully aggregate individual decisions, microfounded macroeconomic models 
typically assume that all agents in a macroeconomy are the same. Microfounded models assume that 
aggregating the decisions of one ‘representative agent’ will suffice to model the macroeconomy. This 
representative agent approach has been criticised for confining macroeconomics to a limited set of 
circumstances, in which the representative agent approach might be appropriate (Stiglitz, 2018; Wren-
Lewis, 2018). Further, Alan Kirman (Kirman, 1992) argues that the use of the preferences of a 
representative agent explicitly prevents the existence of other causal factors—like the dynamics that 
occur when the decisions of heterogenous agents are aggregated—showing up in macroeconomic 
models. Beyond the use of representative agents, Kevin Hoover (2001) argues that microfounded 
macroeconomic models also needlessly ignore the role simple non-microfounded macroeconomic 
models (or heuristics) play in individual decision-making itself. The details of all these arguments 
differ, but critics largely agree that insisting that macroeconomics be microfounded blocks research 
and information that might otherwise be important. Pluralists could conclude from this that economics 
is insufficiently pluralist in the presuppositions it utilises. 
Defenders of the idea that there is already pluralism in economics could give three responses to 
this conclusion. They could, first, defend the importance of microfoundations in the same terms as 
Lucas, but argue that they are not as restrictive as critics think. They could argue that 
microfoundations are important to ensure that macroeconomics models are able to make accurate 
policy decisions through political and societal shifts. In the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
this argument has lost popularity. Modified versions of it, however, are still offered by economists. 
Fabio Ghironi (2018), and Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Mathias Trabandt 
(Forthcoming) have argued that microfoundations are important for Lucas’s reasons, but that the 
microfoundations need to be updated to include things like heterogenous agents and firms. They argue 
that this is being done and that if it continues then there is no reason why microfounded 
                                                             
57 An early version of a paper by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (Forthcoming) caused a storm by 
claiming that “People who don’t like dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are dilettantes. By 
this we mean they aren’t serious about policy analysis.” The word “dilettantes” was cut from the final version of 
the paper, but the message remained: microfounded DSGE models are the only serious way of doing policy 
analysis. See p. 2 of the November 9, 2017, version of the paper for the offending comment at 
http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~yona/research/DSGE.pdf [accessed: 3/4/18]. 
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macroeconomic models can’t incorporate the causal factors some of the critics say they leave out 
(aggregate dynamics, the role of finance, et cetera). They, thus, deny the idea that reducing 
macroeconomics to microfoundations need imply any sort of loss. This means that either macro and 
micro levels are not distinct in the way that Jackson and Pettit and Fodor argue that physics and 
economics are, that microfounded models actually do speak to the macro level causal factors, or that 
all relevant macroeconomic causal factors are fully reducible to the micro level. 
A second response might also point to changes in macroeconomics but drop the centrality of 
microfoundations. Olivier Blanchard (2018), for example, has argued that although macroeconomists 
should retain microfoundations in their theoretical and conceptual discussions, they might employ 
non-microfounded models in policy related circumstances. This would enable a closer relation 
between policy models and actual data, which would enable them to pick up on things like the role of 
finance but ensure that macroeconomic theorising can still develop new tools (to then supplement 
policy models) from a well-grounded (i.e., microfounded) base. Blanchard also argues that something 
like this is starting to happen and that it is the future of macroeconomics. He, thus, implicitly agrees 
that past techniques in macro have been insufficiently pluralist but argues that they are changing and 
being supplemented with other ways of doing things.  
Lastly, those seeking to defend the idea that there is pluralism within economics might argue that 
the existence of various criticisms of microfoundations prove that there is a healthy debate in 
economics. Some economists take the microfoundations approach because they believe it to the most 
fruitful way to get at what they want to investigate—in the same way that some scientists seek to 
understand biological processes through physical properties—but dissent exists. There is, thus, 
sufficient space within economics for disagreement, and a variety of presuppositions. 
These three arguments—microfoundations are important and can incorporate new things, 
microfoundations are important for some uses but are rightly being supplemented for others, the fact 
there is debate shows there is pluralism—are all likely to be rejected by pluralist critics of economics. 
They are likely to flat out reject the idea that everything can be incorporated into microfounded 
models. They are likely to reject the idea that macroeconomics is changing or that there is sufficient 
debate in the discipline and to point to the fact that very few macroeconomic models used by 
economists are non-microfounded. They are likely to also claim that Blanchard’s argument that 
microfoundations should remain the base of theorising is still too restrictive. 
Without going into further details, two features of this debate are salient for present purposes. 
First, the accounts of scientific pluralism I presented in chapter 2 give reasons to believe that the 
sciences should utilise multiple levels of analysis but do not provide a metric for judging what counts 
as different levels or how many are required. Whether macroeconomics should count as utilising 
multiple levels depends on how the boundaries between levels are drawn. Those that argue that models 
based on individual behaviour can incorporate everything on the macro level deny that there is a 
distinction between micro and macro levels or accept that there are two levels but argue that models 
based on individual behaviour speak to both. Pluralists would deny both these points. Whether 
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macroeconomics is too reductionist depends on whether or not its present practices are interpreted as 
obscuring useful information. Those that argue that macroeconomics has changed and now 
incorporates enough or that this whole debate signals pluralism claim that present practices 
incorporate all the causal factors that are necessary. Pluralists would also deny this. 
All of this might be re-written in terms of causal processes and kinds by arguing that 
microfoundations mark the dominance of a particular way of parsing the world at the expense of 
others. This is what Kirman (1992) argues is the issue with microfoundations—he argues that causal 
processes like the dynamics that occur on the aggregate level of decisions of heterogenous agents are 
ignored. But defenders of economics could respond with the same three points above—
microfoundations are important and not that restrictive, microfoundations are being supplemented, the 
fact there is debate shows there is pluralism.58 Thus, as with schools of thought, the answer to ‘[3] is 
[macro]economics pluralist?’ with regard to presuppositions (including levels of analysis, causal 
processes, and kinds) is a matter of degree with multiple possible interpretations. 
Secondly, even if we could conclude that one area of economics (macro, for example) does utilise 
an insufficient number of presuppositions, would that be enough to say that economics is not pluralist 
in general? Can a lack of pluralism in a part of economics condemn the whole discipline? Rather than 
concluding that economics is not pluralist it would be more accurate to conclude that macroeconomics 
does not make sufficient use of multiple levels of analysis given its purposes. But suddenly pluralism 
has disappeared. In its place are local reasons about the fruitfulness of particular reductions. Such local 
debates are important. It seems appropriate for practicing economists and philosophers to engage in 
debates about how many levels of analysis particular economic models or theories should employ (and 
which ones). But I don’t see a clear way to parlay such debates into a judgement about the state of 
pluralism in economics, in general. Moreover, it is hard to see how talking about such a state would 
help those debates. 
 
3.3 Is economics pluralist? 
Even if we were to fix a compound variable or some kind of presupposition as the target for pluralism, 
the question ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ does not appear to have a clear answer. Certainly not one that 
would convince those who initially disagree. In this section, I will briefly argue that it is likely that the 
same can be said if pluralism is defined for economics around the abstract or concrete goals, epistemic 
base units, or products of economic research. 
                                                             
58 More generally, it would be fairly easy to argue that economists examine multiple causal processes and utilise 
multiple kinds. The variety of models approach to economics recently popularised by Dani Rodrik (2015) and 
the rise in significance of empirical work (Hamermesh, 2013) both indicate that economists assume some 
plurality of potential causal processes and kinds. Whether this plurality is sufficient to match Cartwright and 
Dupré’s pictures is questionable, but, as with levels of analysis, the degree of plurality required is open to 
interpretation. 
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As with compound variables and presuppositions, without a clear criterion of difference, it is hard 
to determine whether the range of questions, problems, pragmatic constraints, values, and epistemic 
goals (i.e., abstract and concrete goals) economics focuses on are sufficient. Pluralists could argue that 
Pareto optimality, efficiency, and utility maximisation are too often the targets of economic theorising 
and interventions. But economists could respond that they actually study a wide variety of topics with 
different goals in mind. As an example, they might point to the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment 
(Baicker et al., 2013) that sought to measure the effect of health insurance on health outcomes and a 
number of other key indicators. 
The same thing is true for explanations, representations, and models (the products of inquiry). 
Economic research contains many different models, explanations, and representations (Rodrik, 2015). 
For pluralists, this variety belies the narrow approach from which it comes from: economics may have 
many models, but they are all of the same sort. Economists may disagree and argue that they use lots 
of different kinds of models—some based on behavioural economics, some on complexity economics, 
some on more traditional forms of welfare economics, et cetera. This back and forth very quickly puts 
us back into the impasse discussed earlier. Without a clear criterion of difference or of how much 
variety is necessary, there is no clear answer to ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ based on the products of 
inquiry either. 
But, maybe the focus on modelling itself might be where economics fails to be sufficiently 
pluralist? Even those that see pluralism in economics acknowledge that modelling is central to the 
discipline. David Colander, for example, acknowledges that “the modeling approach to problems is the 
central element of modern economics” (2000, p. 137), and Rodrik (2015) defines economics around 
the use of multiple models. Moreover, text analysis of economics journals points to a long term rise of 
mathematics in economics papers, signalling an increased role for modelling (Kosnik, 2015). Maybe, 
if we focus on methods, forms of causal inference, concrete standards, and forms of representation 
(epistemic base units) as the locus of pluralism, then the adherence to modelling within economics can 
finally give a clear ‘no’ to ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ 
Defenders of economics, however, are likely to point to the range of different modelling 
techniques used in economics (from statistical models, to large computational agent-based models, to 
two-dimensional optimisation models). They might also add that a lot of economics now focuses on 
more concrete empirical work (Colander, 2005; Hamermesh, 2013; Rodrik, 2015; Smith, 2018), with 
models used as mere communicative devices for suggested causal relations in large datasets. This 
discussion raises all the same kinds of questions as with the other potential variables: When does a 
method count as a single approach? When does a discipline count as having a single set of methods? 
And, how much plurality is required? All sciences draw some epistemic boundaries. What kind of 
boundaries are necessary for a science to be considered pluralist rather than monist? A number of other 
sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology) blend modelling with experimentation and data 
collection. What is it about economics’ blend that is more problematic than others? 
All this gives reasons to believe that even if a specific variable (or compound of variables) for 
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pluralism was fixed, answering the question ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ in a way that convinces those 
not already sympathetic to your position is going to be difficult. Determining what counts as 
difference between variables and how many are required for pluralism is open to interpretation. 
 
The arguments for pluralism described in chapter 2 each recommend the multiplicity of particular 
variables. Answering the question ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ seems to require laying out the desired 
arrangement of plural variables and deciding whether some interpretation of ‘economics’ (say 
economic research in Britain and American universities) matches that arrangement. Arguments for 
pluralism in economics typically follow this line of reasoning (Davis, 2014a; Turner, 2012). They 
typically claim that economic research does not match a given arrangement of certain variables. Some 
commentators on scientific pluralism also see pluralism as a particular arrangement of certain 
variables. Inkeri Koskinen and Uskali Mäki argue, for example, that: “Pluralism either justifies the 
actually obtaining (kind and degree of) plurality or recommends that there be (higher than-actual 
degrees or other-than-actual kinds of) plurality in science” (2016, pp. 423-424). Moreover, given that 
the word ‘pluralism’ calls to mind the counting of some thing, it seems natural to focus on plural 
variables in determining what pluralism should mean for economics. 
But, as this chapter highlights, focussing on how economics compares to a particular arrangement 
of certain variables is difficult in practice. Although comparing economics to different potential 
pluralist configurations helps explain why there is a debate about whether economics should count as 
pluralist or not—too many variables and no clear way to determine how much of each is required—
doing so does not offer an obvious way out of that debate. There is a lot of room for interpreting what 
should count as sufficient plurality in practice. Answers to the question ‘[3] is economics pluralist?’ 
can choose from the range of possible plural variables listed in table 1 and interpret the boundaries of 
variables and how much of each variable is required in multiple ways. 
In making this argument, I do not claim that there can never be fruitful discussions about pluralism 
in economics, or elsewhere. There may be cases in which economists can quite easily agree on 
whether schools of thought or levels of description should count as distinct, and there may even be 
cases in which they disagree but where there is enough agreement that they can convince one another. 
I am not implying that there can never be a clear agreed distinction between schools of thought, 
presuppositions, incommensurable systems, et cetera. Outside of economics, there are many 
circumstances in which philosophers identify and agree on incommensurable differences between 
theoretical frameworks or systems of practice. Given some agreement, it may be helpful to ask: does 
our economics department require slightly more of X in order to more likely produce valuable 
models?  
The issue I point to concerns cases of disagreement and specifically the present state of 
disagreement about economics. Arguing for change in how economic research is organised by arguing 
that economics should match a given arrangement of certain plural variables is unlikely to convince 
those that think economics is already pluralist enough. Due to the range of interpretations available, 
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such arguments are also unlikely to identify unambiguous avenues for change. Some see monism 
where others see variety. Some think economics needs more of a given variable, others think it is fine 
as it is. I neither see a clear principled way to determine who is correct, nor think that looking for one 
is the most effective way to note problems in present economic practice. Continuing such an abstract 
debate in the face of so much disagreement is only of so much use. Given the societal significance of 
economic research, it is important to focus on offering concrete avenues for improvement and not get 
bogged down in a debate that is many steps removed from potential avenues for change. In the 
chapters ahead, I aim to do just that. Instead of seeking to match economics to an abstract ideal, I will 
evaluate social epistemic practices in economics by starting from concrete and measurable features of 
the discipline. 
The abstract accounts of pluralism do, however, have something to offer in this task. First, as the 
above highlights, the philosophical accounts of pluralism help to clarify key aspects of the 
disagreement about economics—different interpretations about the variables of pluralism and their 
boundaries. Second, and more importantly, the reasons for pluralism provide important insights into 
how the social epistemic practices in economics might be improved. I will show how in chapters 4-7. 
Focussing on improvements suggested by the reasons for pluralism rather than comparing economics 
to a particular arrangement of plural variables mirrors one aspect of the debate between ideal and non-
ideal theory in political theory: whether normative political theory should focus on ‘end-states’ or 
‘transitional-states’ (see 1.3). I will use the reasons for pluralism to make concrete recommendations 
for improvement in the social epistemic practices of economic research, rather than recommend an 
ideal end-state that economics should emulate. 
 
Conclusion 
Arguments that economics should be more pluralist are typically based on the claim that economic 
research does not match a particular arrangement of certain variables (methods, levels of analysis, 
epistemic values, schools of thought, et cetera). Interpreting pluralism this way does not lead to 
concrete recommendations for change because it leaves too much open. The accounts of pluralism 
explained in chapter 2 do not offer a clear way to answer whether economics is sufficiently pluralist or 
not, let alone what would be required for it to become more pluralist. The issue is that there are too 
many ways of interpreting what pluralism should mean. There are too many variables available, and 
even if a specific variable (or set or variables) for pluralism were fixed, there are too many ways to 
interpret how many of that variable economics has and should have. In chapters 4-7, I will offer a way 
out of this problem by focussing on the reasons for pluralism and the partial improvements they 
suggest to social epistemic practices, rather than comparing economics to an ideal state defined around 
specific plural variables. 
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4 An evaluative framework 
The debate about pluralism in economics is stuck. This is in part a reflection of the range of variables 
pluralism could focus on and the range of ways in which they might be interpreted in practice. Like 
those who argue for pluralism in economics, I seek to evaluate how research in the discipline is 
organised. I will do so, however, by pointing to measurable social epistemic practices in the discipline 
rather than comparing economics to an abstract arrangement of plural variables. In doing so, I hope to 
point to more concrete issues that offer clearer pathways for change. This does not, however, mean 
that abstract arguments for pluralism offer nothing. In the same way that thinking about why political 
ideals might be desirable can offer some guidance for more immediate political improvements, even if 
they do not completely determine those improvements, the reasons why pluralism is desirable offer 
some insights into how social epistemic practices in economics can be improved. In this chapter I 
show how. 
I will once again draw on the arguments for pluralism outlined in chapter 2. But this time I will 
focus on the reasons for pluralism and the social epistemic practices they suggest, rather than ideals of 
pluralism defined around particular variables. I will use the reasons for pluralism to develop three 
heuristics that I will later use to evaluate the social epistemic practices in economics. In 4.1, I will 
argue that the arguments that pluralism can mitigate some of the epistemic limitations involved in 
science (reasons for pluralism of type (ii) from chapter 2) can be used to highlight the importance of 
progressive feedback in science. Social epistemic practices can be evaluated by determining whether 
or not they block important avenues for such feedback. I will then, in 4.2, use the arguments that 
pluralism is necessary because the sciences can serve a variety of goals (iii) to argue that social 
epistemic practices can be evaluated by asking whether they block the influence of certain kinds of 
interests (in 4.2.1) or avenues for public scrutiny (in 4.2.2). In developing these three heuristics, I 
leave the arguments that pluralism is the best way to describe the way the world is (i) to one side, for 
reasons explained in 4.3. 
I will explain how these three heuristics can be applied to economics to evaluate concrete issues in 
the way that research is organised in chapters 5-7. Together these three heuristics and the issues I use 
them to evaluate provide an answer to question [4]: what should be inferred from pluralism for 
practice in economics? 
 
4.1 Epistemic limitations and feedback 
H. Chang, Longino, Mitchell, and Kitcher all argue that pluralism helps to mitigate certain epistemic 
limitations involved in scientific practice (ii). Longino argues that pluralism is a necessary result of the 
social interaction required to justify knowledge in the face of underdetermination. Kitcher argues that 
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it is prudent for scientists to pursue different strategies in the face of uncertainty. H. Chang argues that 
tolerating different systems of practice can help overcome the facts that scientists can never be sure 
which practices will be most suitable to attain a particular goal; that different ways of practicing 
science only seem able to give partial pictures of given phenomena; and that encouraging interaction 
between different systems of practice helps to progress each individual system (via competition and 
co-opting ideas). Lastly, Mitchell argues that pluralism is the necessary result of the idealised character 
of modelling. I will show that all of these arguments, bar Mitchell’s, can be interpreted as suggesting 
mechanisms for increasing feedback to scientific representations and practices, where feedback refers 
to any process by which scientific knowledge and practices are exposed to resistance. It can come in 
the form of empirical testing, competing models, but also social critical interaction. I will then suggest 
that social epistemic practices—that is social arrangements and practices that bare on knowledge 
acquisition, retention, assessment, and transmission— can be evaluated by checking to see if they 
block mechanisms for feedback. 
Longino (2002) argues that social critical interaction between scientists is necessary to ensure that 
the background assumptions they rely upon to bridge the justificatory gap caused by the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence are reasonable. Social critical interaction provides a 
mechanism for correcting falsehoods, inappropriate assumptions, biases, and other failings. Pluralism 
comes as a consequence of this. Different scientific communities can have different goals and develop 
different legitimate standards. The knowledge accepted by the social critical interaction of different 
communities will, therefore, likely differ. As noted in 2.2.3, this is intended as a descriptive argument, 
but it also has a normative dimension. Longino’s argument is both that knowledge is plural, and that 
scientists and philosophers of science should accept a plurality of representations within science 
because of the social way that knowledge is determined.59 Openness to a variety of representations is 
one component of a well-functioning set of norms of critical interaction. Pluralism is part of the 
package needed to help scientific knowledge get over the justificatory problem arising from 
underdetermination. Science should, thus, exhibit pluralism, with social critical interaction within and 
between scientific communities regulating the boundaries of that pluralism. 
But the argument that productive social interactions between scientists help the sciences develop 
stands alone. The step to pluralism is extra. Through challenges, corrections, and enrichments, social 
critical interaction provides a feedback mechanism for scientific knowledge. It is this feedback that 
bridges the justificatory gap caused by underdetermination. The feedback from social critical 
interaction provides checks that aim to ensure that the background assumptions different scientific 
communities use, as well as the knowledge they hold, are reasonable and directed towards suitable 
ends. Scientific knowledge may never be infallible, but at least its robustness can be increased by 
                                                             
59 Longino states, for example, that “on a theoretical level pluralism might give rise to contradictions, but this 
should not lead to an idea of competition where one theory is chosen. Instead multiple theories must persist but 
be made into single explanations (i.e., undergo competition) only when explaining particular events.” (2013, p. 
146) 
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ensuring it is regularly challenged and critiqued.60 
This picture draws heavily from John Stuart Mill’s classic argument for freedom of thought and 
expression in On Liberty (1859). Like Longino, Mill sees criticism as a crucial source of justification 
for knowledge. Human rational beliefs (and actions) depend on the corrigibility of errors. Mistakes are 
possible but rectifiable as long as open discussion and criticism is available to guide people away from 
error. 
The whole strength and value, then, of human judgement, depending on the one property, that 
it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of 
setting it right are kept constantly at hand. (Mill, 1859, p. 146) 
The truth of particular propositions can only be presumed if every opportunity has been afforded to 
efforts to disprove them. Mill adds that criticism is also important for our ideas to remain alive. To 
hold our beliefs rationally, we must understand the reasons for them, and so must also understand 
reasons against them. Without this, our understanding of our beliefs wanes and we are less likely to act 
on them. This turns them into dead dogmas, no longer being acted on effectively, but also blocking the 
ground for new ideas. Moreover, in addition to legitimising what we think we already know, Mill 
notes the obvious potential for critical positions to teach us new things. Criticism can lead us to 
replace whole propositions, and also to mix and synthesise what is correct in competing positions. He 
sees the social process of dialogue between competing truths as one of the most important mechanisms 
humans have for developing new, and better, ideas (see chapter 7, for a further discussion of this). 
Mill, thus, foreshadows Longino’s argument that the feedback provided by social critical 
interaction has a crucial role to play in grounding and improving knowledge. Critical feedback tests 
and corrects knowledge and justifies the retention of knowledge that is not rejected in cycles of 
challenge and response. It keeps our knowledge fresh and ensures we continue to act on it, rather than 
letting it become dead dogma. And, the interplay of competing truths can be an important mechanism 
by which our knowledge develops. 
 
Social criticism is not the only mechanism for feedback available. There are many ways that 
knowledge can be challenged, probed, and tested. Cycles of challenge and response are famously 
central to Karl Popper’s (1972) account of how science progresses. It is by comparing the predictions 
of theories to empirical observations that they are falsified (or revised). Otto Neurath’s famous boat 
metaphor, similarly, emphasises the importance of never-ending cycles of iteration between scientific 
representations of the world and new observations (Cartwright et al., 2008). 
H. Chang (2004) also emphasises the importance of iterative cycles of improvement. He argues 
that scientific systems are enriched and/or corrected via mechanisms that provide ‘resistance from 
                                                             
60 My understanding of robustness is based on Wimsatt (1961): a finding is robust when it is found to be 
invariant under independent measurement, derivation, or identification processes. Scientific knowledge can 
increase its robustness when it is shown to fit with a larger array of independent observations, models, uses, 
forms of reasoning, and critical perspectives. 
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reality’. By pointing to the progressive power of iteration, H. Chang locates the justification of 
scientific knowledge in the same place that Longino and Mill find it: in its ability to self-correct and to 
react. But H. Chang’s focus is wider than Mill’s. He focuses on systems of practice, meaning that he 
thinks iteration also helps to progress scientific methods, measurements, techniques, instruments, and 
abilities, rather than just representations or scientific knowledge.61 Moreover, instead of the social 
practices that Longino and Mill focus on, H. Chang emphasises repeated interaction with external 
reality as the mechanism of correction. This recommends a similar process to Popper’s 
falsificationism, but with a looser understanding of what it means to interact with external reality and 
without Popper’s insistence on a single system.62 As we saw, H. Chang then argues that having 
multiple systems of practice bouncing back and forth with reality can help scientific communities 
move towards whatever their goals are faster by offering them more paths to success. Like Mill, H. 
Chang also suggests the competitive interplay of different ideas as a mechanism to progress scientific 
knowledge and notes that systems might borrow ideas from each other. 
Like Longino, then, H. Chang (2012) emphasises iteration in the development of science and 
pluralism as a mechanism of multiplying the avenues for iterative improvement. As with Longino’s 
argument, the insight that iterative resistance is an important mechanism by which science progresses 
stands with or without the conclusion that some ideal of pluralism best maximises it. 
Kitcher’s (1993) point is similar. He argues that, under reasonable assumptions about the 
probability of success for different research strategies, communities with scientists that pursue 
different strategies are more likely to reach successful outcomes. This is because it is not clear what 
strategies will be successful, because different strategies can bring different useful information, and 
because the opposition between different strategies can stimulate each other. Increasing the ways that 
scientific communities interact with the world (and so draw feedback from it) can be fruitful under 
uncertainty. 
Longino’s, H. Chang’s, and Kitcher’s arguments for pluralism, thus, all suggest that different 
mechanisms for feedback should be utilised to help develop scientific knowledge and overcome some 
of the limitations inherent in scientific practice—underdetermination, no clear method to study what is 
unknown, no way to ensure the production of infallible knowledge, no clear foundational knowledge. 
Rather than taking the extra step to pluralism, I will focus directly on feedback. As my first heuristic, I 
suggest that the social epistemic practices in a given scientific community can be evaluated by: 
H1: Looking for blocks to productive forms of feedback. 
Feedback can come in many guises. It refers to any process by which scientific knowledge and 
practices are exposed to resistance, be that through ethical challenges, reasoned elaboration, new 
                                                             
61 Longino also talks about how community practices and forms of reasoning can be developed through social 
critical interaction. But her discussion mainly focusses on improvements in the knowledge that comes from these 
practices. H. Chang, on the other hand, stresses the equal billing of progress in scientific practices and abilities 
with knowledge. 
62 This is implicit in Popper’s assertion that: “a new theory… must always be able to explain fully the success of 
its predecessor.” (Popper, 1981, p. 94) 
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observations, criticism, or empirical testing. Popper’s already noted processes of conjecture and 
falsification of theories is one of the forms of feedback most well-known among scientists. But 
theories need not be the only things exposed to resistance. Neurath argued that observations and 
methods must also be revisable, and H. Chang stresses the importance of iterative improvement of 
abilities as well as scientific representations. 
Popper, Neurath, and H. Chang’s understanding of feedback come from interactions with external 
reality that provide new observations, refine abilities, and stimulate the creation of new 
representations. There are also other ways that scientific representations and abilities can be improved. 
Take the case of theoretical economic models, for example. Observations sometimes help to refine 
such models. But reasoned criticism or the development of simpler or more general models without 
new observations can also result in refinements. As noted by Longino and Mill, social critical 
interaction can also provide mechanisms for testing and replacing ideas by highlighting new 
observations and experimental results and/or suggesting alternative forms of reasoning, background 
assumptions, standards, values, or presuppositions. This is particularly helpful for ideas that are hard 
to operationalise empirically. 
Feedback can come, thus, in the form of experiments designed to falsify a theory, social critical 
interaction that questions and clarifies a methodology, and everything in between.63 Feedback can 
come from competition, the ways that research is financed, the application of knowledge in 
technologies or policy, and even simple things like presenting ideas to those without the same 
background assumptions or knowledge. It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all the 
possible mechanisms for testing and challenging scientific knowledge and practices. My point is, 
rather, that we can evaluate social epistemic practices in science by asking whether they block avenues 
for testing, resistance, and challenge. The loose category ‘feedback’ will suffice as a label to cover the 
various ways that philosophers have suggested that scientific knowledge and practices be exposed to 
resistance. In looking at feedback mechanisms in general, I extend H. Chang’s insight that resistance 
from reality is an important way to develop science by adding Longino’s point that social interactive 
processes can also provide crucial feedback. I also extend Longino’s argument by adding H. Chang’s 
insight that it is not just the outputs and background (assumptions) of science that should be tested in 
processes of feedback, but also the abilities. 
Productive feedback is feedback that brings information, arguments, or observations to a scientific 
community that enable the enrichment, correction, or justification of the knowledge or practices in that 
community. H. Chang (2004) argues that theories and observations can only be justified by coherence 
within an existing system. But those systems can be said to improve iteratively through resistance 
from reality. Adding social forms of feedback to this, new observations, information, and arguments 
can help enrich or correct scientific systems. When feedback provides this, it is productive. Feedback 
that leads to greater justification of knowledge or practices in a community can also be productive by 
giving greater warrant for action. Bringing more information, arguments, or observations to bear on 
                                                             
63 The idea that drawing on different forms of feedback to refine our practices and understanding of the world is 
important has also recently been picked up by those working on the philosophy of mind (Clark, 2015). 
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the knowledge and methods of a scientific community amounts to an improvement in the productive 
feedback in that community. As does bringing information, arguments, or observations that are more 
challenging or novel from the perspective of the community’s assumed knowledge. 
The idea that productive feedback improves knowledge is compatible with each of the four most 
popular understandings of scientific progress (Dellsén, 2018): as the solving of contextually 
determined problems (Laudan, 1978), as increases in truthlikeness (Niiniluoto, 2014), as increases in 
justified true belief (Bird, 2007), or as increases in understanding (Dellsén, 2016). The problem-
solving account fits best. Feedback brings new information and ideas to bear on problems and 
challenges proposed solutions until they work (to whatever degree required). But even if scientific 
progress were defined in any of the three other ways, productive feedback also comes up as 
progressive. Testing hypotheses against reality, critiquing assumptions, and challenging the rationality 
of inferences all aim to increase the truthlikeness of knowledge. Bringing new information, 
perspectives, and observations to bear on scientific knowledge can also increase the justification (as 
well as truthlikeness) of beliefs. And, understanding can be improved by gaining new information, 
being forced to explain one’s knowledge in new ways, and refining one’s knowledge in the face of 
challenges. 
H1 suggests looking for social epistemic practices that block productive forms of feedback. This 
takes a negative rather than a positive approach. Instead of evaluating all the mechanisms that 
scientific communities utilise for feedback, H1 suggests looking for aspects of social epistemic 
practices that block feedback that if altered would lead to more productive feedback within the 
community, other things being equal. In many contexts there will be many different ways that social 
epistemic practices might be altered to allow for more feedback, some of which may pull in different 
directions. Determining the right balance of feedback enhancing techniques for different disciplines 
and kinds of knowledge is not going to be easy. I doubt an ideal balance can be determined for any 
discipline. The best avenues to pursue will have to be determined in context specific evaluations of the 
trade-offs involved. But looking out for the ways that social epistemic practices block feedback is the 
first step. 
 I will use chapters 5-7 of this thesis to explain how the feedback in a specific context can be 
improved. I give some examples of ways that productive feedback is blocked by the social epistemic 
practices in economics. A poor gender balance, a steep hierarchy, and a dismissive attitude to outsiders 
mean that economics forgoes productive forms of feedback that might otherwise progress the 
discipline. 
 
4.2 Choosing goals: representation and scrutiny 
Another set of arguments for pluralism outlined in chapter 2 cite (iii) the variety of goals that the 
sciences can and should be directed towards as a reason for pluralism. Because the specific goals of 
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science shift with context, some form of pluralism is desirable. There are many legitimate epistemic 
ends economic knowledge can serve—including parsimony, generality, empirical adequacy, 
consistency, scope, et cetera—and multiple potential uses for economic knowledge. Some aspects of 
economics may be used to make predictions (however loose) about future states of the economy. Other 
parts of economics may aim to aid the design of particular policy interventions (perhaps helping 
determine the rate of a new tax). Still other aspects of economics may aim to explain or aid the 
understanding of certain economic phenomena (strategic decision-making via game theory, for 
example). But it is not only variety in epistemic goals that (iii) target. The arguments for pluralism in 
category (iii) assert that because the sciences can serve different epistemic and pragmatic goals, it 
should be expected and accepted that they utilise a variety of methods, assume different 
presuppositions, create different representations, et cetera. 
For Longino, underdetermination implies that knowledge can only be justified within the critical 
practices and standards of particular scientific communities, and those communities can reasonably 
use different background assumptions, apply different standards, and target different pragmatic goals. 
Similarly, H. Chang argues that scientific knowledge and practices can only be justified by coherence 
within a progressive system, and that different systems can be developed towards different pragmatic 
aims and utilise different epistemic virtues. Hacking also makes a similar point about styles of 
reasoning. Kitcher argues that because the ways that representations cohere with or depart from reality 
depend on the ways that they will be used, representations should be judged with particular contexts 
and uses in mind. Kitcher and Jackson and Pettit argue that something similar is true of the kinds and 
levels of analysis used in science. 
The point from all these arguments is that, given that there is not a single goal or use for scientific 
knowledge, epistemic or otherwise, sciences that are suitably open should develop a variety of 
representations and ways of interacting with phenomena. As we saw in chapter 3, the potential version 
of pluralism these arguments recommend underdetermine practice. But they can have implications for 
scientific practice without necessitating some pluralist end-state. As a first step, it seems helpful to 
ensure that the social epistemic practices of any given science are open to a variety of different goals. 
This approximation is just one step removed from pluralism. As stated, it might be just as difficult 
to apply to practice. Should maximum variety be aimed for? If not, how much variety? My suggestion 
is to ignore these questions and look at the problem in a different way. Rather than asking how much 
variety is desired (and aiming for a particular state), I suggest it is helpful to look for instances in 
which certain kinds of goals and uses are illegitimately constrained. But, what does it mean for the 
social epistemic practices of a community to ‘illegitimately’ constrain certain kinds of goals and uses? 
This question has two dimensions. What kinds of goals and uses should be considered? And, by what 
mechanism can the decisions of scientists to focus on certain goals and uses over others be legitimate? 
To answer the first question, I will, in 4.2.1, expand on Kitcher’s argument that the sciences serve 
different ends. I will argue that the social epistemic practices of sciences should ensure that the 
interests of all constituencies (in the societies they serve) play a role in determining the goals and uses 
of science. I will answer the second question, in 4.2.2, by arguing that scientists can only legitimately 
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ignore certain kinds of goals and uses if their decisions are open to public scrutiny. 
 
4.2.1 Representation 
How should the goals and uses of the sciences be decided? Kitcher (2001; 2011) attempts to answer a 
similar question. He argues from the absence of a simple epistemic goal for science to the democratic 
oversight of science. The basis of his argument is the claim that science does not just search for any 
old truth, but for significant truths. Some truths are more significant than others. Although some 
comparisons of significance seem obvious—the structure of the genome seems more valuable than the 
number of bottle caps that can be placed between Cambridge and London—64many are not. Scientists 
must judge the significance of the truths they seek in order to determine what to investigate. These 
judgements do not just come about in deciding the goals of inquiry (as suggested by Max Weber, 
1949), but are replete throughout science. They occur in determining resource allocation, how projects 
should be pursued, the weight of different pieces of evidence, and how truths should be used. 
Kitcher (2001) argues that significance cannot be purely pragmatic. If significance were 
determined purely pragmatically, then areas of inquiry without immediate practical relevance would 
be neglected. He also argues that attempts to formulate context-independent epistemic grounds for 
significance have failed. Kitcher argues that directing science towards a unified picture of the world 
cannot provide an epistemic criterion of significance because it is not clear why unity should be so 
desirable. He argues that the same is true for making causal processes or laws the centre of epistemic 
significance. Learning about causal processes helps us intervene in the world. But, if we assume that 
significance is more than just pragmatic, then a question remains why causal processes are valuable. 
Moreover, some causal processes might seem more significant than others. Likewise, learning about 
natural laws (should they exist) might be useful, but separate from practical concerns it is not clear 
that laws demarcate significance and some laws might seem more significant than others. Kitcher 
thinks that the most promising epistemic criteria for significance comes from explanations. But he 
argues that if explanations were to ground significance, then the explanations provided by science 
must be systematic in some way. If science just provided a long list of explanations, one for each truth 
in each possible context, then every possible truth would figure somewhere in the list and ‘providing 
explanations’ would not be able to determine between more or less significant truths. He dismisses the 
idea that scientific explanations could be systematic in some way for the same reason that he argues 
for a plurality of kinds (explained in chapter 2): there does not seem to be a way to reduce the 
concepts of higher level sciences to lower level concepts and human interests play a role in 
determining what counts as phenomena. 
Kitcher concludes that significance is determined by what seems surprising to us from the 
perspective of our capacities and cultures. Questions we take to be significant and how we try to 
answer them co-evolve with our practical projects. This means that, instead of being purely epistemic 
or pragmatic, Kitcher thinks that judgements of significance mix epistemic and pragmatic 
                                                             
64 This is a modified version of the famous example attributed to Richard Popkin. 
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considerations through combining practical interests and curiosity from the perspective of our 
capacities. Thus, even if the main goal of the sciences were truth (as Kitcher thinks it should be), 
context dependent epistemic, pragmatic, and value-based considerations enter the process by helping 
to determine the truths that are significant.65 
If there is no context independent way to determine scientific significance, then issues important 
to certain kinds of people can easily be ignored if their perspectives do not form part of the context of 
science. This has long been something that feminists have pointed out. Julie Nelson, for example, has 
noted the failure of economic metrics like GDP to pick up female forms of labour (Nelson, 1995). 
There are at least two ways that certain perspectives can be left out of judgements of significance. 
Firstly, voices representing particular perspectives and interests in society may not be involved in the 
situations in which significance is judged (including in funding decisions prior to inquiry, and 
throughout choices made during inquiry). One way this might happen is if the only way to be involved 
in judgements of significance is to have a certain type of education not accessible to all. Secondly, 
certain kinds of voices may not be given equal weighting in discussions about significance. This might 
happen for legitimate reasons—those that consistently get particular agreed facts wrong might, for 
example, be considered too ill-informed to have equal voice to others. But it can also happen for more 
troubling reasons. Miranda Fricker (2007) has pointed to cases in which prejudices towards particular 
social types systematically negatively skew their credibility. She labels instances of this ‘testimonial 
injustice’. She gives the example of a black witness at a trial not being believed by prejudiced white 
jurors as an example of such an injustice. 
There are at least two issues that might arise if conversations about significance lack certain 
voices or afford lower credibility to certain kinds of voices. Firstly, particular social groups may offer 
unique perspectives and abilities. If those groups are either excluded or marginalised, then judgements 
of significance may not draw on important information that their perspectives and abilities provide. 
Secondly, particular social groups may have unique interests that are not well represented in the rest of 
the population. If those groups are excluded, marginalised, or otherwise not heard in some way, then 
their interests are unlikely to figure in judgements of significance. This can make it seem as if the 
things they are concerned with do not exist. It can also contribute to what Fricker calls ‘hermeneutical 
injustice’, where society lacks the resources to understand the experiences of particular kinds of 
people (the example Fricker gives is the experience of sexual harassment before the concept entered 
public discourse). If the sciences have ambitions to be a positive force for society, as Kitcher and 
many scientists think they should, then systematically ignoring particular interests in judgements of 
                                                             
65 Kitcher’s argument is just one way of articulating how science involves more than purely epistemic 
judgements. Longino (2002) points to several social aspects of scientific knowledge. A number of scholars have 
argued against the idea that the sciences can make value-free inductive inferences (Rudner, 1953; Douglas, 
2009; Wilholt, 2009; Wilholt, 2013), and have attacked the idea that the sciences can view the world from 
aperspectively (Putnam, 1981; Rorty, 1979; Rorty, 1991). Lastly, feminist philosophers and historians have 
discussed the role socially determined perspectives play in scientific judgements, inferences, framings, and 
methods (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 2015a; Harding, 2015b). I endorse a number of these arguments but will not 
explain them in detail. I use Kitcher because his position is likely the least controversial for economists, and 
because the ideal he recommends is useful foil for the heuristic I develop. 
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significance seems like a problem. 
To forestall this possibility, Kitcher (2001) suggests an ideal for science based on deliberative 
accounts of democracy. Deliberative democrats argue that judgements about values are only legitimate 
when they emerge from discussions in which all participants come as equals (Dahl, 1956; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Rawls, 1993; Rawls, 1971).66 Since judgements of 
significance involve values and, like values, do not have an obvious context independent foundation, 
Kitcher thinks that legitimate decisions about significance must similarly emerge from equal 
discussions. Kitcher, thus, argues that, for a science to be well ordered, the significance judgements it 
makes should approximate an ideal deliberation between all members of society (or a representative 
sample determined by splitting people into groups with common perspectives), in which the 
participants come as equals. Kitcher thinks that such an ideal deliberation would have three stages: 
determining how resources should be allocated, determining how projects should be pursued, and 
determining how findings should be used. The first and third stages should involve discussions that 
respect the preference of all in the deliberation, as well as some form of aggregation that considers the 
needs of all, aided by a body of disinterested experts (selected by the deliberators). In the second 
stage, deliberators should decide between possible operational paths—determined by a disinterested 
arbiter using conclusions from the first stage of the deliberation—using an agreed upon decision 
mechanism (utility maximisation, for example). 
Ideal deliberations are supposed to ensure that the interests of disparate groups of people are 
balanced in a fair and transparent way. By insisting that the sciences use judgements of significance 
and certification that emulate those that would be arrived at in an ideal deliberation, Kitcher aims to 
make the practices, processes, and uses of the sciences represent all kinds of people in a given society.  
When he first presented his ideal of well-ordered science, Kitcher (2001) emphasised its 
counterfactual nature. If the judgements of significance matched those that would come out of an ideal 
deliberation, then science was well ordered. This was at odds with many arguments for deliberative 
democracy that consider actual conversations are necessary (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). In later re-
presenting his ideal, Kitcher (2011) acknowledged this and added that, to be well-ordered, a science 
must utilise some actual conversations, as well as reach conclusions that would be the same as those 
from an ideal deliberation. He is a little vague on what these conversations should entail. He discusses 
the creation of citizen panels that would have some say in the direction of science, but also other 
institutional forms that encourage conversations, like research review boards. He does not argue for 
any one institutional form but for the existence of conversations in general, arguing that nothing “can 
transcend the authority of the conversation” (Kitcher, 2011, p. 134). 
Kitcher’s ideal, thus, has two aspects. Representation (balancing the interests of disparate groups) 
and legitimacy (decisions coming from actual conversations) are both needed to ensure that the 
sciences make acceptable judgements of significance. Both of these considerations are important, and 
                                                             
66 Rawls’s work does not necessarily fit under the title deliberative democracy (Saward, 2018), but his use of 
ideal deliberations, nonetheless, inspires Kitcher’s account. 
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I will use them to develop two heuristics below. But, I am not convinced by the usefulness of Kitcher’s 
ideal framework for three reasons. 
Firstly, it is difficult to see how actually existing scientific institutions should be structured to be 
compatible with well-ordered science. Actually existing scientific institutions are quite far from ideal 
deliberations. Moreover, the counterfactual character of well-ordered science, which remains even 
after Kitcher’s later addition that the sciences should include some actual deliberations, means that it 
does not have much to say on the actual institutional arrangements of an ideal or better science. 
Kitcher does offer some concrete issues in present scientific institutions—present incentives do not 
reflect human needs, public input is currently done badly, privatisation will make matters worse, and 
current science neglects the interests of too many—but it is not clear that an ideal is needed to point 
out that these things are problematic. 
Secondly, given that Kitcher’s ideal deliberations are based on a number of implausible 
assumptions (the disinterested arbiter in step two, for instance), it is not clear what the outcome of 
such a deliberation would look like for a number of issues. Without being able to infer an outcome, 
and without being able to emulate one in practice, we can't see how well reality matches the ideal 
decision. This makes it difficult to determine when sciences are in practice well ordered. 
Lastly, Kitcher's focus and his examples all come from classical concerns of practical ethicists—
should we, for example, allow for genetic testing of unborn babies? These sorts of questions do not 
have simple solutions, but they are at least well defined and fit easily into a deliberative frame. There 
are many other issues around science, however, that are much less clearly defined and fit much less 
easily into a deliberative framework. The power balance between technocrats, governments, and 
polities at large is, for example, an important issue (particularly for economic expertise). Should 
central bank policy be decided by appointed experts, as it currently is in most developed countries, 
rather than elected officials? Should the experts employed by the European Commission be able to 
determine as many facets of the EU regulations as they do? When experts do make what seem to be 
politically salient decisions, should there be any form of oversight? Institutional issues about who gets 
to decide and on what grounds (particularly when decisions are required quickly) are hidden by 
Kitcher’s examples of well-defined ethical deliberations that lead to outcomes determined by 
disinterested experts. 
For all of these reasons, Kitcher's well-ordered science does not offer us much to assess the social 
epistemic practices of economics. Nonetheless, his points that the sciences should aim to make 
judgements of significance that represent the viewpoints of their citizens and that conversations have 
an important role in legitimising judgements in science are important. Instead of formulating an 
alternative ideal for how sciences should deal with these facts, I will focus directly on how social 
epistemic practices score on them. I take up the issue of citizen conversations in legitimising decisions 
of significance in 4.2.2. I close this subsection by suggesting a second heuristic for evaluating social 
epistemic practices based on representation. Social epistemic practices in a given scientific community 
can be evaluated by: 
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H2: Looking for blocks to certain kinds of interests being considered in judgements of 
significance. 
The point of this heuristic is to look for ways to improve the social epistemic practices within a 
given science by making the goals and interests they draw on more representative of the wider 
community they serve. The recognition that the sciences can serve many ends and that it is important 
for the sciences to make representative judgements of significance is enough to motivate piecemeal 
improvements in the social epistemic practices of a given science, without postulating an ideal state of 
well-ordered science.67 There are all sorts of qualifications that can be made—that those judgements 
are informed, reasonable, et cetera—but simply checking whether particular social epistemic practices 
in a specific science block the possibility of making representative judgements offers a first step for 
identifying improvements.  
As we saw in Kitcher’s account above, judgements of significance entail decisions about what 
kinds of processes and information a science considers important and worthy of study. They play a 
central role in determining what scientists in the given field work on, how the phenomena in fields are 
framed, and when findings are deemed acceptable. The facts that judgements of significance are 
unavoidable in science, and that there are no context-independent or purely epistemic ways to judge 
significance, open up the possibility that certain perspectives of significance can be left out. To avoid 
that possibility, the sciences should avoid social epistemic practices that make it difficult for certain 
kinds of interests to be considered in judgements of significance. By ‘certain kinds of interests’ I mean 
the goals and uses for science considered important by particular constituencies in the societies that 
the science in question serves. These interests can be epistemic and/or pragmatic. Working class 
communities might, for example, want secure employment opportunities to be explicitly targeted by 
macroeconomics over more generic targets like economic growth. Intellectuals may, for instance, 
place higher value on parsimonious, systematic, or abstract knowledge than more detailed but messy 
knowledge. The heuristic above does not argue that the interests of all communities should always be 
realised, but that we should be wary of social epistemic practices that make particular interests 
invisible. 
The practices that might make certain kinds of interests invisible could be quite simple. They 
might come in the form of institutional obstacles to particular kinds of interests or perspectives being 
considered by a given science, or they might simply come from the lack of particular kinds of 
perspectives in conversations about significance. I will highlight some specific ways that social 
epistemic practices in economics block certain kinds of interests being considered in judgements of 
significance in chapters 5-7. In chapter 5, for example, I will show, that economics has a high ratio of 
                                                             
67 Interestingly, Kitcher (2011) nods to a similarly piecemeal approach on many occasions. On p. 78 he notes 
that democracy is best thought of as a continuing process of “democratization”. On p. 47 ethical progress is 
presented as a process of refining practices to overcome practical problems. On p. 36 he says that “there is a 
strong temptation to believe that to show a decision is aligned with canons of good reason and good judgement 
requires producing explicit canons and demonstrating how the decision exemplifies them”, implying that such a 
temptation should be avoided. He even suggests we should think about how judges are able to produce well-
reasoned judgements in complex situations that do not easily admit ideals. 
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men to women, making it less likely that the concerns of women are heard in economic research. 
 
4.2.2 Scrutiny 
Economists might hope that their training, experience, and institutional structures (tenure, peer review, 
et cetera) give them the authority to make judgements about the directions of their work, without 
needing to constantly check that those judgements are representative. This is compatible with the idea 
that social epistemic practices should not systematically block certain kinds of interests from being 
considered in judgements of significance. As long as the interests of all play a role in suggesting goals 
and uses for economics, it seems plausible to accept that economists should have some freedom to 
judge which goals and uses make the most sense to pursue, given their knowledge of potential 
outcomes. However, given that it is quite possible for any expert group, economists included, to make 
biased decisions or close avenues for inquiry too soon,68 when are such judgements legitimate and 
not? 
Below I will discuss how judgements, including judgements of significance, by scientists that take 
place during the process of their work, can be legitimate. As we saw, Kitcher has something to say 
about this. In addition to emphasising the importance of representation, he stresses the role of citizen 
conversations in legitimising judgements about the goals and uses of science. I will, however, not use 
Kitcher’s suggestion for two reasons. Firstly, it is vague; it is not clear what kind and how many 
conversations are required. Secondly, it is not clear how such conversations should be balanced with 
leaving space for the judgement of the trained and experienced specialists. I develop a different 
approach drawing on the potential for citizen criticism. 
Political philosophy contains a long history of discussions about authority and legitimacy. Rather 
than exploring all potential definitions of and relations between authority and legitimacy, I will adopt 
what has come to be known as the democratic account of legitimacy (Chambers, 2017; Moore, 2017). 
The democratic account of legitimacy takes legitimacy to be a virtue of authority. Authorities issue 
reasons for action and that those reasons create political obligations when authority is legitimate. By 
forcing others to act, authority can still be effective without being legitimate, but it is only when it is 
legitimate that it creates obligations (Raz, 1986; Peter, 2010).69 Contrary to conceptualisations of 
legitimacy that mandate unquestioned acceptance of the demands of legitimate authorities, the 
democratic account of legitimacy then asserts that although subjects are obliged to act on the demands 
of legitimate authorities, they are free to judge those demands. Such judgements form the basis of 
democratic legitimacy; legitimate authority is authority that is judged over time to be acceptable by its 
subjects. 
                                                             
68 An example of claims being accepted with too little evidence comes from Haraway’s (1989) famous study of 
primatology. An example of the reverse comes from Epstein’s (1996) account of HIV patients wanting access to 
anti-retroviral drugs at a faster rate than the U.S. Food and Drug Administration were willing to certify them. 
69 Not everybody agrees on this understanding of the relationship between authority and legitimacy. But because 
my focus will be on epistemic, rather than political, authority and legitimacy, these disagreements are not 
particularly crucial. For overviews of the different accounts of legitimacy and authority available see Peter 
(2010) and Christiano (2004). 
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This parallels Mill’s account of the constitutive power of criticism for knowledge. For Mill, it is 
only through intense criticism that we can assume anything as knowledge. Similarly, it is through 
judgements by critical outsiders that authority is legitimised. The reasons that authority is judged 
legitimate can vary—maybe due to mutual benefit or some other convincing reason—but whatever 
those reasons are, they must be contested and challenged to ensure they still stand. Thus, although they 
are not required to persuade subjects to act in any one instance, explanations and justifications of 
demands are crucial for maintaining the legitimacy of authority relations over time. Judgements of the 
demands of authority are necessary for legitimacy in the same way that criticism is necessary for the 
existence of knowledge for Mill. Like knowledge, constant affirmation of authority need not be 
explicit. Affirmation can also come from the absence of disapproval, but only if avenues for 
disapproval exist. It is the potential and occasional exercise of disapproval that warrants trust in 
authority and, thus, its legitimacy. Democratic accounts of legitimacy, thus, utilise the importance of 
criticism in constituting effective authority highlighted by Mill; but, because subjects must still act on 
the specific demands of authorities, does not undermine the function of authority to enable binding 
collective decisions. 
Democratic accounts of authority were developed with entities like states and state actors in mind, 
entities that can have what we might call political authority. The epistemic authority economists 
possess seems to be of a different sort to political authority for two reasons. First, epistemic authority 
is based on inequality of judgement (arising from training, experience, and knowledge), whereas 
political relations of authority typically assume equality of political judgement. Secondly, the actions 
that epistemic authority demands are the belief of certain propositions. This makes acting on the 
demands of epistemic authority, and thus believing what they say, while also judging it, seem 
impossible. 
Despite these differences, Alfred Moore (2017) thinks that the democratic account of legitimacy 
and authority can be used as a good basis for understanding epistemic authority and the role of 
expertise in society. He suggests Joshua Cohen’s (1989) distinction between acceptance and belief as a 
way of making it possible to act on epistemic authority while still judging it. Moore argues that, to 
accept the statement of an epistemic authority, we take it as a premise in our own deliberations. Even 
if we do not individually believe it, we accept it as a surrogate for a fact (Turner, 2003). Accepting a 
claim, but not believing it, then provides strong reasons to closely scrutinise how it came to be and can 
lead to the retrospective testing and criticism that constitutes the legitimate authority of experts. Like 
(democratic) legitimate political authority, legitimate epistemic authority warrants acceptance in each 
instance, but judgement over time. That judgement over time makes it important for epistemic 
authorities to engage with their subjects and give reasons for their claims. 
The fact that epistemic authority assumes inequality rather than equality of judgement seems more 
difficult to square with the democratic account of authority. How can the public judge the claims of 
epistemic authorities given that they do not have the same knowledge or skills as those authorities? 
The regularity with which their ideas are discussed (and often dismissed) in popular and political 
discussions makes economists especially liable to flinch at the mention of public judgement. Many 
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studies have shown the public to be irrational (Sunstein & Thaler, 2008) and ill-informed (Pareek & 
Pattison, 2000). Numerous economic theories reach what seem from many people’s perspectives to be 
counter-intuitive conclusions—the paradox of thrift, which states that, if everybody tries to save more, 
then aggregate savings decrease, or Ricardo’s model of comparative advantage, are two classic 
examples. Moreover, it doesn’t seem realistic that all citizens will be able to understand even basic 
economic concepts like elasticity of demand, let alone more complicated concepts, nor is it clear that 
citizens attaining such knowledge is desirable. The division of epistemic labour exists for a reason, 
economists might argue. It would be a waste of time for everyone to understand all the details of 
economic theory. 
All of this can be accepted without dropping the idea that economists might admit some form of 
public oversight. It may be difficult for the public to understand the full detail of all expert 
conclusions, but that does not mean that there are no forms of judgement available to them (Moore, 
2017). Two simple examples give an idea why this might be the case. In his Politics, Aristotle (1984) 
notes that guests are better able to judge the quality of a meal than the cook as they are the intended 
beneficiaries of the meal (III, XI). Similarly, I may not be a skilled computer technician, but I know 
when my computer has been fixed and I can tell when something has started to slow it down. There 
are two things going on in these examples. Firstly, aspects of the products of epistemic authority are 
often accessible to those without the full technical details, even when the complete picture is more 
detailed. Secondly, if the products of epistemic authority are supposed to benefit others, then whether 
or not they experience that benefit matters even if they do now know all the technical details in 
between. These points indicate that there can be and are ways to judge the claims made by those with 
epistemic authority even without possessing the full knowledge those with epistemic authority 
possess. 
Moore (2017) draws on extensive literature in social epistemology to suggest a number of ways 
that ‘experts’—those with epistemic authority—might be judged by non-experts. Assessing the 
credentials of experts and how those credentials are attained is one way of judging their conclusions 
(Collins & Evans, 2007; Goldman, 2001b). Although judging whether credentials are working well 
might sometimes involve substantive knowledge of the conclusions that those with them produce, 
some proxies for assessing credentials are available without such knowledge. If credentials can be 
bought or are distributed in some other troublesome fashion (without sufficient access to certain 
groups, for example), then they might not be worth significant consideration. The advice of particular 
experts or experts relying on particular tools and techniques can also be judged by looking at their past 
track record (Goldman, 2001b). Looking for consensus among experts is another way to judge their 
conclusions. Although, consensus alone tells us nothing about its conditions of production and only 
seems valuable if it arises from cycles of challenge and response between independent experts and 
different kinds of evidence, that is if it emerges from a science without significant obstacles to 
productive feedback. Witnessing debate or glimpsing parts of the cycles of challenge and response 
might then also be a way to judge expert conclusions. The existence of productive debate can signal 
that the conclusions drawn have been suitably challenged and refined. Moreover, it is in debates 
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(public facing debates in particular) that reasons for reliability and trustworthiness, and challenges to 
them, are often raised. In such debates, questions are often asked about funding patterns, biases, 
interests, and the values behind inferences, which are themselves useful proxies for judging expert 
conclusions.70 Similarly, the processes of arriving at conclusions might be judged against common 
views about the norms required in deliberation. Were all sides listened to fairly? Were some groups 
unfairly marginalised? Were people judged on the knowledge and information they brought to the 
table? 
Perhaps the most complicated of Moore’s suggestions is for non-experts to fit and combine their 
own lay knowledge with expert conclusions.71 If parts of expert knowledge can fit in with and 
corroborate non-expert knowledge, while also extending it, then that might be a reason to trust expert 
knowledge. Moore gives an example of a patient listing symptoms to a doctor. If a doctor is able to 
respond with further symptoms that the patient finds they also have (but did not volunteer), then the 
patient might take that as a reason to trust the doctor’s eventual diagnosis. Expert-lay interactions and 
the blending of knowledge in this way increases trust in expertise, actively helps people to augment 
how they understand the world, and can offer a resource for feedback to expert knowledge. 
A mixture of all these factors makes it possible for reflective acceptance of epistemic authority. 
The above methods require some skill, but do not require the same skills as the experts they are used 
to judge.72 Moreover, although some of these methods require effort, the constant active judgement of 
every piece of expert testimony by all people is not required for legitimate democratic epistemic 
authority. All that is required is that those that act using expert advice reflect on the authority of those 
experts over time, and that the potential for critical reflection on expert advice is available to all. It is 
the existence of real potential for critical reflection that constitutes the democratic legitimacy of 
epistemic authority. 
Certain ways of organising expert advice and certain social mechanisms for oversight of expert 
advice can aid the existence and potential for critical reflection. Institutional arrangements that ensure 
that systems of accreditation are reliable might be useful in this regard. Independent measurements of 
key aspects of expert advice might also be helpful—the way that Greenpeace collects information and 
monitors governments, or the way that think tanks provide alternative analysis or data. Institutional 
arrangements that support active public contestation that experts actually engage with are particularly 
important.73 Many of the methods of judgement suggested above draw on information that often 
emerges under contestation. Through contestation, information about interests and biases is made 
more visible, the memory of the interests that lose out in collective conclusions are preserved, and 
                                                             
70 It may not be the case that any expert advice is perfectly objective, but it might be useful to know whether 
those offering advice on particular topics have links (financial or otherwise) to parties that are affected by those 
topics. See Wright (2018) for a contextual account of objectivity that is motivated by this idea. 
71 The idea of ‘lay knowledge’ comes from Brian Wynne (1992; 1996), who argues that knowledge relevant to 
scientific endeavours is often distributed through different actors in society. 
72 They require what Urbanati terms “deliberative competence” (2002, p. 44). That is, more general deliberative 
skills, the kind of which are assumed by many political and social institutions in modern societies. 
73 By ‘public’ here, I do not necessarily mean in front of everybody. I mean publicly accessible. It is the potential 
for judgement, and so the availability of public deliberation, that is important. 
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reasons are tested, connected to active concerns, and made more visible to citizens (Moore, 2017). In 
addition to the existence of organisations like Greenpeace and think tanks, institutional arrangements 
that give rise to a variety of independent sources of expertise for any given issue can help encourage 
active public contestation. Examples of such arrangements include having experts study similar topics 
from different disciplines or discouraging single peaked hierarchies within disciplines (see chapter 6). 
The vigilant presence of concerned groups can have a similar effect. As can regular deliberations 
between different forms of expert (economists engaging with other social scientists, for example), 
public debate, and more common forms of public outreach. 
The question is not whether citizens can know enough to develop their own economic theories or 
polices, but whether they can know enough to scrutinise and judge the claims of economists, the ways 
they arrive at their conclusions, and the role they play in decision-making processes. The legitimacy of 
epistemic authority is part constituted by critical reflection, which plays an active role in ensuring that 
such authority is secured or replaced where appropriate. Complete criticism all the time is not 
required, a few institutional norms and the active engagement by some can enable more passive but 
informed judgements by others. This should ensure that experts have some space to develop their own 
judgements. The exact balance between criticism and expert space should be assessed in specific 
institutional and scientific contexts. The point here is simply that it is in avenues for outside critical 
engagement and judgement that the legitimacy of expertise can be found. If economists want to retain 
legitimate authority, they need to engage with the questions, reasons, and concerns of citizens and not 
just assert their authority.74 For epistemic authority to be legitimate and sustained—that is for it to be 
accepted, live, and resilient (rather than brittle)—it must be open to the potential for critical 
judgement. The social epistemic practices of economics should facilitate debates and discussions in 
the public sphere and should make the conclusions of economists potentially judgeable in some of the 
ways outlined above. 
These considerations can ground legitimate judgements by economists of what goals and uses to 
act on. To be legitimate, the decisions of economists, which include judgements of significance, must 
be open to criticism. This can be used to make a third evaluative heuristic. Social epistemic practices 
in a given scientific community can be evaluated by: 
H3: Looking for blocks to avenues for public scrutiny. 
The choices economists make about the goals and uses they aim towards have authority. But that 
authority can only be legitimate and sustained by engaging with suitable practices for public scrutiny 
(in addition to ensuring no particular kinds of interests are blocked from being considered). 
Economists can make their own decisions about which avenues to open and close, but for those 
decisions to be legitimate, they must be open to challenge. The potential for citizens to form informed 
                                                             
74 This was part highlighted in the United Kingdom’s recent vote to leave the European Union. Angus 
Armstrong, former head of macroeconomic analysis at the Treasury, noted that, in tours around the country to 
argue against Brexit before the referendum, his models and arguments weren’t well adjusted to speak to 
concerns of ordinary people and he was largely dismissed (personal communication). He has since set up a 
project aiming to make macroeconomics more relevant. 
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judgements about their expert advice must be there. 
The potential for public scrutiny can be blocked in a variety of ways. I mentioned some ways to 
aid public scrutiny above—reliable accreditation, independent measures, ensuring public contestation. 
H3 suggests that circumstances in which any of these things are blocked are potentially problematic 
and deserve attention. Public scrutiny might also be blocked by overly technical discourse, or minimal 
attempts to communicate with the public (or worse, obscuring decisions from public understanding 
internationally), artificially constructed consensus (that obscures the debate within a discipline from 
public view), or a range of other conditions. I will highlight some ways that the potential for public 
scrutiny is blocked by social epistemic practices in economics in chapters 6 and 7. I will note in 
chapter 6, for example, that hierarchy within economics, and in particular the overemphasis on 
publications in a narrow set of journals, disincentivises economists from communicating with those 
outside the discipline. 
 
4.3 The way the world is 
There is a third set of reasons for pluralism in table 2 that I have not yet mentioned: those based on (i) 
the way the world is. Starting from the way the world is might also seem like a promising way to 
determine how economic research should be organised. Both Dupré (1993) and Cartwright (1999) 
have offered suggestions for how the sciences should be organised based on metaphysical diagnoses 
(don’t give too much funding to projects that promise unification, for example). I will not, however, 
take this approach for two reasons: because metaphysical assertions are difficult to substantiate, and 
because there are better avenues to effect practical change. 
Firstly, the metaphysical arguments for scientific pluralism rest on contentious evidential grounds. 
Take Jackson and Pettit’s (1992) and Fodor’s (1974) anti-reductionist arguments from chapter 2. Both 
argue that moving from a higher to a lower level results in important losses (of information and 
generalisations); losses that are permanent rather than contingent. The way the world is organised 
implies that reductions will always result in such losses. These permanent anti-reductionist arguments 
rely on two forms of evidence: examples of reductions in which information/generalisations are lost, 
and a justification as to why the higher level information/generalisations lost are unlikely to ever show 
up at the reduced level. The problem with the first part of these arguments is that examples cannot 
show permanent problems with reductions. The failure of a particular micro-level explanation to 
provide all the information of a macro-level explanation of the same phenomena might be the result of 
the present state of science, rather than the general impossibility of such micro-level explanations. The 
same goes for the failure of a proposition or generalisation in one language to reduce to another. 
General conclusions about the impossibility of explanations or propositions on one level, or in one 
language, to be reduced require more than the failure of some (possibly contingent) reductions. 
This is what makes the second parts of Jackson and Pettit’s and Fodor’s arguments important: they 
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provide a rationale for general anti-reductionism beyond contingent examples. It turns out, however, 
that these rationales also rest on contingent evidence. Fodor’s reason for thinking that failures of 
reduction are permanent arises from doubts over whether the physical predicates that special science 
generalisations are reduced to can ever be natural kinds or admit physical laws. Stephanie Ruphy 
(2017) notes, however, that even though it might be difficult to imagine such physical predicates being 
lawlike or natural kind-like, this still only amounts to contingent evidence. The history of science 
offers multiple examples of cases in which reductions previously thought impossible become 
possible.75 Given that our knowledge of how the world is rests on the findings of our most developed 
sciences at any one point in time, there doesn’t seem to be any way to verify the claim that the 
generalisations of the special sciences can never be described in terms of useful generalisations in the 
physical sciences. 
Jackson and Pettit’s argument rests on the assertion that there are different kinds of causal 
information, which can only be known at different levels. Comparative information comes from macro 
explanations, and contrastive information comes from micro ones. The assumption in asserting this 
trade-off is that the information given by micro level explanations cannot be aggregated together to 
provide something like comparative information. This is a claim that might be well supported when 
directed at particular examples of micro/macro phenomena (the divide between cellular and molecular 
levels, for example) and given the present state of science concerning those levels. But, as with 
Ruphy’s objection to Fodor, the examples Jackson and Pettit give cannot show that developments in a 
given micro level science can never lead to a form of aggregation that allows for micro level 
explanations to contain all the comparative information of macro level ones. 
Although I buy Jackson and Pettit’s and Fodor’s arguments that there exist (many) cases in which 
reducing present laws, explanations, or theories results in the loss of something (given the present state 
of science), such cases depend on their epistemic contexts. Although there may be good reasons why 
certain reductions give up something important given a particular state of development of science, it is 
a jump to claim that said reductions will be problematic in all possible future states of science. As the 
sciences change, reductions that were once unadvisable might become useful. It is a further jump to 
claim that there are permanently distinct levels or languages that provide different kinds of 
information and generalisations. 
This highlights the difficulties involved in trying to draw normative conclusions for the practice of 
science from metaphysical analysis. To make general normative claims, Jackson and Petit and Fodor 
draw general conclusions from contingent examples. Anti-reductionist doubts about the efficacy of 
particular, contextually situated, reductions might be well grounded, but the general anti-reductionist 
conclusions drawn from these doubts go too far.76 Dupré has argued, however, that even if this is the 
case, “science itself cannot progress without powerful [metaphysical] assumptions about the world” 
                                                             
75 Ruphy (2017) uses the once popular contention that chemical bonding could not be explained in terms of 
subatomic particles as an example. This contention is now defunct. Quantum mechanical developments have led 
to reductive explanations of the bonding of chemical elements (McLaughlin, 1992). 
76 Ruphy (2017) argues that something like the above is also true for Dupré’s arguments for metaphysical 
disorder. 
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(Dupré, 1993, p. 1). Science has to make some metaphysical assumptions even if they are imperfect. 
Moreover, the existence of many cases in which reductionism fails, or of circumstances in which 
supposed universal laws, causal processes, or kinds do not apply at least provides some evidence 
against the assumptions that complete reductionism will be possible in some future state of science 
and that the world is nicely ordered. 
I do not deny this. But, like the arguments that economics is insufficiently pluralist, it leaves a lot 
open. Some evidence for disunity seems unlikely to convince economists that their social epistemic 
practices need changing. This is my second reason for not drawing on the metaphysical reasons for 
pluralism. Even if it is true that metaphysical assumptions about the world are unavoidable, I don’t see 
metaphysical analysis as the most productive avenue to impact social epistemic practices in 
economics.77 As Ruphy notes, “an appeal to metaphysical considerations comes at the price of a much 
weaker credibility and relevance to scientific practice” (2017, p. 77). This does not mean that 
philosophers of science should never do metaphysical analysis, just that it is a risky path to go down if 
one wants to impact actual scientific practice. It may still be an important path to go down in some 
circumstances. But, for economics at least, there are more fruitful avenues for philosophical analysis 
to contribute to practice. In chapters 5-7, I will use H1-H3 to offer more concrete and less contentious 
reasons to change economics than challenging its metaphysical presuppositions. The social epistemic 
issues I will point to are problematic under a range of commonly accepted metaphysical assumptions. 
 
4.4 Why heuristics rather than pluralism? 
H1-H3 offer three starting points for evaluating and improving social epistemic practices. In chapters 
5-7, I will give examples of how these heuristics can be used to identify concrete issues within 
economics. But before I do so, I allay one worry. I argued that pluralism does not offer unambiguous 
recommendations for change in economics because there are too many ways to interpret it in practice. 
Pluralism offers an abstract ideal that can fit both critics’ and defenders’ pictures of what economics 
should be. As such, it is not clear what, if anything, should change on account of pluralism. But do my 
heuristics not suffer a similar fate? Are they not also abstract and open to interpretation? Take my first 
heuristic for example. Is it not possible for defenders of economics to say that there is enough 
feedback in the discipline while critics argue that there is not? My response consists in four related 
points. 
First, the framework I offer above suggests heuristics, rather than ideals in an attempt to support 
contextually grounded normative analysis. They are intended to be open to some interpretation in 
order to fit with the requirements of different contexts. They suggest looking out for particular issues 
                                                             
77 See the reception and (lack of) impact of Tony Lawson’s arguments that economics has something 
metaphysically wrong as an example of why I think that metaphysical arguments are not likely to be well 
received in economics (Fullbrook, 2008). 
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(practices that block feedback, the reception of certain interests, and public scrutiny) that, if resolved, 
can offer avenues for change, but must be weighed up against other factors in the context concerned. 
They are designed to aid the evaluation of specific practices by pointing to important considerations. 
They are not designed to determine how research communities should be organised a priori. In 
chapters 5-7, I will start from present practices in economics and use the heuristics to look for 
improvements, rather than suggest an ideal state and look for ways to reach it. 
Second, although the three heuristics I suggest do leave some things open to interpretation, in the 
context of economics they offer a clearer diagnosis of the issues than comparing economics to 
particular arrangements of plural variables. I did not argue that pluralism as an ideal is not helpful 
purely because it is abstract and open to interpretation. My argument was that the specific ways that 
pluralism as an ideal has been articulated are difficult to map over to practice in economics. I will 
argue that this is not the case for H1-H3. In chapters 5-7, I will show how they can be brought to bear 
on the current social arrangement of economics to point to three concrete issues. 
Third, my goal in this thesis is to argue that those concerned with how economic research is 
organised should turn towards concrete issues in economics rather than argue for ideal end-states. 
Ideals can be helpful, but in the context of economics, the ideal of pluralism has led to an impasse that 
blocks more obvious issues from view. My heuristics should be directly applied to practice and not 
held as alternate ideals. I will not use H1 to argue that there is not enough feedback in economics in 
general. Rather, I will take specific features of the way that economic research is organised and ask: 
do these restrict feedback in some way? I will argue that there are three features of the way that 
economics is organised for which the answer to this question is yes. Severe gender imbalances in 
economics limit the quality and scope of feedback in the discipline. A steep hierarchy in economics 
creates perverse incentives and a concentration of power that also limit feedback in the discipline. 
And, the way that economists interact with outsiders leads them to ignore or dismiss ideas and 
criticism from without, again limiting the feedback in the discipline. 
Fourth, my approach points to a number of the same concerns that pluralists have, but without 
postulating an ideal state. I highlight some aspects of economics that pluralists complain about as 
barriers to pluralism (a hierarchy that impedes non-mainstream approaches, for example). But I do so 
by pointing out the issues with those aspects of economics directly (the hierarchy in economics blocks 
avenues for feedback, the uptake of certain interests, and conditions for public scrutiny), rather than by 
arguing that they block the path to an ideal pluralist state. This gives concrete evidence to support 
some of the changes pluralists would like to see and relies less on debatable interpretations of how 
economics compares to an ideal state. Moreover, my recommendations are potentially more palatable 
to economists because I suggest concrete ways of making economics more responsive to important 
epistemic and political considerations (feedback, the interests of a wide variety of citizens, public 
scrutiny), without arguing that economics must change the theoretical and methodological frameworks 
they utilise. 
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Conclusion 
Whether economics should count as pluralist or not is difficult to answer. But the arguments for 
pluralism offer useful insights about the kinds of social epistemic practices that are likely to be 
progressive and that are likely to best serve society. Pluralists highlight mechanisms for feedback as an 
important way to iteratively progress sciences towards whatever goals they are taken to have. 
Feedback can involve interaction with external reality, social criticism, and any way of challenging the 
knowledge and practices of science. Some suggest pluralism as a way to increase the forms of 
feedback scientific knowledge and practices are exposed to. I suggest we look for feedback directly 
and evaluate social epistemic practices based on whether or not they block productive forms of 
feedback. I will show a number of ways that feedback is blocked in economic research in chapters 5-7. 
Pluralists also argue that the sciences do and should be used towards a variety of different goals 
and uses. But how should the goals and uses the sciences draw on be decided? I have argued that they 
should be decided in a way that does not systematically leave out particular kinds of interests in 
society, and that the decisions scientists make should be potentially open to criticism. Social epistemic 
practices can be evaluated by looking to see if they block certain kinds of interests being considered 
when deciding the goals and uses for science or block the public scrutiny of those decisions. 
I summarise how the evaluative heuristics I suggest in this chapter relate to the arguments for 
pluralism in table 3. It is these heuristics that I will take forward to argue from pluralism to practical 
changes in economics.   
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Type of reason Reason for pluralism Social epistemic practices 
can be evaluated by 
   
(i) The way the 
world is 
Propositions at higher levels of analysis cannot 
be reduced to lower levels without losing 
something 
 
The world is not made up of a privileged set of 
kinds or a privileged level of analysis 
The world is not made up of an ordered set of 
laws or causal processes and/or is complex 
The failure of essentialism, reductionism, and 
determinism suggests a radically disordered 
world 
The correspondence theory of truth does not 
cover all sentences and representations 
   
(ii) Epistemic 
limitations  
Underdetermination implies a social dimension 
to science and knowledge production 
H1: Looking for blocks to 
productive forms of 
feedback 
Utilising a variety of strategies, methods, and 
systems hedges bets in the face of uncertainty 
Integrating different approaches can provide 
more complete pictures of particular phenomena 
Systems can be improved by co-opting ideas 
from others and through competition with others 
A single method for science is not forthcoming, 
there can be many epistemic virtues 
There is no such thing as a perfect representation, 
different representations focus on different 
features of a target 
 
   
(iii) A variety 
of goals 
The sciences explain and different events and use 
different explanations for different ends 
H2: Looking for blocks to 
certain kinds of interests 
being considered in 
judgements of 
significance 
 
H3: Looking for blocks to 
avenues for public 
scrutiny 
Different communities have different capacities, 
processes, goals, and interests 
Representations should be judged with particular 
uses and contexts in mind 
Basing science on a variety of goals allows for 
better political representation 
Different systems and styles can be used towards 
different goals and questions 
Table 3. Three heuristics for evaluating social epistemic practices and how they relate to arguments 
for pluralism. 
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5 Gender imbalances 
A lack of gender diversity has become an issue of contention in many research communities. Leading 
mathematicians, physicists, philosophers, and economists have all bemoaned their disciplines’ skewed 
male-female ratios. On some metrics, economics does no worse than others (Larivière, Ni, Gingras, 
Cronin, & Sugimoto, 2013). The percentage of PhDs awarded to women is no lower in economics 
than it is, for instance, in the physical sciences (Fourcade, Ollion, & Algan, 2015). Yet, there are two 
reasons that make the lack of gender diversity in economics more concerning than elsewhere. Firstly, 
because economic research and economists are closer to power and have a more direct line to policy 
(see 1.1 for evidence of this), issues of diversity are more acute. Secondly, empirical evidence suggests 
not only that there are not many women in economics, but that women face an adverse environment in 
the discipline. This is sometimes subtle—female economists typically form less productive 
networks—and other times less subtle—women typically receive more hostile teaching evaluations 
and face abusive and misogynistic behaviour in economics' online forums.  
In this chapter, I highlight the gender imbalances in economics and describe why they are 
problematic. In 5.1, I present statistics on the number of women in economics, and show evidence that 
women face an adverse environment in the discipline. In section 5.2, I use the heuristics developed in 
4 to argue that this state of affairs is a problem. 
 
5.1 Women in economics 
5.1.1 The numbers 
At every level of the academic hierarchy, female economists are a minority, and one that shrinks as 
you move up the levels of seniority. At departments with doctoral programs in the United States in 
2016, women made up 31 percent of the PhDs granted, 28.3 percent of the untenured assistant 
professors, 25.6 percent of the tenured associate professors, and 13.1 percent of the full tenured 
professors (Lundberg, 2017, p. 767).78 This gives the economics profession the character of a ‘leaky 
                                                             
78 All data in this section is for universities in the United States unless otherwise stated. There are two reasons 
why this should not undermine its significance. Firstly, American universities tend to dominate economic 
research and thinking internationally (Backhouse & Fontaine, 2010). Their faculty win more prizes (see any list 
of Nobel or John Bates Clark winners), they train more policy makers (Fourcade, 2006), they dominate the big 
journals (see chapter 6), and the ideas produced within them carry international significance (Backhouse & 
Fontaine, 2010; Coats, 2005; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Harvey, 2007; Markoff & Montecinos, 1993). 
Secondly, evidence suggests that similar gender imbalances exist in other countries (Tenreyro, 2017). 
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pipeline’, with fewer women entering than men and women leaving at a higher rate at every rung of 
the ladder (see figure 1).79 
Donna Ginther and Shulamit Kahn (2004) show that, although similar leaky pipelines exist in 
other social sciences, the rate of attrition is higher in economics. Female economists are less likely to 
get tenure and take longer to achieve it than women in other disciplines and men in economics.80 
Given this leaky pipeline, progress towards equal representation of women and men in economics 
has been reliant on growth in the share of women entering the discipline. The last quarter of the 
twentieth century did see such growth. The share of PhDs granted to women increased from 7.6 
percent in 1972 to between 30-34 percent in the late nineties and early two-thousands. However, 
recent reports from the American Economic Association’s (henceforth AEA) Committee on the Status 
of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP) suggest that this increase has since stagnated 
(McElroy, 2016; Lundberg, 2017), and that similar stagnation can be seen in the share of female 
assistant professors.81 Without a return to growth in the share of women entering economics, or fixes 
to the leaky pipeline, there is unlikely to be any movement towards equal representation of women and 
men in economics. 
Further disparity is evident in the actual jobs women get. In 2016, women made up 20.1 percent of 
all tenured faculty at schools with doctoral programs, but 35.3 percent of teaching posts without tenure 
                                                             
79 This leaky pipeline also shows up in simple lock-step models based on PhD graduation year. There is a 
decrease in the share of women at each stage of the academic hierarchy even if you account for a time lag in the 
increases in women moving into economics (Lundberg, 2017). This is supported by recent work showing that 
women who graduated with economics PhDs in 2008 were 9.6 percent less likely to have tenure 8 years later 
than men graduating the same year (Chen, Kim, & Liu, 2017). 
80 Ginther and Kahn (2014) find the same result with updated data. 
81 Although the share of female associate professors has continued to rise slowly, this is due to the longer lag in 
time it takes to move from recent PhD graduate to higher levels. 
Figure 1. The “leaky pipeline” (Lundberg, 2017, p. 769). 
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eligibility at the same schools. At the top 20 ranked departments, this difference was even more 
pronounced, with women occupying only 14.9 percent of all tenured posts, but 39.8 percent of 
teaching posts without tenure eligibility. In addition to being better represented in non-tenure track 
posts at top departments, women are also better represented at departments without doctoral programs 
(i.e., departments that are in general lower ranked and give faculty members less time for research). 
Women occupy 32.7 percent of all tenured posts at departments without PhD programs, compared to 
the 20.1 percent of tenured posts at departments with PhD programs just mentioned, and this trend 
runs across all academic ranks. This pattern suggests that, where women do continue with academic 
careers in economics, they end up in less research focussed and less secure roles: 
[T]he representation of women declines as the emphasis on research increases, averaging 40.4 
percent for (full-time) non-tenure track teaching positions in non-doctoral departments, 35.3 
percent of non-tenure track teaching positions in doctoral departments, 32.7 percent of all 
tenure track positions in non-doctoral departments, 20.1 percent in all doctoral departments, 
14.9 percent in the top-20 departments, and 13.3 percent in the top-10 departments. (McElroy, 
2016; Lundberg, 2017, p. 769) 
 
5.1.2 An adverse environment 
The above statistics show that women are underrepresented within economics, particularly in the 
upper echelons of the discipline (see chapter 6 for a discussion of how significant the hierarchy in 
economics is). This might be partially explained by six adversarial environmental aspects for women 
in economics, which I outline below. 
 
Tougher reviewing 
Using readability scores of over nine-thousand abstracts, Erin Hengel (2017) finds that female-
authored papers in the top four economics journals—the American Economic Review (AER), 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), Econometrica (ECMA), and Journal of Political Economy 
(JPE)—are 1-6 percent ‘better’ written than male-authored papers, with this gap in quality widening in 
review.82 Hengel also uses review times at ECMA to estimate that female-authored papers spend six 
months longer in review (this estimate is produced after controlling for motherhood, childbirth, 
citations, and field).83 Using a decision theoretic model from the perspective of female authors, Hengel 
argues that, because the gap in quality between male and female authored papers widens in review, the 
only explanation for the difference in readability is that women face tougher editorial standards. If 
                                                             
82 Readability scores are algorithm generated scores that are supposed to pick out more clearly written prose. 
Hengel (2017) uses Harley et al.’s (2003) finding that readability scores are correlated across an article’s 
abstract, introduction, and discussion to justify only analysing abstracts. 40 percent of the male-female gap in 
readability scores originates in peer review. Hengel determines this by comparing pre-reviewed working papers 
and drafts to the finished output. 
83 Richard Tol (2018) recently argued that this result is not replicable in the journal Energy Economics. After a 
conversation on Twitter and an exchange of data, however, Hengel argued, and Tol conceded, that Tol’s data 
was biased by the fact that it counts desk rejections. Because desk rejections are faster and because women 
receive more desk rejections, including these data points made it seem like review time for women was shorter 
than it is. When only accepted publications are counted, women do encounter statistically significantly longer 
review times at Energy Economics. 
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correct, this highlights a serious disparity between the treatment of male and female economists.84 But 
even if Hengel’s decision theoretic explanation were rejected, her empirical findings are enough to 
suggest a less-than-level playing field for women. They face longer review times and for some reason 
seem to be compelled to hone their articles to a greater degree than men. The implications of both 
these facts is that an average female economist spends more time polishing her articles and less time 
writing new ones compared to her male colleagues. 
 
Less credit for co-publishing 
Heather Sarsons (2017) finds that, even once women publish, they receive less credit for their work if 
it is co-authored. After controlling for paper quality (using journal ranking and citations as a proxy), 
men who co-author most of their papers are no less likely to receive tenure than those who single-
author most of their work. In contrast, women who co-author, rather than single-author, papers receive 
tenure at a lower rate. Sarsons puts this down to the credit men get for co-authored work. Her 
measures suggest that an extra co-authored paper increases a man’s chances of tenure by 8 percent, but 
only increases a woman’s chance of tenure by 2 percent. This is the case for women who co-author in 
general (with women and with men) but the disparity is greater for women who co-author with men. 
Sarsons argues that this is explained by the fact that the authorship order of economics articles is 
alphabetised, making it less clear how much work each author puts in. This allows space for 
assumptions and judgements to enter into the allocation of credit.85 Sarsons’ data indicates that tenure 
committees generally assume women put in less work to co-authored papers than men. This both 
highlights the problems women have in getting credit for their work, and also suggests the presence of 
biases that might also influence other judgements. 
 
Stereotyping and unequal treatment 
Alice Wu (2017), Justin Wolfers (2015; 2016; 2017), and Friederike Mengel, Jan Sauermann, and Ulf 
Zölitz (2018) all show more evidence of bias in the way that women are treated and judged within 
economics. Wu shows that women are stereotyped on the anonymous online forum Economics Job 
Market Rumors (EJMR). By scraping text from threads between 2013 and 2017, Wu finds that posts 
and threads about women are significantly more likely to involve words that relate to personal and 
physical characteristics, whereas threads and posts about men are more likely to involve words that 
relate to academic and professional characteristics. Wolfers argues that the stereotyping of women is 
not confined to EJMR and that Wu’s work merely shows one aspect of a climate in which women are 
systematically stereotyped (2017). He documents multiple cases in which significant female 
                                                             
84 Most economics journals are single rather than double blinded. Even the few that are double blinded may not 
always be successful in keeping authors hidden. Academic networks and events make it common for academics 
to know what others are working on. Moreover, the rise in significance of working papers (which is particularly 
strong in economics) makes it easy to search for an early version of a paper that identifies the author (I will 
discuss some other implications of this in chapter 6). 
85 To support this, Sarsons shows that the disparity does not exist in sociology (where authorship is ordered by 
input into the work). 
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economists are demoted in favour of their male co-authors (and in some cases spouses) (2015). In a 
particularly striking example, Wolfers notes that: 
The great economic historian Deirdre McCloskey, a distinguished professor at the University 
of Illinois at Chicago, has a unique perspective on all of this, having spent the first half of her 
career as the male economist Donald McCloskey. Today, she reports that it is quite common 
for her colleagues not to acknowledge a point she has made until it is reinforced by another 
male economist. That rarely happened when she was Donald. (Wolfers, 2016) 
That women are not taken as seriously and held to different standards is also highlighted by Mengel, 
Sauermann, and Zölitz (2018), who report that female instructors at an economics and business school 
in the Netherlands systematically receive lower teaching evaluations than their male colleagues, after 
controlling for performance. 
 
Lower remuneration 
Female economists are also paid less than their male counter parts. Stephen Ceci, Donna Ginther, 
Shulamit Kahn, and Wendy Williams (2014) report that female full professors in the United States 
earned on average 75 percent of their male counterparts in 2010. Large differences also exist in the 
UK, where a more rigid pay structure is supposed to partly protect against such disparities. At the 
London School of Economics (LSE), an average female academic in the economics, finance, or 
business departments “receive 18.8% less than her male counterpart… despite controlling for the fact 
that women might have a different age, tenure and research productivity than their male colleagues” 
(Bandiera, 2016, p. 11). A gender pay gap exists in other departments at the LSE too, but, at 6 percent, 
it is significantly lower. 
 
Lower output 
It is well known that female economists score worse on a number of metrics of academic output than 
their male colleagues. Lorenzo Ductor, Sanjeev Goyal, and Anja Prummer (2018), for example, show 
that, since the 1980s, men have on average had a productivity rating about 50 percent higher than 
women (54 percent in 2006-2010).86 Daniel Hamermesh (2013) notes that women account for only 
12.6 percent of authors in the AER, JPE, and QJE in 2011.87 This is particularly low when we note that 
women accounted for 29 percent of all authors in economics journals between 2010 and 2016 (Ductor 
et al., 2018).88 12.6 percent does mark a rise from 4.7 percent in 1963, but the share of female authors 
rose almost four times in a similar time frame (from 8 percent in the early 1970s to 29 percent in 
                                                             
86 This is measured as the sum of articles produced multiplied by a measure of quality of the journal in which the 
article appeared (based on citations weighted by journal, with self-citations excluded (Kodrzycki & Yu, 2006)), 
divided by the number of authors of each article over a five year period. 
87 These are the only three of the ‘top 5’ (see chapter 6) that Hamermesh focuses on. This is also the highest 
figure of all the years he considers. In other years, the percentage of women publishing in these journals is even 
lower. Tommaso Colussi (2018) finds similar figures. He notes that 90 percent of the share of authors in the top 
four economics journals—AER, JPE, ECMA, and QJE—were men between 2000 and 2006. 
88 Based on journals on EconLit, a bibliography of economics journals compiled by the Journal of Economic 
Literature. 
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2010-16 (Ductor et al., 2018)), making the rise from 4.7 percent to 12.6 percent in the AER, JPE, and 
QJE look comparatively low. Moreover, the 12.6 percent share in authorship of these journals is way 
below the share of women that that are assistant professors. Even when limiting these percentages to 
those aged below 35, women only make up 16 percent of the authors in AER, JPE, and QJE in 2011, 
but 29.3 percent of the assistant professors in the same year. 
 
Less productive networks 
Ductor et al. (2018) argue that the lower output among female economists can be explained by the 
networks they form. They focus on networks of co-authorship, where nodes are defined as authors and 
edges between nodes represent relations of co-authorship. Ductor, Fafchamps, Goyal, and van der Leij 
(2013) show that higher levels of ‘inbetweenness’ (how likely it is that a given economists acts as a 
connection for others) and ‘degree’ (the number of others an economist is connected to) are positively 
correlated with research output.89 In contrast, higher degrees of ‘clustering’ (a measure of how much 
an author’s co-authors collaborate with each other) and ‘stronger’ ties (how regularly one co-authors 
with a collaborator) are negatively correlated with output.90 Ductor et al. (2018) find that women 
typically have fewer co-authors and a lower level of inbetweenness, with higher clustering and 
strength of connection, all characteristics associated with lower output. 
Ductor et al. (2018) go on to speculate as to why this might be the case. Their data suggests that it 
is not due to any desire from women to collaborate with each other, due to family commitments, or 
due to general discrimination against choosing women as co-authors. Instead, they suggest differences 
in risk taking as a causal factor. They justify this with the fact that research output variance is higher 
for men than women and that the network behaviours exhibited by women—clustering, strong 
connections—are less risky behaviours than those exhibited by men—more, looser connections. 
Ductor et al. also add that women typically produce less single-authored papers and co-author with 
more senior academics, both behaviours that indicate risk aversion. Ductor et al. suggest that higher 
degrees of risk aversion among female economists might be explained by differences in underlying 
risk preferences or some of the features of the adverse environment for women sketched above, 
making female economists more cautious and less comfortable in their environment (not being 
comfortable in one’s environment is also associated with lower risk taking, Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1979). 
Although the arguments that network features have an impact on output and that women form less 
productive networks are convincing, the conjecture that the latter is a result of risk aversion and that 
risk aversion is the main cause of women having lower outputs is less convincing. No reason is given 
to rule out the possibility that other features of the adverse environment for women—the longer 
                                                             
89 This is the same coefficient of output used in Ductor et al. (2018). 
90 Ilse Lindenlaub and Prummer (2014) also argue this theoretically. They argue that having a high number of 
connections and being centrally located in a network gives access to new ideas, whereas having a high degree of 
clustering and forming stronger ties brings greater peer pressure and trust. They argue that the former is more 
beneficial in high uncertainty environments—which characterises academia—with the latter being more 
beneficial in more stable environments. 
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review times they face, the more time they have to spend on teaching to get decent evaluations, 
stereotyping, et cetera—lower their opportunities to form productive networks or their output directly. 
Nonetheless, whatever the causal implications, the fact that women end up in less productive networks 
adds evidence to the point that the climate for women in economics is, at best, worse than for men. 
 
5.1.3 Responses 
Women are poorly represented at every level in economics with numbers decreasing as you move up 
levels of both seniority and prestige. This is exacerbated by the fact that at least six features of the 
structure of research in economics, described above, are unfavourable to women. Women are subject 
to longer review times before publication, and possibly tougher standards. They get less credit for co-
authoring papers. They face a heavily stereotyped environment in which their voices are taken less 
seriously, and they are judged to be worse teachers. They are paid less. They publish less in the top 
journals and have an overall lower output. And, they form less productive networks, possibly due to 
risk aversion stimulated by the other adversarial environmental factors they face. 
Defenders of economics might have a number of responses to this. First, they might argue that the 
leaky pipeline, and the resulting lack of women within the profession, is due to environmental 
conditions that the discipline cannot control, like the fact that women often have babies in the crucial 
early career period. Childrearing might be a factor, but the fact that some academic disciplines have 
more balanced distributions of women and men suggests it is not the primary cause of the disparities 
(Ceci et al., 2014). Moreover, Ginther and Kahn (2014) find that, whereas in academia overall 
childrearing can explain the lower rates at which women receive tenure, economics is the exception. 
Defenders of current practices in the discipline might respond by arguing that, even if certain 
environmental factors can be ruled out, the leaky pipeline need not be the result of any individual or 
collective biases. Women are, after all, less productive and also poorly represented in other STEM 
disciplines. Maybe women just choose to work less, and in less math-intensive fields. It is only those 
who want to be there that can be promoted and it seems fair to make promotion decisions using 
productivity metrics. However, although it may well be the case that promotion decisions are not 
biased and some self-selection does occur, Ginther and Kahn’s (2014) measurements show that the 
productivity gap cannot fully explain the promotion gap in economics, which has barriers that don’t 
seem to exist in other math heavy disciplines (where productivity does account for the lower rate of 
promotion of women). As Ceci et al. (2014) summarise: 
Economics is an outlier, with a persistent sex gap in promotion that cannot be readily 
explained by productivity differences. (2014, p. 116) 
Moreover, the causation might also go the other way. The fact that female economists score badly on 
metrics of output might be partly caused by the dominance of men in the discipline or the adverse 
environmental factors they face. In addition to the numbers above, 92 percent of the editors of the top 
4 journals between 2000 and 2006 were men. In an environment in which women are a minority and 
are often treated differently, they may be risk-averse, which may lower their output and chances of 
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success in the discipline (as Ductor et al. (2018) suggest). A more radical explanation might be that 
women are cited less91 in part because they are women.92 This would lower their output scores directly 
and also lower their position in the profession, in terms of both the jobs they end up in and how people 
think of them, in turn lowering their chances of developing productive networks or further damaging 
their output in other ways. The fact that women typically occupy less research focussed and less 
secure jobs at less research focussed universities might also explain a chunk of the productivity gap in 
economics rather than the other way around.93 
The causes of the poor gender balance and adverse environment in economics do not seem easily 
reducible to a single cause (Ceci et al., 2014). But identifying precise causal factors is not my focus. 
The descriptive statistics are enough to show that women are underrepresented (particularly higher up) 
and that at least some features of the discipline are unfavourable to them. This need not imply that 
economists are biased individually, on average, or in aggregate. Some of those I have referred to do 
argue this, some of the explanations of lower female output might cite this, and some of the above 
might count as circumstantial evidence of bias. But, it can both be the case that women are 
underrepresented and face an adverse environment in economics and that most economists are not 
sexist (even the stereotyping and unequal treatment could be the work of a minority within the 
discipline). 
Gender imbalances are also not exclusively an issue within economics. Ginther and Kahn (2014) 
give us reason to believe that the leaky pipeline is worse in economics than elsewhere, and issues like 
the lack of credit for co-authored articles, lower pay, and unequal treatment are either not present or 
less pronounced in other disciplines. But even if economics were no worse than other disciplines, the 
gender balances described above seem problematic. Defenders of economics may, however, offer one 
final response. They might argue that: ‘this may be a regrettable situation for ethical or fairness-based 
reasons, but it has no impact on the quality of economic research. Economics is a rigorous social 
science; its findings are valid and should be trusted no matter how many economists are women.’ I 
will argue against this response in the next section. 
 
                                                             
91 A fact noted, but not discussed in detail, by Ductor et al. (2018). Female economists receive on average 5.69 
citations whereas male economists receive 12.86. 
92 A recent paper by Dion, Sumner, and Mitchell (2018) supports this possibility. They find that, across a 
number of social science fields (including economics), men cite women less than they cite other men and are less 
likely to attribute original ideas to women. 
93 This is part supported by Xie and Shauman (2003) who show that in STEM as a whole higher demands on 
female faculty’s time for teaching and/or service can explain a significant portion of their lower research 
productivity. This point is exacerbated by common efforts within universities to make committees as balanced as 
possible while drawing from a pool that contains more men (Porter, 2007), and by the commonly held, and well 
founded, belief that men are more likely to avoid doing admin tasks (Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, & Weingart, 
2017). These effects are also part evidenced by Misra, Lundquist, Holmes, and Agiomavritis (2011), who show 
that, even within a single university, male STEM faculty devote more time to research than their female 
counterparts. 
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5.2 Why worry about gender imbalances? 
Women are poorly represented and face a number of adverse environmental factors in economics. I 
will now argue that these facts are problematic regardless of their causes.  
Recall my argument, in chapter 4, that, regardless of the goal, mechanisms for feedback are an 
important way of developing science. By providing different forms of criticism, new observations, and 
testing and challenging the knowledge and practices of science in different ways (from 
experimentation to providing alternative explanations) feedback helps to weed out biases, bad forms 
of reasoning, falsities, and out of date observations and theories, and generally helps to progress 
science.  
I also argued that, given that the sciences can be used towards many different kinds of goals (both 
pragmatic and epistemic), and that these goals cannot be determined by epistemic criteria alone, social 
epistemic practices should also be evaluated based on the goals they enable. In particular, scientists 
necessarily make judgements about what they take to be significant throughout their work. I argued 
that this makes it important that the choices scientific communities make about what goals to pursue, 
and the judgements of significance they make, are legitimate from a societal perspective. I argued that, 
for this to be the case, certain kinds of interests should not be systematically blocked from 
consideration, and that the decisions scientists make should be open to public scrutiny.94 
I combined these points to argue that social epistemic practices can be evaluated by: 
H1: Looking for blocks to productive forms of feedback. 
H2: Looking for blocks to certain kinds of interests being considered in judgements of 
significance. 
H3: Looking for blocks to avenues for public scrutiny. 
In this section, I will use H1 and H2 to argue that the gender imbalances outlined in 5.1 are 
problematic. Although many of the issues involved speak to both heuristics simultaneously, in order to 
make the implications of each heuristic as clear as possible, I will discuss how the issues described 
above affect each heuristic in separate subsections. In 5.2.1, I will argue that the gender imbalances 
within economics lead to lower quality and less varied feedback (H1). In 5.2.2, I will argue that the 
gender imbalances within economics block the interests of a large section of society—women—from 
being considered in judgements of significance in economics (H2). H3 is less relevant to the issues 
surrounding gender in economics. An argument might be made that incorporating more women in the 
discipline would make it more varied, and so contain more of the critical debates that help citizens 
make judgements. But given the more obvious relevance of H1 and H2, I will not pursue that 
possibility here. 
                                                             
94 Most of the points in this paragraph were based on bringing together arguments from others. I have omitted 
references here in order to not repeat myself. See chapter 4 for details. 
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5.2.1 Feedback 
Stanford economist and the first female John Bates Clark Medal winner (in 2007) Susan Athey has 
argued that the gender imbalances in economics amount to a waste of human capital (Romero, 2013). 
H1 and the idea of feedback can highlight two ways in which Athey’s claim might be correct. 
Firstly, a lack of women within economics plausibly leads to lower quality critical interaction, 
observations, and research within the discipline. If social critical interaction is one important feedback 
mechanism for testing knowledge, as I argued in chapter 4, then a range of critical interaction, rather 
than repeatedly responding to similar points, seems valuable. With respect to economic knowledge, 
this might simply be taken to imply that as many economists as possible should be involved in any one 
conversation. If we assume that there exists some variety in the quality of critical feedback people can 
provide, we might also hope to have more of those that provide higher quality feedback. Critical 
feedback will be more effective if those that are more skilled in reasoning within the community’s 
standards partake in it. But, if we also assume that the quality of the kind of critical feedback relevant 
to economics is evenly distributed between men and women, then the gender disparity within 
economics is likely to result in some men holding positions at the expense of more skilled women, 
lowering the overall quality of the critical feedback in comparison to a scenario with a more even 
gender balance.95 Similar comments might be made for other forms of feedback (in addition to critical 
interaction). More important observations and more useful models are likely to be developed if 
economics contains more skilled people. Women likely make up more than just 13.3 percent of the 
most able economists (Ceci et al., 2014), so the fact that they make up just 13.3 percent of the tenured 
professors in economics means the discipline is missing out on talent—talent that would likely 
increase the effectiveness of feedback in the discipline. 
Secondly, female economists might offer a unique set of perspectives simply because they are 
women. In arguing for the importance of social critical feedback, Longino adds that: 
A diversity of perspectives is necessary for vigorous and epistemically effective critical 
discourse. The social position or economic power of an individual or group in a community 
ought not determine who or what perspectives are taken seriously in that community. … 
[This] is to ensure the exposure of hypotheses to the broadest range of criticism. (2002, pp. 
131-132) 
This suggests that increasing the number of perspectives that critical interactive feedback draws upon 
increases the number of ways that knowledge can be challenged and tested. Something similar might 
be said for other important forms of feedback. If we want to maximise resistance from reality, then 
practicing forms of economics, testing hypotheses, and incorporating observations that come from a 
range of different perspectives can help. Moreover, utilising different perspectives might lead to the 
                                                             
95 Empirical evidence suggests this assumption is correct, even at the far right hand side of the distribution (see 
Ceci et al. (2014) for a detailed review of the evidence), despite Larry Summers’ infamous comments to the 
contrary (Summers, 2005). Moreover, even if skills are not evenly distributed, they are unlikely to be as 
unevenly distributed as women are in economics (recall women account for only 13.3 percent of tenured faculty 
in the top 10 departments). 
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partial satisfaction of different aims, and when integrated in either an ad hoc or systematic fashion 
they might offer more complete or useful pictures of their targets. 
Situated knowledge is the name given to the unique knowledge any social group might offer by 
dint of their social position (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1991). The idea of situated knowledge is 
sometimes interpreted as radical, but it need not be. It need not imply that what counts as truth and 
knowledge varies across individuals or social groups (although it can). At its most basic level, it 
simply assumes that circumstances in which people live have an impact on what they come to know. 
Elizabeth Anderson points out many ways that this can happen: 
People experience the world by using their bodies, which have different constitutions and are 
differently located in space and time. … People have first-personal access to some of their 
own bodily and mental states, yielding direct knowledge of phenomenological facts about 
what it is like for them to be in these states. … People often represent objects in relation to 
their emotions, attitudes and interests. … People have different skills, which may also be a 
source of different propositional knowledge. … People have different styles of investigation 
and representation. What looks like one phenomenon to a lumper may look like three to a 
splitter. … [People have different] background beliefs and worldviews. … People may stand 
in different epistemic relations to other inquirers—for example, as informants, interlocutors, 
students—which affects their access to relevant information and their ability to convey their 
beliefs to others. (Anderson, 2000) 
The social positions people occupy effect all of these things. Whether somebody is a factory worker or 
accountant is, for example, likely to bear heavily on the skills they have, the people they rely on for 
information, their understanding of tax law or of how it feels to do manual labour for long stretches of 
time, et cetera. Social positions affect the access individuals have to information, the form of their 
knowledge, their standards of justification, and their judgement about which claims are significant 
(Anderson, 2000). This seems intuitively correct. Most would agree that it makes more sense to ask a 
factory labourer about the tools of their work than a tax accountant. And, without the assumption of 
situated knowledge, there would be no reason for designers to ask end users for feedback on products. 
Situated knowledge simply assumes that the regular experience one has in life and the position 
from which one perceives the world has some bearing on what one knows. This idea is perfectly 
compatible with many assumptions economists make about the world and has even been used to 
justify a number of popular economic theses. Friedrich von Hayek’s (Hayek, 1948) famous argument 
against planning and for the price mechanism, for example, is based on the idea that the knowledge 
relevant for planning draws on personal circumstances, is dispersed throughout society, and cannot be 
fully transmitted. This developed into the view, now commonly held among economists, that market-
like structures and prices should be developed for all social interactions that require coordination 
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(Wright & Mata, Under review; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2017).96 
The idea that female economists provide a unique and valuable set of perspectives assumes that 
some of the situated knowledge they possess by being women forms an epistemically relevant 
perspective on economic issues. Historians of science have pointed to a number of examples in the 
history of science in which the absence of female scientists has caused the absence of particular forms 
of critical feedback.97 Feminist philosophers of science have argued that the different roles and norms 
that men and women play and comply with in society regularly lead to the development of different 
traits, skills, background beliefs, and world-views, which produce differences in knowledge significant 
enough to affect the sciences. The higher propensity of women to be involved in care, for example, 
often means that they have greater knowledge of what such care requires, greater caring skills, and are 
likely to place greater significance of the role of care within a society (Nelson, 1995). 
This does not imply that men and women are inherently different. Rather, that they have 
differential access to the circumstances that lead to the development of skills and knowledge. Simple 
forms of propositional knowledge are unlikely to be influenced by these differences. Men and women 
have the same propensity to grasp the basic rules of arithmetic (Ceci et al., 2014). This sometimes 
leads commentators to argue that gender differences do not influence science. But, as feminists point 
out, many forms of knowledge differ significantly from the simple propositional statements of 
arithmetic. Where knowledge is more reliant on judgement, background assumptions, detailed 
understandings of particular processes, or the weighing up of the significance of different factors, the 
different aspects of knowledge that accrue to men and women are more likely to make a difference. 
This means that the significance of situated knowledge in determining the kind of critical feedback a 
person provides likely varies with field. 
Economists might hope their rigorous methods make situated knowledge insignificant to their 
field, but there are four reasons to think to the contrary. Firstly, the variability of conclusions 
economists draw from their models suggests that the field is not characterised by simple propositions 
similar to arithmetic (Rodrik, 2015). Secondly, the large degrees of uncertainty within economics 
mean that judgements and background assumptions play a big role in determining what is accepted. 
This is highlighted by the recent attention the role of good judgement in model selection (i.e., in 
determining which model fits which problem) has received (Aydinonat, 2018). Thirdly, the history of 
economics suggests that women do bring different perspectives to the discipline. Julie Nelson (1995) 
has shown, for example, that the ways that economic metrics developed when the discipline contained 
                                                             
96 Even the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (home of rational expectations macro policy 
and not known for their radicalism), Narayana Kocherlakota (2014), and the head of the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, Paul Johnson (2018), have endorsed the point that peoples’ background history and social position gives 
them different perspectives that are useful in economic policy analysis. Kocherlakota, for example, states that 
“Ultimately, a person’s ideas are a culmination of his or her journey through life. We will have access to more 
and better ideas if our employees have a large number of distinct life journeys. And we need those more and 
better ideas if we are to be effective in solving the various public policy challenges that we confront.” 
(Kocherlakota, 2014) 
97 The prevalence of androcentric views, for example, in historical periods of science where female scientists 
were not present; views that were only critiqued and replaced as women entered the sciences (Haraway, 1989; 
Keller, 1985). 
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very few women left out typically female forms of labour.  
Lastly, Ann Mari May, Mary McGarvey, and Robert Whaples (2014) have shown that on average 
male and female economists in the United States reach different conclusions on a number of central 
economic issues (differences that are statistically significant even after controlling for place of 
employment and decade of PhD). In general, male economists are more likely to support pro-market 
propositions than their female counterparts. Men are more likely to think government regulation is 
excessive, and more likely to support market solutions like voucher systems for school funding. 
Women are more likely to support policies for equalising the distribution of income, to support 
progressive taxation, to support linking trade agreements to labour standards, and to require employers 
to provide health insurance. Moreover, women are much more likely to think that job opportunities for 
women are not equal to those of men and are more likely to disagree with the view that the gender 
wage gap is explained by differences in human capital and choice (a proposition men generally agree 
with). Women are also much more likely to think that there are better opportunities for men within 
economics than women. Interestingly, this is all while men and women largely agree on a number of 
core assumptions in economics—that human wants are unlimited, that people are utility maximisers, 
and that mathematical modelling is important—indicating that lots of gendered situated knowledge 
and judgements enter between the starting and end points of economic analysis.98 
This all suggests that female economists offer a unique perspective that is underutilised within 
economics. If Longino is correct, then including more of this unique perspective should increase the 
range and effectiveness of critical interactive feedback in the discipline. Empirical evidence suggests 
something like this does indeed happen; that group decisions and deliberations are positively impacted 
by incorporating a diverse range of perspectives. Bayer and Rouse (2016), Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, 
and Chiu (2008), Rubin and O’Connor (2018), and Page (2007) all offer extensive reviews of the 
literature on this topic. Among the studies they point to, Sommers (2006) finds that racially diverse 
mock juries exchange more information, discuss for longer, engage with more perspectives, and make 
fewer errors. Levine et al. (2014) find that bubbles are less common in markets with an ethnically 
diverse mix of traders. Hoogendoorn, Oosterbeek, and Van Praag (2013) find that mixed-gender 
groups of business students produce better course projects. Phillips, Northcraft, and Neale (2006) find 
that racially diverse groups do better at solving complicated problems than other groups. Freeman and 
Huang (2015) find that academic papers produced by ethnically diverse groups have higher impact 
and more citations (this is from a sample of 2.5 million US based authored papers between 1985 and 
2008). Richard, Murthi, and Ismail (2007) and Richard et al. (2007; 2012) both find that companies 
whose leadership positions are filled by people from diverse backgrounds are financially more 
successful. 
Hélène Landemore (2012) and Cass Sunstein (2006) list similar findings and note that the 
epistemic benefits of drawing on the dispersed knowledge of crowds (Surowiecki, 2005) and the 
                                                             
98 In a later paper, May, McGarvey and David Kucera (2018) show similar results for European economists, with 
the exception that female European economists are more likely to disagree with some of the core economic 
assumptions. 
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positive effects of deliberation depend on diversity. Moreover, in their models of group problem 
solving, Lu Hong and Scott Page (Hong & Page, 2004) find that diverse groups outperform groups 
with higher ability individuals in many scenarios (note that this is based on modelling rather than 
empirical data). The important point all these studies make is that an individual’s value to a group 
depends on their ability to improve collective decisions, which is determined more by the makeup of 
the rest of the group than their individual ability. 
Care is needed in drawing general conclusions from these studies. Many of them target quite 
simple cases of group action and decision-making. But they do provide support for the idea that 
groups that contain diverse perspectives are more likely to have productive conversations, more likely 
to come up with novel approaches, and less likely to rely on biased forms of reasoning. This supports 
what I have argued above: a diversity of perspectives in a community is an effective mechanism for 
producing productive feedback. Diversity leads to more deliberation and better critical interaction, 
lowering the propensity for biases and groupthink and improving the reliability of outcomes. Through 
a lack of female economists, research in economics forgoes some of the feedback improvements that 
diversity can provide (different perspectives, different forms of reasons, different observations, as well 
as different skills). 
Thus, under plausible (and empirically supported) assumptions about the distribution of critical 
faculties between the genders, the lack of female economists leads to lower overall quality feedback in 
the discipline. Moreover, given that female economists likely offer an epistemically relevant 
perspective for economics, their absence also likely leads to less varied feedback within the 
discipline.99 It is easy to see how these constraints are further exasperated by the adverse environment 
that women in economics face. 
If it is true that female economists face tougher review standards, then they are more likely to 
publish in lower-ranked journals, have a lower publication rate, and potentially even be more 
conservative in what they write (i.e., less likely to challenge entrenched positions or powerful 
individuals). Even if female economists do not face tougher standards, they do at least face longer 
review times, which delays how fast they can produce work. This is exacerbated by the fact that the 
less favourable teaching evaluations they receive likely induces a reallocation of the time and 
resources away from research and towards teaching activities. All of this reduces the ability of female 
economists to offer effective critical feedback, develop new observations, et cetera. 
These constraints on the ability of female economists to do research also likely hurts their job 
prospects and reduce their chances of getting into powerful positions or even stay in the discipline. 
This is again compounded by the fact that they get less credit for co-authored work, are stereotyped, 
and are treated differently (as well as lower teaching evaluations also lowering their job projects 
                                                             
99 It is possible for women to be as skilled in the practices of economics in general—seeing reasoning errors, 
crating mathematical models, noticing important observations, et cetera—while also offering an epistemically 
relevant different perspective. There is no reason to think that men are better than women in getting from A to B 
(i.e. from start to end of analysis), but they will, on average, make qualitatively different judgements along the 
way, and these judgements offer crucially different perspectives that expose economics to more forms of 
feedback. 
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directly). This feeds back into the issues outlined above by likely lowering the number of women 
within economics (particularly high up) offering feedback from their unique perspectives. 
The stereotyping and differential treatment women face also combine with constraints on their 
output to undermine what they have to say if they do stay in economics. This likely also combines 
with the other factors discussed to affect female economists’ self-confidence and beliefs about their 
teaching abilities and abilities as economists.100 All this is likely to dull the effectiveness of the 
feedback female economists provide. 
Taken together, the adverse environmental factors women face in economics, thus, exacerbate the 
constraints on feedback in economics caused by the low ratio of women to men. It lowers the ability of 
female economists to provide productive feedback, lowers the prevalence of feedback from them in 
general, and lowers the effectiveness of whatever feedback they provide. 
 
All of this means that the skewed gender balance within economics and the adverse environment for 
women within the discipline reduce the prevalence and effectiveness of the kind of feedback women 
typically provide (for example, about issues for which their social situatedness gives them a better 
understanding), and likely lowers the quality of feedback within economics overall. This means that 
the hypotheses produced by economists are exposed to less varied and less stringent tests, and that the 
idiosyncratic biases of individuals or subgroups within the community are more likely to go 
unchecked. This point can be accepted from a purely epistemic point of view and assuming that the 
goals of economics can be determined completely by truth. Even if we assume that in each stage 
purely epistemic grounds are used to make inferences, record data, et cetera, the people doing this play 
a crucial role. It is people that ensure lines of argument are reasonable, that evidence is recorded and 
treated fairly, and that biases are avoided. The argument here is that the balance of women and men 
within economics impacts this in an epistemically relevant way. Fewer female economists means less 
variety and lower overall quality feedback. If economists want to improve productive iteration within 
their discipline and improve the knowledge economics produces, they should aim to improve the 
forms of feedback within the discipline. Other things being equal, making the gender distribution 
within economics more balanced and making the environment within the discipline less hostile for 
women would do that. 
 
5.2.2 Interests 
Progressive iterative feedback is a process that takes many forms and can be directed towards a variety 
of goals. It is desirable even if economics is taken to have just one goal. But, as we saw in chapters 2 
and 4, there are a number of reasons to believe that sciences should be open to a variety of different 
                                                             
100 Sarsons and Xu (2015) report that top female economists are 7 percent less likely to give 'extreme' answers 
when asked about the economy, less confident in the accuracy of their answers, and less confident about answers 
to questions outside of their main field than top male economists. These results persist when controlled for PhD 
institution and year, current institution, and number of publications. Lower confidence and cautious behaviour 
are also likely to lead to lower comparative significance of female critical feedback within economics. 
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goals. Given that it can serve multiple ends and that there is no purely epistemic and context 
independent way of determining significance, it is also important that economics is able to incorporate 
the interests of those in the societies it serves if it is going to investigate issues that are relevant to 
them (H2). This is particularly important given the significant role economics plays in shaping policy 
thinking and designing interventions that impact many facets of life in contemporary western 
societies. 
Given that women form a significant constituency, with different interests and perspectives to men 
due to their social positions in most societies, any blocks to women’s interests being heard in 
judgements of significance would be an issue worth paying attention to according to H2. Can we say 
that the data presented in 5.1 shows evidence of blocks to the interests of women being heard? I think 
we can. As pointed out already, there are plenty of reasons to suggest that average female and male 
economists have slightly different goals,101 make different judgements, observe different things (or at 
least emphasise different things in their observations), and parse the world in different ways. On 
average, female economists are likely to offer different perspectives to their male colleagues; 
perspectives that plausibly have some things in common with female perspectives in the wider 
population (being better acquainted with the importance of care, for example). It seems intuitive, then, 
that having fewer women in economics, and marginalising female voices within the discipline, limits 
how much influence female perspectives and interests have in economic research. 
Three objections might be offered to this. Firstly, a balance of male and female economists need 
not be necessary to incorporate a fair balance of female interests into economics. Representation can 
occur without inclusion. The problem is that the extent to which people from significantly different 
social positions are able to represent the perspectives of each other is questionable. This is particularly 
true for perspectives that are less well represented in popular culture more generally. As described 
above, the history of science is replete with episodes in which the absence of women has led to the 
absence of the consideration of their interests (Haraway, 1989; Harding, 1991). 
Secondly, parity between the number of economists coming from various social groups need not 
be required for the interests or goals from different perspectives to be considered. If female voices 
within economics are effective, then their perspectives could be heard without matching male 
economists for numbers. This objection might be partly correct. Complete parity may not be necessary 
to ensure the adequate representation of the interests of women. However, it is likely that economics 
could do better. In a discipline where only 13.3 percent of the full professors, 8 percent of the editors 
of the top four journals, and 12.6 percent of the authors in the top three journals are women, the 
female economists are going to need very effective voices to be able to make the interests of women 
known on an equal basis as those of men. Moreover, for all the reasons discussed in 5.2.1, the adverse 
environmental conditions women face within economics are likely to make that job even harder. It is 
difficult to quantify exactly what balance would be necessary to ensure that female perspectives are 
                                                             
101 The fact that many more women sign up to economics courses when they are explicitly socially meaningful 
adds further evidence to this (Varathan, 2017). 
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heard within economics. Complete parity may not be necessary. But improvement surely is. 
Thirdly, it might be objected that my reasoning assumes that all women are the same. It would be 
possible for women of particular social categories (rich, white Ivy leaguers, for example) to dominate 
within economics even if numbers of men and women were equal. This is a legitimate worry and calls 
for more forms of diversity within economics. Nonetheless, for all the reasons presented above, 
women do on average offer slightly different perspectives to men. Women may not all be the same, but 
they differ around an average that is currently underrepresented. The adequate inclusion of the 
interests and goals of women is surely preferable to their exclusion, other things being equal. 
Thus, the lack of women in economics combined with the adverse environment they face within 
the discipline part block female interests being heard in judgements of significance within economics. 
Incorporating more female economists into economics and/or improving the environment for women 
within the discipline would increase the presence of the interests and goals of women in judgements of 
significance in economics. 
 
Conclusion 
The current social epistemic practices within economics block important avenues for productive 
feedback by leaving out female abilities and perspectives (H1). This is because there are not many 
women in economics, and because those that are in the discipline face an adverse environment. For all 
the reasons discussed in chapter 4, this makes it less likely that errors and biases within economics 
will be exposed, and less likely that economics will develop new interesting forms of research utilising 
the situated knowledge female economists possess. The gender imbalances in economics also block 
the influence of female interests in the discipline (H2). This makes economics less likely to focus on 
issues and notice things that matter to women. This makes the discipline less able to respond to and 
further the needs of a significant constituency in the societies it serves. Both of the issues I point to—
feedback and representation of interests—are made more acute by the significant societal role 
economics plays in most countries. I summarise these points in table 4. Other things being equal, the 
mechanisms of feedback in economics and how well the discipline incorporates the range of interests 
in the societies it serves can be improved by increasing the share of women within the discipline and 
by making the environment for women within economics less adverse. 
Two objections could be offered to this conclusion. First, assuming more gender diversity is a 
good thing, how much diversity is enough? Does what I have said not just fall into the same problem 
as the debate about pluralism? Is the question still not just: how much X (diversity, pluralism) is 
needed? This objection misunderstands my claim. My point in moving away from comparing 
economics to pluralist ideals was to move to a discussion about improvements rather than end-states. I 
have no issue with arguing that certain aspects of economics need more of this or that plural variable 
(although, as I argued in chapter 3, even that is a difficult in practice). Local debates about methods  
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Why pluralism? Evaluative heuristic Issues caused by gender imbalances 
   
(ii) Epistemic 
limitations  
H1: Looking for blocks to 
productive forms of 
feedback 
Lower quality feedback and a loss of 
important situated knowledge. Together these 
factors make it less likely that errors and 
biases will be spotted and less likely that new 
interesting avenues will be explored 
   
(iii) A variety of 
goals 
H2: Looking for blocks to 
certain kinds of interests 
being considered in 
judgements of significance 
More difficult for the interests of women to 
be heard in economics. Complete parity may 
not be necessary, but economics could do 
better 
   
 H3: Looking for blocks to 
avenues for public scrutiny 
 
Table 4. The issues caused by gender imbalances in economics and how they relate to H1-H3 and the 
reasons for pluralism. 
and ontologies are appropriate. The problem was that comparing economics to an overall ideal state 
(pluralism) does not offer sufficiently concrete advice regarding next steps; pointing out that 
economics has a serious gender imbalance does. The latter offers a clearer claim (than pluralism) 
regarding what is currently problematic, why, and where improvement lies. The gender imbalances are 
a clear and measurable feature of economics that is harder to wave away under the guise of a different 
interpretation (unlike the claim that economics does not have enough schools of thought). By starting 
from a concrete and verifiable point about how economics is currently organised, rather than an ideal 
of how it might be, unambiguous avenues for change and more easily identifiable. Once some 
improvement has been made, the situation can be assessed again.  
Second, how can we be sure that alleviating gender imbalances is a good thing to do? Doing so 
may have negative impacts elsewhere (affirmative action may be unfair on some young male 
economists, for example). Or even if it does not, spending resources changing the gender balance in 
economics could reduce resources available to tackle other issues. Are there no trade-offs? This is an 
open question. The existence of trade-offs, however, do not detract from my point. My goal is not to 
provide a final answer as to what should be done when all things are considered. That would be a 
conversation that I encourage, but my point has simply been to point out that gender imbalances are an 
issue that both philosophers and economists should care about because they affect the output of 
economics and how economics relates to society. They are an important and concrete social epistemic 
issue worth alleviating, other things being equal. Doing so may have knock-on effects and trade-offs 
elsewhere. But that does not change my point that improving the gender dynamics in economics is a 
change worth thinking about in detail, given the present situation. 
Some of the issues described in this chapter have been noticed by powerful governing bodies 
within economics (the AEA in the United States, the Royal Economic Society in Britain). The 
numbers presented in 5.1.1 are mainly collected by the AEA’s CSWEP, who have expressed concern at 
the flatlining of women entering economics. 2017 saw the popular press on both sides of the Atlantic 
become increasingly interested in issues of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. In that 
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climate, Alice Wu’s work on the unfavourable climate women face on EJMR received significant 
popular attention. In response, the AEA commissioned an Ad Hoc Committee on the Professional 
Climate in Economics. The committee’s main recommendation was a new Code of Professional 
Conduct, which was adopted in April 2018. The code is short, but states explicitly that: 
Economists have a professional obligation to conduct civil and respectful discourse in all 
forums, including those that allow confidential or anonymous participation. 
The AEA seeks to create a professional environment with equal opportunity and fair treatment 
for all economists, regardless of age, sex, gender identity and expression, race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, health condition, marital status, parental 
status, genetic information, political affiliation, professional status, or personal connections. 
(AEA, 2018) 
In addition to this code, the ad hoc committee also recommended regular surveys to check the 
professional climate in economics, disseminating guidelines for how to reduce biases, and efforts to 
increase the range of students studying and continuing in economics. All of these measures should be 
welcomed. But it is not clear that they will make a significant dent in the issues described in 5.1. It is 
not clear that the code of conduct will change the culture exhibited on EJMR.102 Moreover, given that 
many of the issues described above either come from subtle biases or hierarchies repeating themselves 
(sub-fields, for example, are typically gender skewed and people typically look more favourably on 
people who work in the same sub-field as them), it is not clear that one aspirational sentence in a code 
of conduct will alleviate them. Perhaps more stringent measures like mandating more women on 
tenure committees,103 hiring committees, and journal editorial boards are needed.104 In the next 
chapter, I will argue that the steep hierarchy within the discipline creates similar issues to the lack of 
women for feedback in the discipline: important perspectives are likely to me marginalised. This 
suggests that both issues should be tackled together. 
                                                             
102 A brief look at comments on the pages where these changes have been announced attests to that. 
103 Evidence suggests this makes a difference (Bagues, Sylos-Labini, & Zinovyeva, 2017). 
104 This could have the negative effect of increasing the amount of non-research tasks female economists take 
on. But maybe this can be mitigated by taking these tasks into account in promotion decisions (this would help 
women in itself as they typically take on more tasks like this) and exempting women from other non-research 
tasks. 
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 103 
6 Internal hierarchy 
The economics profession today is hierarchical. Although most academic disciplines have some 
internal hierarchical structures, the hierarchy in economics is steeper and more consequential. The 
hierarchy within economics creates perverse incentives and centralises power, both of which cause 
blocks that fall foul of H1-H3. 
A hierarchy is typically defined as some kind of partially ordered set. In organisational terms, a 
hierarchy is an ordering of individuals along one or more socially important dimensions (Anderson & 
Brown, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Six features of the way that research is governed, evaluated, 
and rewarded in economics illustrate the orderings that make up economics’ hierarchy. Economics 
places particular significance on journal rankings (and the top 5 journals in particular); networks in the 
discipline are dominated by ‘stars’; those that govern the discipline are drawn from a narrow 
subsection of economists; those at more highly ranked institutions are more likely to be editors of, and 
authors in, high-prestige journals; and, the rankings of institutions in which economists reside, get 
their PhDs, and get their first jobs play significant roles in career success.  
In this chapter I show evidence of all these factors (in 6.1), and use the framework developed in 
chapter 4 to argue that the hierarchy they combine to form is problematic (in 6.2). The perverse 
incentives and centralisation of power caused by economics’ hierarchy block avenues for productive 
feedback, make economics less responsive to certain interests, and make public scrutiny more 
difficult. 
 
6.1 Economics is hierarchica 
The top 5 
Journal rankings play a big role in economics. Publications (or lack thereof) in the journals with the 
best reputations are significant in determining academic success or failure in most fields. In economics 
this is more acute, with the ‘top 5’ journals particularly significant—the American Economic Review 
(AER), Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE), Econometrica (ECMA), Journal of Political Economy 
(JPE), and Review of Economic Studies (ReStud).105 Many economics departments have informal or 
formal targets for junior academics to publish in the top 5, with tenure resting on little else (teaching 
ability, other publications, impact, et cetera, do not feature significantly). James Heckman and 
Sidharth Moktan (2017) show that at the top fifteen economics departments in the United States,106 
                                                             
105 There is some dispute as to whether ReStud should count as a member of the top 5, or whether the 5 should 
become 4. For now, at least, it is normally 5. 
106 Heckman and Moktan do not say which ranking they use to pick out the top departments, but their data would 
be striking for all commonly used rankings. 
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those that receive tenure only achieve marginally more non-top 5 publications than those that do not 
(for the very top departments, those ranked 1-5, there is almost no difference). For top 5 publications, 
however, the difference is significant. Those that secure tenure at departments ranked 1-5 publish an 
average of 2.7 more top 5 articles over an eight-year period than those that do not (the difference is 1.6 
at departments ranked 6-15). This suggests that publications in non-top 5 publications are not 
considered (or at least not significantly) in tenure decisions, with the tenure resting almost exclusively 
on ability to publish in the top 5.  
The importance of the top 5 does not end at tenure. Top 5 publications are also instrumental in 
securing pay rises, research grants (sometimes via internal faculty rankings), requests for professional 
advice, and invitations to conferences and similar events. Given this, it is not surprising that 
submissions to the top 5 journals more than doubled, from 2 800 to 5 800, between 1990 and 2011 
(Card & DellaVigna, 2013).107 The top 5 has become so dominant that Heckman (2017) reports that 
young economists now frequently measure themselves and their progress by their number of published 
or forthcoming top 5 articles. Nattavudh Powdthavee, Yohanes Riyanto, and Jack Knetsch (2018) even 
find that, other things being equal, economists will judge a colleague’s CV as worse if it includes a 
reference to an article in a lower ranked journal. 
 
Stars 
Economists are prone to elevating particular individuals. The prizes in economics (the Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel and the John Bates Clark Medal, in 
particular) serve to separate out particularly venerated stars. Prize awardees are typically afforded 
greater voice and authority in the discipline and their citations are significantly boosted by their 
awards (Offer & Söderberg, 2016). Ben Clift (2018) also notes that famous economists play an 
important role in many policy institutions. In the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, 
new ideas, memos, and proposals do not catch on unless they cite at least one household name 
economist. 
Sanjeev Goyal, Marco J. van der Leij, and José Luis Moraga-González (2006) highlight the 
significance of certain individuals in economics by analysing networks of co-authorship.108 They argue 
that economics looks like a network of ‘interlinked stars’. By this they mean that the distribution of 
co-authorship is very unequal, with the 100 most linked economists (those with most co-authors) 
averaging 25 connections compared to the population average of 1.67 (a difference of 10 times the 
standard deviation). The well-connected stars also have a very low clustering coefficient compared to 
the network average, meaning that most of their co-authors do not collaborate with each other. As an 
example of what a network of such an interlinked star looks like, figure 2 shows the network of the 
most connected economist in the 1990s, Joseph Stiglitz. Between 1990 and 1999, the largest linked 
component of the co-authorship network accounted for 40.7 percent of all the authors of economics 
                                                             
107 The number continues to grow. The AER, for example, went from 1 644 submissions in 2011 to 1 929 in 
2016, an increase of 17% (Goldberg, 2017). 
108 Using a similar methodology to Ductor et al. (2013) and Ductor et al. (2018) (described in chapter 5). 
 105 
journals. That means that 40.7 percent of the authors of economics journals, including authors of just 
one or two papers (who might normally publish outside of economics journals) and authors of only 
single-authored papers, could be connected to each other by co-authorship connections. The existence 
of well-connected stars is crucial for holding this group together, if the most connected 5 percent of 
nodes are removed from the network it completely breaks down. This suggests that the stars in the 
network are important go-betweens for others in the network. This is borne out by the fact that the 
stars have much higher rates of ‘inbetweenness’ (a measure of the frequency that the shortest links 
between others will pass through them).109 
The significance of interlinked stars within economics has two effects. Firstly, the role certain 
economists play in connecting others likely gives them outsize influence on the research questions, 
frameworks, and methodologies in the discipline. Secondly, the output of interlinked stars likely 
benefits from their networks and reinforces their centrality and influence within economics. Given 
increases in the length of papers and in the time peer review takes (Ellison, 2002), it would be fair to 
assume that collaborations entail a significant amount of communication. Lorenzo Ductor, Marcel 
Fafchamps, Sanjeev Goyal, and Marco J. van der Leij (2013) argue that this increases the research 
output of interlinked stars by keeping them close to the spread of important (or at least fashionable) 
ideas. This concurs with the fact, discussed in chapter 5, that co-authorship connections and 
inbetweenness are positively correlated with research output. 
 
                                                             
109 It might be argued that, given these networks are only based on co-authorships, the stars will not really be the 
only thing connecting different economists. While this may be true, the assumption is that large co-authorship 
networks signal large networks of communication and connection in general. So, even though the stars may not 
be the only connection between the economists they link in the co-authorship network, the fact that they have 
high inbetweenness of co-authorship suggests they also have high inbetweenness of other networks. 
Figure 2. “Local network of collaboration of Joseph E. Stiglitz in the 1990s. The figure shows all nodes 
within distance 2 of J. E. Stiglitz as well as the links between them” Goyal et al. (2006, p. 410). 
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Centralisation of governance 
Hierarchy is also evident in the governance of economics' professional bodies. Kevin Hoover and 
Andrej Svorenčík’s110 data on the American Economic Association (AEA) shows that from 1982 to 
2014, 42 percent of the governing positions of the AEA went to academics from four universities: 
Harvard, MIT, Chicago, and Stanford. In the same period, 71 percent of those in governing positions 
held doctorates from the same four universities (Harvard, MIT, Chicago, and Stanford). To see the 
scale of this centralisation of power it is worth noting that the AEA has a membership of 21,000 and 
Harvard, MIT, Chicago, and Stanford make up less than 3 percent of the PhD granting institutions in 
the United States. Fourcade et al. (2015) compare similar findings to the professional associations of 
other social sciences. For the period 2010-14 they find that 72 percent of the AEA’s executive 
committee came from the top five ranked departments (with no committee members outside the top 
twenty departments). This compares to 12 percent for the American Political Science Association 
(APSA) and 20 percent for the America Sociological Association (ASA).111 
This centralisation is not without consequence. The AEA controls a number of the most important 
economics journals, including the AER (one of the top 5), Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) and 
Journal of Economic Perspectives (JEP)—the latter two being invitation based.112 Thomas Schelling 
notes that the AEA’s three main journals (AER, JEL, and JEP) “represent the scholarly profession; 
their policies and procedures determine what gets published in them; and what gets published strongly 
influences the image of economics in America” (Schelling, 2000, p. 528). The AER is particularly 
notable because it accounts for a large chunk of the top 5 papers published (40 percent in 2011-12).113 
Given the significance of top 5 publications on the careers of economists and under the assumption 
that top 5 publications are weighted roughly equally: “the AER now carries substantially more weight 
in determining the job opportunities and salaries of economists than other top-five journals” (Card & 
DellaVigna, 2013, p. 150). 
The AEA’s importance also spreads beyond journals. It plays a significant role in the job market 
for economists in the United States.114 The president-elect and program committee determine the 
annual meeting program of the Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA). The latter includes 
controlling the meetings of 59 other organisations that also come under the ASSA’s umbrella 
(including a number of less ‘mainstream’ ones) and selecting which papers are included in the “Papers 
and Proceedings” issue of the AER. As Fourcade et al. point out, “[t]his procedure ensures a flagging 
                                                             
110 This paper is unpublished. A summary of some of its findings is available online, see (Hoover, 2017). 
111 This uses US News rankings for economics departments from 2013. For some reason, the US news rankings 
included six departments in the top five that year: Harvard, MIT, Chicago, Princeton and Berkeley tied for first, 
with Stanford fifth. However, because the numbers would not alter very much if we also used six departments 
for political science and sociology (i.e. the APSA would still have roughly 15 percent and ASA 20 percent from 
the top six), and because other data in this section points in the same direction, we can disregard this anomaly. 
112 Other journals the AEA controls are: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics; American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics; American Economic Journal: Economic Policy; and American Economic Journal: 
Microeconomics. 
113 An increase from 25 percent in the 1970s, this excludes “papers that can be identified as comments, replies, 
corrections, or announcements” (Card & DellaVigna, 2013, p. 146). 2011-12 is the last period in the sample. 
114 It is not uncommon for universities in other countries to also run searches through the AEA. Both the 
University of Copenhagen and the University of Oslo have done this recently. 
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of topics and authors deemed most important by the organization’s leadership" (2015, p. 100). 
 
Centralised publishing 
In addition to dominating the governing bodies, elite departments make up a significant share of the 
authors and editors in the top journals (Colussi, 2018; Fourcade et al., 2015; Heckman & Moktan, 
2017; Wu, 2007). Tommaso Colussi (2018) finds that, between 2000 and 2006, 25 percent of all the 
authors in the top four economics journals—the top 5 minus ReStud—were employed by just six US 
universities (Harvard, Chicago, MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, and Princeton), and 47 percent of the authors 
got their PhDs from the same six universities.  
The cases of individual journals are particularly striking. Stephen Wu (2007) shows that, between 
2000 and 2003, 14 percent of the pages of the JPE were authored by economists from the University 
of Chicago (where the journal is based), with 15 and 13 percent of the pages of QJE coming from MIT 
and Harvard respectively (both based in Cambridge, Ma., like the journal). The eight departments that 
provide the most authors to these journals account for 40 percent of the pages of JPE and 58 percent 
of the pages of QJE. Even more striking, Colussi (2018) finds that those with PhDs from Harvard and 
MIT accounted for just under 50 percent of the authors in QJE in a similar period (2000-06). Updating 
these findings, Heckman and Moktan (2017) find that, between 2000 and 2016, 11.9 percent of the 
papers in the AER and 24.7 percent of the papers in QJE had at least one author affiliated with Harvard 
(15.4 percent of QJE papers had authors from Chicago, 13.9 percent from MIT, 9.7 percent from 
Berkeley, and 9.3 percent from Stanford). They also found 14.3 percent of JPE papers had authors 
affiliated with Chicago with similarly high numbers (although not as high as QJE) for schools that 
provided second to fifth most authors.  
Colussi suggests that part of the cause of this concentration of authorship is connections to editors. 
The same six universities mentioned above (Harvard, Chicago, MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, and 
Princeton) provided a massive 56 percent of the editors of the top four journals between 2000 and 
2006, with most of those coming from Chicago (26 percent) and Harvard (15 percent) (Colussi, 2018). 
Moreover, PhDs form those same six universities accounted for 64 percent of the editors of the top 
four journals in the same period. The roles of MIT and Harvard PhDs are particularly striking, 
providing 31 and 13 percent of the editors of these journals respectively. That means that 44 percent of 
the editors of the top four journals got their PhDs from just two institutions based in the same town 
and known to have similar philosophies. Colussi uses these figures and adds to them to note that 43 
percent of the articles published between 2000 and 2006 were authored by at least one scholar 
‘connected’ with at least one editor at the time of publication—‘connected’ meaning that an author was 
employed or studied at the same place at the same time as an editor, had their PhD advised by an 
editor (this measure uses a proxy),115 or has coauthored with an editor. In particular, 15 percent were 
former graduate students of editors and 29 percent one-time faculty colleagues. As a percentage of 
                                                             
115 “A Ph.D. Advisor connection is established when an editor had an academic position at the same university 
and in the same year in which the author obtained his or her Ph.D.; moreover, the two scholars also share at least 
one research field.” (Colussi, 2018, p. 46) 
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total authors (rather than articles), these numbers are even higher; 46 percent of the authors in the top 
four journals had at one time been colleagues of editors, and 32 percent had editors as former advisors. 
Colussi uses this data to estimate that colleagues of a journal editor publish 8 percent more articles, 
and advisees of an editor publish 14 percent more articles, in the connecting editor’s journal during 
their tenure. 
Given the fact that editors and authors are concentrated at so few universities, Colussi’s data on 
connections isn’t that surprising, being as it is based on shared institutional history. But even if 
Colussi’s causal claim that proximity to editors causes the concentration of authorship were incorrect, 
his data sharpens the issues raised by the numbers in this sub-section. Publishing within the top 
economics journals seems to be easier if one is connected to the top departments, and some institutions 
seem to gain additional home advantage (JPE and Chicago, QJE and Harvard and MIT).116 Even if 
there were no unfair advantages gained (that is even if all articles submitted were judged fairly 
according to the same standards), this paints a picture of economists connected to just a few US 
departments being afforded larger voices in some of the premier journals. 
Fourcade et al. (2015) note that, although sociology exhibits some centralisation of publishing, the 
extent of the centralisation is economics is unique. Between 2003 and 2012 employees at the top five 
economics departments accounted for 28.7 percent of all authors in JPE and 37.5 percent in QJE, 
compared to 22.3 percent in the American Journal of Sociology. Moreover, PhDs from the top five 
economics departments account for 45.4 and 57.6 percent of authors in JPE and QJE respectively, 
compared to 35.4 percent for the American Journal of Sociology. Fourcade et al. also note that the 
home advantage JPE and QJE seems to give economists in Chicago and Cambridge (Ma.) respectively 
is “virtually nonexistent in the main sociology journal edited out of a university department, the 
American Journal of Sociology” (2015, pp. 99-100). 
 
Prestige 
Unsurprisingly, hierarchy also plays a role in hiring patterns. Shin-Kap Han (2003) shows that a 
‘prestige principle’, where departments hire from similarly ranked or above departments, exists in 
many academic departments, but notes two unique things about economics. Firstly, the main ‘faction’ 
in economics is more dominant than in other disciplines (Han, 2003, p. 264). This means that there 
seems to be one accepted hierarchy in economics, whereas other disciplines contain parallel 
hierarchies that interpret prestige differently. Secondly, the prestige principle is stronger in economics 
than in any of the other disciplines Han considers.117 Top economics departments are more likely to 
hire students from other top departments than are top departments in sociology, political science, 
history, psychology, English, and even mathematics.118 Hierarchy is also built into hiring practices in 
                                                             
116 This is likely helped by the fact that one-quarter and one-third of the submissions to JPE and QJE were desk 
rejected in 2000-03. 
117 This is also shown by Stephen Wu (2005). 
118 Using network analysis of different departments (with vertices defined by one department hiring from 
another), Han also shows that, in economics, centrality indices—a collection of measures of how central a node 
is in the network—are also much more strongly correlated with the US News rankings than in other disciplines. 
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economics in more systematic ways than in other departments. Economics departments frequently 
offer internal rankings of job market candidates for hiring departments to use (Fourcade et al., 2015). 
 
The first job 
For doctoral students that do not train at the best departments, these hiring practices are compounded 
by Paul Oyer’s (2006) analysis that getting a good initial job has a causal effect on having a good job 
later. Oyer stresses this is a causal effect because he does not regress the quality of later jobs with 
candidates’ first jobs but with job market ‘health’ when they finish their PhD—using Job Openings for 
Economists (JOE) listings as a measure of job market health. The logic is that because the strength of 
the job market when a candidate finishes their PhD affects the quality of their first job (Oyer also 
shows this) regardless of their underlying quality as a candidate, job market strength can be used as a 
proxy for initial job quality. Using this technique, Oyer claims to screen out differences between 
candidates and focus solely on the effects from their first jobs. He finds that candidates that initially 
place into tenure track jobs are 55 percent more likely to secure tenure in a later year. And, initially 
placing into a top 50 department makes a candidate 60 percent more likely to be in a top 50 
department in a later year. 
Oyer suggests that this effect is in part caused by better quality initial jobs having a causal effect 
on productivity (measured as publishing activity in terms of number of top 5 publications). He 
estimates that getting placed in a school ranked thirteenth rather than sixteenth equates to one extra 
paper in ten years for a person who would normally publish 10-15 papers in ten years. He also 
estimates that being placed at a top 50 school increases the probability of publishing in the top 5 
journals by 50 percent. But he notes that it is not clear to what degree this productivity increase 
explains the positive effect of initial first jobs. Indeed, Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) have 
contested the idea that elite universities provide productivity gains. They argue that most of the 
productivity gains that elite universities historically provided have dissipated due to changes in 
communication technology. It is plausible that placing into an academically stronger department 
causes candidates to settle on different norms of success and gives them access to more fruitful ideas 
and collaborations. But it is also plausible that later search committees do not consider the possibility 
that a candidate’s first placement may be in part due to luck (of how strong the job market was when 
they graduated), and instead see the prestige factor in their first job as a sign of underlying quality. An 
alternative explanation might be that some other factors that make one attractive to search committees, 
in addition to journal publication productivity, are increased by getting a better initial job. A candidate 
with a better initial job is likely to be more central in the hierarchical economic networks, they are 
more likely to know someone involved in the governance of the AEA or who edits one of the big 
journals, and they are more likely to receive national research grants. 
Regardless of the explanation, everything points to a reinforcing loop. Economics is hierarchical, 
and the higher up the hierarchy you are able to place (due to luck or otherwise), the more likely you 
are to stay in that position relative to others. 
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A steep and consequential hierarchy 
Career advancement within economics is heavily determined by publications in the top 5 journals. A 
few star economists benefit from being central in economic networks. The AEA is dominated by those 
from a few top universities. Being connected to top economics departments increases an individual’s 
propensity to publish in or edit top economics journals. There is an extremely strong prestige factor in 
hiring in economics, based on a single hierarchy. And, the success of an economist’s career is strongly 
affected by the rank of the institution that first hires them. Together these features paint a picture in 
which some economists, some institutions, and some journals are afforded more significance than 
others in a variety of ways.119 These things come together; the more significant economists are in the 
more significant departments and publish in the more significant journals. 
I suggest that these features give a good picture of the hierarchy in economics and demonstrate 
that it is consequential and steep. By ‘consequential’ I mean that where an individual finds themselves 
in the hierarchy is likely to have a significant impact on what they can do and where in the hierarchy 
they will be later down the line. The ‘steepness’ of a hierarchy is the degree of asymmetry between the 
power, status, and influence of its members.120 By saying that the hierarchy in economics is ‘steep’, I 
mean that the asymmetries between economists at different rungs of the hierarchy is large. Each aspect 
of the way economics is organised outlined above increases the gradient of economics’ hierarchy by 
pointing to new ways in which the distribution of power, status, and influence in economics is 
asymmetrical. Those at the top might end up as editors of big journals or high up in the AEA, those 
lower down are much less likely to be in such positions. 
 
6.2 Why worry about economics’ hierarchy? 
There are two ways to respond to the conclusion that economics is steeply and consequentially 
hierarchical. The hierarchy in economics, or certain aspects of it, might be justified, either as an 
unavoidable feature of something else desirable or by bringing positive benefits in its own right. Or, 
the hierarchy in economics might be taken to be a problem to remedy. In the below, I will argue 
against the first response and for the second. 
                                                             
119 Although I have not provided a systematic meta-analysis of the data I presented to highlight these features, I 
have attempted to present the most significant and up to date research on the institutional structures of 
economics. Even if I have missed some important literature on this topic, what I have presented is no less 
important. Moreover, even if some of the data I have presented is challenged, the fact that I presented a large 
amount of evidence, from various different sources, which all point in the same direction, suggests a pattern. 
120 I draw this from literatures on hierarchy in organisational studies and studies of animal behaviour. In steeper 
hierarchical organisations, the differences in power, status, or influence between those at the top and bottom is 
larger. In steeper dominance hierarchies (found in animals), those towards the top end are more likely to defeat 
those at the lower end in contests. See Cronin, Acheson, Hernández, and Sánchez (2015) and de Vries, Stevens, 
and Vervaecke (2006) for discussions of hierarchies in animals. See Anderson and Brown (2010) for a review of 
the literature on hierarchies in organisational studies. 
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Steeper organisational structures need not be intrinsically problematic. Organisations with steeper 
hierarchies seem to be able to act more swiftly and decisively. If those in positions of power in a 
hierarchy want to shift the way an organisation thinks they often have the power to do so. Clift (2018), 
for example, argues that the IMF’s hierarchical structure helped it adapt in the wake of the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. He argues that Olivier Blanchard was instrumental in shifting ideas away 
from those characterised as the Washington Consensus in his job as Economic Counsellor (often called 
Chief Economist, the role makes him a member of the IMF’s senior leadership team and head of 
research at the fund), between 2008 and 2015. Clift credits Blanchard, and the power he had as 
Economic Counsellor, with opening up the fund to new ideas against the preferences of many fund 
employees. 
Steep hierarchies are often thought to benefit group action in two ways: by motivating members to 
work towards the interests of the group and by making collective decisions more efficient (Levine & 
Moreland, 1990; Cartwright & Zander, 1953). 
Hierarchies are thought to motivate members of an organisation by conferring benefits on those 
that successfully climb them, under the assumption that when an individual successfully climbs a 
hierarchy they also contribute to the group’s goals. There are two issues with applying this to 
economics. First, most empirical evidence (across small lab experiments and larger field studies) has 
found that the effect of hierarchical structures on motivation is negative, rather than positive (for a 
review, see Anderson & Brown, 2010). Second, the assumption that successful hierarchy climbing by 
individuals contributes to the wider community’s goals is unwarranted in economics. I will argue 
below that the ways that economists climb up economics’ hierarchy often hinders, rather than benefits, 
the development of research in the field, because the hierarchy creates a number of perverse 
incentives. 
Hierarchies are also thought to make group decision-making more efficient by giving 
disproportionate control to members with superior abilities and leadership skills and by reining in 
conflict. Again, there are two issues with applying this to economics. Firstly, it is questionable whether 
the community goals of economics are anything like efficient and conflict-free decision-making. 
Under the interpretation of economic knowledge as dispassionate and technical policy advice, this 
may be the case. The problem is that efficient and conflict-free decision-making would also mean less 
feedback, less debate, and the consideration of fewer, not more, interests. As we saw in chapter 4, all 
of these things are important for the sciences (which are not organisations like firms or armies). 
Secondly, even if efficient and conflict-free decision-making were the goal of economics, empirical 
findings on the benefits of hierarchical structures on performance in such tasks is mixed.121 Even 
                                                             
121 See Anderson and Brown (2010) for a review. Some small scale laboratory studies find that hierarchical 
structures do better at simple problem solving tasks (i.e., they find the correct answer more quickly) (Maier & 
Solem, 1952; Shaw, 1964). Other lab experiments have found the reverse to be true (Berdahl & Anderson, 
2005). A number of field experiments of more complex organisations have found that steeper hierarchies (in 
terms of pay or power) perform worse. See, for examples, Ouchi’s (2006) study of school districts that found 
that less centralised districts had better test scores, or Pfeffer and Langton’s (1993) study that found greater wage 
disparities in academia are associated with lower productivity (in terms of publications). 
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worse for any arguments that a steep hierarchy might benefit economics, Cameron Anderson and 
Courtney Brown (2010) point out that the studies that find steep hierarchies to be beneficial tend to 
involve relatively simple, stable, unambiguous tasks, whereas studies that look at more complicated 
group tasks, or tasks that are ambiguous or require creativity, tend to find that steep hierarchies hinder 
rather than help performance. 
Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that steeper hierarchical forms either motivate economists in 
a productive way or help to make the decisions and findings in economics more accurate and efficient. 
In fact, the general literature on organisational forms suggests that, given the kinds of tasks involved in 
economic research, the opposite might be the case. In the rest of this section I will make this general 
worry more specific. 
Three questions seem important when assessing a specific group decision-making hierarchy. Is the 
hierarchy facilitating or constraining productive (or correct, or good) choices? Is it able to react to the 
needs of those it should serve? Is the hierarchy accountable? These three considerations are directly 
analogous to the three heuristics for evaluating social epistemic practices outlined in chapter 4: 
H1: Looking for blocks to productive forms of feedback. 
H2: Looking for blocks to certain kinds of interests being considered in judgements of 
significance. 
H3: Looking for blocks to avenues for public scrutiny. 
My point in the below will not be that steep hierarchies in research environments are always 
problematic. The precise structures that lead to fruitful feedback, the consideration of a wide variety of 
interests, and openness to public scrutiny will depend a lot on the context of the community involved. 
My point will be, rather, that the specific practices discussed in 6.1 are problematic from the 
perspective of the framework developed in chapter 4. That is, the steepness of the hierarchy in 
economics is presently problematic and efforts should be made to alleviate it.  
I will break the negative implications of the steep hierarchy in economics into the perverse 
incentives it causes and the concentration of power it amounts to. I will argue that both of these factors 
lead to problems from the perspective of H1-H3. I will make this argument in stages. I will start by 
examining, in 6.2.1, one aspect of economics’ hierarchy: the significance of the top 5. I will highlight 
the perverse incentives and concentration of power the importance of the top 5 causes in turn, and as I 
do so I will highlight how the issues discussed might be evaluated from the perspective of H1-H3. I 
will then, in 6.2.2, show how similar issues arise for the other aspects of economics’ hierarchy and 
with hierarchical social epistemic practices in general. Again, I focus on perverse incentives and the 
concentration of power in turn and highlighting the relation to H1-H3 as I go. 
 
6.2.1 The top 5 
Hamermesh (2018) analyses the citations of papers in a range of journals and concludes that the top 5 
vs non-top 5 dichotomy does not do a particularly good job of separating out what it intends to: the 
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most important, or at least most cited, articles in economics. This is corroborated by the fact that only 
two of the top 5 were among the five journals with the highest two, five, and ten-year impact factors in 
2015 (Heckman & Moktan, 2017).122 Moreover, from the perspective of specialist subfields 
(development, labour, et cetera), the top 5 journals only publish a small fraction of the most influential 
(by citations) work. Yet, the same economists that publish work in non-top 5 specialist journals still 
use the top 5 as an important marker in hiring and tenure decisions (Heckman & Moktan, 2017). 
Even if we leave the issue of whether or not the top 5 captures what it aims to (the five most 
important economics journals) to one side, a number of other issues remain. In particular, the top 5 
creates perverse incentives and concentrates power in the hands of a small subset of economists. 
 
Perverse incentives 
The dominance of the top 5 combines with long review times, high rejection rates, and short tenure 
clocks,123 to necessitate individual economists to think strategically about the work they pursue. This 
creates a number of perverse incentives, particularly for early career economists, who might otherwise 
be hoped to be the most productive and creative. Many young economists will tell you that whether or 
not a piece of work would get into the top 5 is at the forefront of their mind when starting a project. 
This consideration crowds out other concerns, including innovation. Publishing in the top 5 and doing 
innovative work need not be mutually exclusive, but there are reasons to believe they often conflict. 
The importance of the top 5 incentivises economists to follow known paths to top 5 success. 
According to a former editor of two top 5 journals (JPE and ECMA), Lars Hansen, this makes “high-
quality follow up papers” more common, as they are the easiest way into a top 5 journal (circa 55-56 
mins of Heckman, Akerlof, Deaton, Fudenberg, & Hansen, 2017). It also encourages the herd-
following behaviour that creates fads.124 And, it incentivises spending more time polishing papers to 
satisfy editors over taking those papers elsewhere and moving onto new projects. All of this reduces 
overall output by increasing the time economists spend refining single papers and means that 
economists spend less time developing innovative frameworks or ideas. 
Although there may occasionally be good reasons to limit innovation in certain parts of science 
(perhaps because taking some things as fixed is important for making progress on others, see chapter 7 
for how this can be squared with allowing for feedback), the crowding out of incentives to innovation 
                                                             
122 These were QJE (2nd) and ReStud (5th) for two-year, QJE (2nd) and JPE (5th) for five-year, and QJE (2nd) 
and JPE (4th) for ten-year impact factors. The journal that tops two, five, and ten-year impact factors is the 
invited JEL. Third in all cases is Journal of Finance, and fourth for two and five-year and fifth for ten-year 
impact factors is the invited JEP. 
123 Tenure track systems are fast becoming the model of employment (for the top end of economics departments 
at least) all over the world. Even where tenure track systems are not in place, something resembling the process 
(evaluation based on top publications between 5 and 8 years into an economist’s first job) is quite common. 
124 Take for example the quick rise in excitement towards the use of machine learning or randomised control 
trials. The rush to use both these methodologies obscured other factors from view (see ‘Economists are prone to 
fads, and the latest is machine learning’, No author, 2016). In the case of randomised control trails, Deaton and 
Cartwright (2018) have argued that they are less reliable than often touted, and that they make it seem like 
theoretical discussions about causes is not important. Moreover, the elevation of randomisation obscures 
questions for which randomised trails are hard to apply, on the effects of institutions or monetary policy for 
example. 
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in general seems problematic. (H1) Feedback helps explain one reason why. Innovative ideas can 
provide criticisms of existing theories that can then be replaced, enriched, or further justified. 
Innovative forms of measurement, observation, experimentation, and intervention offer new ways of 
providing feedback to existing theories and practices through providing new angles on and new forms 
of resistance from the world. Innovation is, thus, an important mechanism by which scientific 
knowledge and practices progress (however construed), by which sciences can develop new 
applications, and by which scientific knowledge and practices are justified. Incentives that undercut 
innovative work for an instrumental goal that only serves to develop individual careers lowers the 
prevalence of productive feedback. George Akerlof (in Heckman et al., 2017) argues along these lines 
by claiming that whole potential forms and types of economics are often ignored by economists as 
they are unlikely to produce top 5 journals articles.125 Similarly, lower productivity means that 
economists put out less new ideas, likely lowering the amount of interesting observations and ideas in 
economics. 
The emphasis on the top 5 also has an impact on the interests economics considers (H2). Gaps in 
the big journals highlight that preferences for research that is significant from a societal perspective 
(or from the perspective of some sub-community) are crowded out by instrumental choices. George 
Akerlof, for example, laments the lack of detailed reportage that might help shed light on the workings 
of certain parts of the economy, like the financial system (Heckman et al., 2017). Such crowding out 
of considerations of significance from any perspective other than what will aid top 5 publications 
likely curtails the extent to which economists consider the interests of those that are not top 5 journal 
editors. Given that top 5 journal editors come from a small community (which is 92 percent male), this 
likely leads to the interests of large sections of society not being considered in determining what to 
research. Moreover, given that the top 5 are all generalist rather than specialist journals,126 the 
importance of the top 5 also disincentivises economists from doing specialist work, which referees and 
editors are likely to refer to specific field journals. A lot of important work has historically been 
published in field journals but the increasing importance of the top 5 disincentivises similar future 
work. This undercuts niche work that might have particular significance to certain sections of society, 
work on economic development or the economics of climate change for example. (It also narrows the 
kinds of feedback that ideas in the discipline are exposed to by pushing more economists into similar 
generalist areas and discouraging the development of alternative niches (H1).) 
The dominance of the top 5 journals within economics also marginalises other mechanisms for 
communicating economics ideas. Take books, for example. Some of the most historically significant 
works in economics have been books. Not only where Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes’s most 
                                                             
125 Akerlof doesn’t offer examples of types of economics he sees as missing. But he does lament the absence of 
reportage (see next paragraph) and that might suggest he is particularly annoyed at the lack of detailed empirical 
work that examines particular facets of the economy. 
126 This means that they publish work that all economists should be able to understand (at least to an extent). 
This does not mean that they never publish specialist work, but they are much less likely to do so. ECMA is 
slightly between a specialist and a generalist journal. Published by the Econometric Society, ECMA aims to 
promote the connection between economic theory and mathematics and statistics. This means its papers tend to 
be more technical. But given the wide use of mathematics and statistics in economics, it is debatable whether this 
constitutes a particular specialist field. 
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significant works, The Wealth of Nations and The General Theory, books, but books have been pivotal 
in shifting more recent economic debates—take Thomas Piketty's Capital (2014), Gary Becker's 
Human Capital (1964), or even a more technical book like Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent's 
Robustness (2008). That is not to mention the role of textbooks. It seems perverse to incentivise 
researchers (especially the young) to avoid a medium that has been key to developing the field. 
Even more troubling, marginalising books marginalises a crucially important mode of 
communication to those outside of economics, thus undermining an important mechanism for 
encouraging public scrutiny (H3). Books tend to be more visible, more complete, easier to access 
without university affiliation or an understanding of journal platforms, and more accessible than 
journal articles. All of these factors make books more likely to be used by other academics, journalists, 
policy makers, and other consumers and users of knowledge to understand topics. If the value of 
books among economists is downgraded, then we should expect other disciplines and the public to be 
less informed about the most recent developments in the discipline. Moreover, it is not only books that 
are marginalised. Anything that is not a top 5 publication is seen as less important. 
Anyone interacting with economic knowledge or practices from an outside perspective is going to 
find it more difficult to engage and be listened to if they cannot get some handle on what is going on 
close to the frontier of economic research. As I noted in chapter 4, outside scrutiny need not require 
the knowledge of an internal expert. But ways of grasping some understanding of what is going on at 
the frontier are important for outside actors if they are to judge what goes on in a discipline and add 
relevant criticisms and observations. Some public communication is, thus, needed to cultivate the 
potential for the public scrutiny of expertise, something that I argued is necessary for legitimate 
epistemic authority. This is important for all forms of expertise, but particularly important for 
economics, given the significant societal role it plays. Books and non-journal article forms of 
communication are crucial mediums by which outsiders can gain this understanding; undermining 
them undermines public scrutiny and the epistemic legitimacy of economics. 
The fact that there is a lack of mediums for those outside economics to understand what goes on in 
the discipline is highlighted by the way that economists often respond to criticism. Those arguing for 
pluralism are often, for example, told that they have an outdated understanding of what is going on 
within economics and that economics should not be judged by its textbooks (Smith, 2017; Smith, 
2018; Coyle, 2018). If this is correct, then the significance of the top 5 and the consequent lack of 
importance of books and other forms of communication with those outside the discipline likely plays a 
role in causing this situation. Without valuing some forms of communication targeted at a wider 
audience (even just a slightly wider audience, like other academics), it is difficult for a productive 
dialogue to form between economists and those outside the discipline. All of this contributes to a sense 
of detachment between debates on economic issues in the public sphere and those within economics, 
which makes public scrutiny of the decisions that economists make more difficult. (It also blunts 
avenues for feedback from outside perspectives (H1), and makes it more difficult for those outside to 
communicate their interests to economists (H2).) 
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Concentration of power 
The acceptance (both implicit and explicit) of a clear top 5 by economists justifies one of its causes: a 
strategy taken by deans, administrators, and hiring and tenure committees of simply counting top 
publications rather than reading papers to determine an individual or department’s worth. This 
amounts to a delegation of the selection of good scholars and work to the editors and reviewers of top 
5 journals. In and of itself, this is an odd thing to do. It seems to be a dereliction of the duties of those 
tasked with selection and seems to sacrifice the interests of the institutions involved (who may not get 
the most talented individuals) to save time for the selectors. But the wider effect on the balance of 
power in the discipline is even more troubling. It increases the significance of the already important 
decisions that journal editors make. 
This can hamper mechanisms for feedback in economics (H1). Journal editors choose what to 
send to reviewers, what to reject before review, who should review papers, and make final decisions 
on what to publish. They also influence the kinds of topics and work that journals publish. Given the 
importance of the top 5 journals, their editors have a disproportionate impact on the direction of the 
discipline. Such a concentration of power amplifies small biases on the part of editors. Michèle 
Lamont (2009) notes that at many levels—evaluation of student work, admission to post graduate 
studies, hiring, acceptance of papers, awards of grants, invitations—people favour work that they see 
as similar to their own.127 Social psychologists and sociologists have also noted the prevalence of more 
general versions of this effect. In many contexts people favour and connect with those that are similar 
to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Moreover, it makes sense for academics to 
favour work that conforms to positions they have previously defended or that criticises positions of 
their rivals  (Holst & Christensen, 2018). All this means that it is plausible to assume that economic 
journal editors (and reviewers) exhibit at least weak biases in favour of forms of research similar to 
their own.128 
It might be hoped that such biases are countered by one of two mechanisms: a clear way of 
determining good or ‘correct’ work or drawing editorships from a wide pool of perspectives. If there is 
a clear mechanism by which work can be singled out as of the kind that should be published (maybe 
by some agreed standards for accuracy and significance), then editor and reviewer biases are less 
likely to be decisive. George Akerlof and Pascal Michaillat (2017) draw a comparison with statistics 
and call the extent to which such a mechanism exists the ‘power of tests’. In a model of tenure 
decisions over time, they argue that the combination of a low power of tests (i.e., a large margin of 
error in the mechanism for deciding quality) with weak biases in favour of work from one's own 
                                                             
127 Also see Tellmann (2016). 
128 This need not imply any great conspiracy. Top 5 journal editors can be diligent, hardworking, and principled 
economists and still admit weak biases towards particular forms of research. This is also not specific to 
economics. What is specific to economics is the concentration of power that amplifies these biases. 
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paradigm leads to dynamics in which disciplines can be stuck in inferior paradigms.129 They argue that 
economics does not have particularly strong tests because there is no consensus on mechanisms for 
determining quality. This makes the drawing of editorships from a wide pool of perspectives very 
important. Diversity in the intellectual perspectives of editors can alleviate the effects of selection 
biases by spreading them out. 
As we saw in chapter 3, determining what should count as a diversity of perspectives admits a 
wide variety of interpretations. Nonetheless, there are two things we can say about the diversity of 
intellectual perspectives amongst editors of the top 5. Firstly, the outsize influence of a narrow set of 
journals puts limits on diversity by enshrining a small collection of editors with influence. Secondly, 
the editors in this already small pool are mostly trained at a small group of elite universities (as a 
reminder, six universities provided 64 percent of the editors of the top four journals between 2000 and 
2006, with MIT alone providing 31 percent (Colussi, 2018)). While not showing categorically that the 
intellectual perspectives of top 5 editors are not diverse enough, these two facts at least indicate 
constraints on how diverse they might be. If the top 5 were extended to a top 10 or 20 (or a multi-
dimensioned ordering) the pool of editors holding power would widen (and likely diversify). If the top 
5 journals were less dominated by economists educated at a small subsection of universities, they 
would also likely bring more diverse perspectives (for some of the reasons outlined in 5.2.1). 
Thus, because journal editors in part determine what research is approved, because they plausibly 
exhibit some selection bias, and because a key mechanism for mitigating bias—diversity—is 
undermined by the concentration of power in economics, important new ideas and ways of practicing 
economics are less likely to develop. Moreover, this situation incentivises young economists to follow 
the preferences of the select powerful older economists in the discipline.130 Both of these things 
severely undercut the feedback within the discipline (H1). A lack of new ways of practicing 
economics undercuts possibilities for new observations, applications, judgements of significance, 
arguments, et cetera. The incentives for young economists to follow their lauded seniors crowds out 
innovation and helps to further concentrate power at the top of the discipline by making the work of 
senior economists even more visible and successful, thus increasing their influence further. 
The concentration of power in the hands of a few editors also raises questions about how well 
economics can incorporate a wide array of interests (H2). Can such a small group adequately represent 
the diversity of interests relevant to economic issues? As I argued in chapter 4, the variety of goals and 
uses the sciences can be directed towards makes it important that decisions about what topics to 
pursue, and how, are informed by the interests of significant constituencies in society. Decisions need 
not always be representative but given that there is no purely epistemic or context independent way of 
determining significance or the goals of economics, it is important that certain interests are not 
                                                             
129 Their concept of paradigm is drawn from Kuhn (1962). Their thought experiment imagines a phase in which 
two paradigms are competing, with one superior to the other. The idea is that a test in favour of the superior 
paradigm on aggregate, which has a wide margin of error, can be overwhelmed by biases among those that are 
supposed to execute the test. 
130 The latter is highlighted by the fact that 47 percent of the articles in the top four journals in 2000-06 cite one 
of the journal’s editors (Colussi, 2018). 
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systematically excluded from being considered. The significant societal role economics plays makes 
this even more the case. The two comments I made about the diversity among top 5 editors above—
the importance of the top 5 makes for a small pool of editors and that pool is dominated by a few elite 
universities—both make it more likely that certain interests will be systematically excluded in the 
discipline. 
 
Thus, by creating a collection of perverse incentives and concentrating power in economics into the 
hands of a few editors, the reification of the top 5 falls foul of H1-H3 in a number of ways. These are 
summarised in table 5. 
The perverse incentives the top 5 creates block important avenues for feedback in the discipline by 
crowding out innovation, lowering output, disincentivising specialist work, and lowering the 
importance of communicating with the outside (H1). They also make it more difficult for interests that 
are not already well represented within economics (women, minorities, workers, and people from 
socio-economic backgrounds or without elite educations) to be considered by disincentivising research 
that might be socially significant, the development of specialist work that might speak to particular 
concerns, and dialogue between economists and outsiders (H2). Lastly, the marginalisation of outside 
communication and books by the importance of the top 5 makes public scrutiny of decisions by 
economists more difficult (H3). Given their interest in incentives, none of this should surprise 
economists. In fixed reward systems people should be expected to work to the test. Where rewards 
depend on where you publish rather than the most important or interesting problems to solve, the 
former is likely to crowd out the later. 
The dominance of the top 5 and their importance in determining career paths also serves to 
concentrate influence over economics into the hands of a small group of editors (who themselves 
come from a small subsection of universities). This constrains avenues for new ideas within the 
discipline and means that the preferences of those at the top dominate (H1). It also constrains the 
extent to which research in economics is informed by the interests of those in wider population, 
particularly those that are not well represented in the higher echelons of the discipline (H2). 
 
6.2.2 Hierarchy in general 
The reification of the top 5 is, however, not the only thing that makes economics steeply hierarchical. I 
have described how the top 5 (plus the fact that top 5 editors are concentrated in a few universities) 
blocks avenues for productive feedback, the consideration of certain interests, and some conditions 
that aid public scrutiny by creating perverse incentives and centralising power. The problems with 
other aspects of economics’ steeply hierarchical structures can also be viewed through the ways that 
incentives and power affect H1-H3. 
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Top 5 creates This leads to Which blocks 
   
Perverse 
incentives 
Less innovation and lower output H1 avenues for feedback 
Lower incentives for societally important 
work 
H2 the consideration of a wide 
variety of interests 
Lower incentives for specialist work that 
might satisfy niche communities 
H2 the consideration of certain 
interests (plus part affects H1) 
A marginalization of books and other forms 
of external communication 
H3 public scrutiny (plus part 
affects H1 and H2) 
   
Concentration 
of power 
The amplification of biases H1 avenues for feedback 
A higher likelihood that certain 
perspectives and interests will not be 
considered 
H2 the consideration of certain 
interests 
Table 5. The issues caused by the reification of the top 5 and how they relate to H1-H3. 
 
Perverse incentives 
If hierarchies are recognised as highly consequential, then climbing them can distract from other, 
possibly more important, goals. Above I noted that focussing on top 5 publications can distract from 
innovation, wider significance, special interest, and communicating with a wider audience. The 
pressure to place well in hierarchies that are steep and competitive crowd out other considerations too. 
As evidenced from the recent replication crisis in psychology and some other disciplines (Baker, 
2016), the pressure to publish in academia can encourage p-hacking and other malign research 
practices that seem to run counter to truth (or the development of socially useful abilities). There are 
many dimensions to this. In this subsection I focus on one: ‘maverick’ behaviour. The hierarchical 
structures in economics disincentivise maverick behaviour, meaning that the discipline forgoes the 
important critical feedback and new ideas that mavericks bring (H1). 
A number of social epistemologists have used formal models to investigate the kinds of behaviour 
desirable to form productive epistemic communities. Both Kitcher (1993) and Michael Weisberg and 
Ryan Muldoon (2009) develop models of scientific communities in which some scientists actively 
pursue research strategies that are different to all—‘mavericks’—whereas others are more 
conservative (in the case of Weisberg and Muldoon, these are either followers of others or those that 
work alone and ignore what others do). In Weisberg and Muldoon’s model the research communities 
with mavericks (either communities of just mavericks or mixed communities) outperform the research 
communities that do not contain mavericks. Similarly, Kitcher finds that communities that contain 
scientists that pursue maverick strategies are likely to be more successful than those that do not. While 
the abstraction in these models makes it difficult to apply them to practice it is instructive that they 
both find that maverick behaviour—actively pursuing research strategies that are different to others in 
the community and going against conventions—as important for a scientific community. The point I 
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want to make is that many of the hierarchical aspects of economics disincentivise maverick behaviour. 
The probability of success of new strategies in economics (that is the probability of being 
published and influential) is lowered by a small number of generalist journals having such importance 
and the fact that those journals are dominated by people from a small selection of universities. This is 
compounded by the fact that the AEA is dominated by the economists from the same schools; meaning 
that the ASSA meetings and the directions of the AEA journals are dominated by the interests of a 
select set of economists. The awareness among economists (and particularly young economists) of a 
clear and consequential hierarchy in economics—where you work affects where you publish,131 your 
first job matters a lot, and top 5 publication is crucial for job placement and career progression—also 
serves to make the competition in economics intense and stressful (Fourcade, 2009). A number of 
studies have provided reasons to believe that high stakes competitive environments that are perceived 
to be risky heighten risk-averse behaviour (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic et al., 
1979; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002). When combined with the lower success rate of new strategies, this 
likely makes maverick-like behaviour less common in economics. 
This is highlighted by, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Paul Romer’s explosive 
broadside against present practices in macroeconomics. Upon joining the Bank, Romer commented 
that he felt free to deliver his wide-ranging (and in places funny and rude) critique of macroeconomic 
methods because he was leaving academia: 
This price [of dissenting] is lower for me because I am no longer an academic. I am a 
practitioner, by which I mean that I want to put useful knowledge to work. I care little about 
whether I ever publish again in leading economics journals or receive any professional honor 
because neither will be of much help to me in achieving my goals. (Romer, Forthcoming, p. 
20)132 
Romer adds that, although some of his academic colleagues agree with his comments about 
macroeconomics in private, they would never do so in public for fear of reprisals. The intense 
competition in economics and the pressures and incentives internalised by economists from a young 
age, makes them unlikely to rock the boat. In addition to disincentivising disagreement with common 
practices, Romer notes that the culture within economics creates a climate in which economists are 
unlikely to challenge certain (generally famous) individuals: 
[I]t is an extremely serious violation of some honor code for anyone to criticize openly a 
revered authority figure… After I criticized a paper by Lucas, I had a chance encounter with 
someone who was so angry that at first he could not speak. Eventually, he told me, ‘You are 
                                                             
131 Many economists outside the top ranked institutions (who call themselves ‘LRMs’—low ranked monkeys) 
often assume that the fact that peer review is only single blinded in most economics journals means their papers 
are rejected from top publications based on their institutional affiliations (this is regularly openly discussed 
online at Economics Job Market Rumors and at conference social events). Even if this is not true, the fact that 
there is a lack of trust is an issue. 
132 This paper has not been published yet. All quotes refer to the September 14, 2016, version available here 
https://paulromer.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/WP-Trouble.pdf [accessed: 28/9/18]. 
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killing Bob.’ (Romer, Forthcoming, p. 21)133 
All of this highlights the pressures that work against criticism, new ideas, and other forms of 
maverick-like behaviour in economics. New ideas are unlikely to succeed, and economists are less 
likely to take the risk given the high costs of failure and the stressful and competitive environment in 
the discipline. Disagreement with accepted practices is likely to come at a personal cost, and 
disagreement with renowned individuals is frowned upon. Empirical studies on hierarchical 
organisations show that such effects are common. Steeper hierarchies encourage members to adopt the 
perspectives of high-ranking individuals (Newcomb, 1943), and discourage those with dissenting 
opinions from articulating them (Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & Edmondson, 2009; Milanovich, 
Driskell, Stout, & Salas, 1998). This all serves to reinforce the issues described in 6.2.1. The steeply 
hierarchical social epistemic practices within economics disincentivise productive forms of feedback 
in the form of new ideas and critical interaction (H1). Furthermore, the lower instances of criticism 
within the discipline also makes public scrutiny more difficult (H3). This is because, as noted in 
chapter 4, the existence of debate helps bring out factors that help the public make judgements about 
expert and scientific practices (it highlights things like biases, untested assumptions, background 
assumptions, et cetera). When internal criticism is marginalised, the public receive less information by 
which they might scrutinise the decisions of economists. 
 
Concentration of power 
The elevation of certain individuals, the fact that the AEA’s governing body is dominated by those at 
the top universities, and the fact that where you work seems to affect where you publish all point to 
positive benefits accruing to those further up economics’ hierarchy. Those higher up are more likely to 
engage in productive networks, have greater platforms, find it easier to publish in and edit the big 
journals, and influence (via direct control or contacts) the running of the AEA, its journals, the ASSA 
meetings, and the economics job market. When combined with the prestige factor in hiring and the 
fact that an economist’s first job has a big impact on their later career progression, a pattern emerges in 
which those that get PhDs from the top universities (and likely degrees from the top universities, and 
come from privileged background before that (Chetty, Friedman, Saez, Turner, & Yagan, 2017)) find it 
easier to secure influential roles, have their voices heard, and reshape the discipline. 
An economist may respond that this is justified. They may argue that all that I have described is a 
well-functioning meritocracy, in which the best economists rightly rise to the top. I have two answers 
to this. Firstly, the limited data available on whether benefits are earned or based on a combination of 
luck and initial position points to the latter playing a significant role. Oyer’s (2006) work, outlined 
above, indicates that even when luck is involved in where an economist first gets employed, the rank 
                                                             
133 Incidentally, Romer’s attack did not seem to hurt him that much. He went on to win the 2018 Sveriges 
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. But this serves to highlight another aspect of 
economics’ hierarchy: once an economist has become renowned enough, critical viewpoints are more accepted. 
Those lower down the hierarchy are not normally afforded such critical space. Only a select few (who invariably 
have spent the rest of their careers being less critical) are afforded critical platforms. 
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of that institution plays a causal role in their later career progression. This might either be due to the 
benefits that accrue to those higher up the hierarchy, or due to later (hiring, tenure, or grant) 
committees taking position in the hierarchy to be a signal of underlying quality. In both cases it is 
initial placement rather than some hidden underlying quality that is important. Secondly, even if the 
concentration of power in economics could be said to be a well-functioning meritocracy, the extent of 
that concentration (i.e., the steepness of the hierarchy) causes issues. I already described why 
concentration of power in the hands of a small group of top 5 editors is problematic in 6.2.1. 
Regardless of whether those at the top are the best or not, the concentration of power in the hands of a 
small sub-group of economists limits possibilities for new ideas, incentivises the young to follow the 
preferences of older luminaries, and limits the extent to which research within economics considers a 
wide array of interests. 
The other aspects of economics’ hierarchy have similar effects. The elevation of certain 
individuals, the domination of the AEA by economists from certain universities, the fact that those at 
the same universities find it easier to publish in the big journals, and the prestige factor in hiring all 
serve to further concentrate influence into the hands of the same subsection of economists. This results 
in the preferences of a small subsection of economists being better heard in debates and more 
influential in decisions on what gets published, what gets discussed at conferences, how the job market 
is structured, and how the AEA is run.134 Even if that small subsection of economists were the best on 
some scale of merit, the facts that they have such a large amount of influence and that speaking out is 
discouraged incentivises following their lead and constrains avenues for new ways of thinking and for 
criticism in economics (Wu, 2007).135 This conclusion is supported by multiple studies that show that 
hierarchies in general tend to produce homogeneity in thought through selection biases, especially 
when those higher up have discretion or who is able to rise up.136 The concentration of power within 
economics thus hampers mechanisms for critical feedback in the discipline by lowering the direct 
criticism of the ideas of those higher up in the discipline and lowering the propensity of new ideas to 
develop (H1).137 
This is compounded by the fact that it is difficult for economists who start at lower ranked 
institutions to rise up the ranks (even if they have important new ideas). Because of the prestige factor 
in hiring and the fact that those outside the top find it more difficult to publish in the top journals, the 
voices and preference of those at the top dominate and there are few avenues available for those 
outside the top to make it there. This might even discourage some from entering or continuing in 
                                                             
134 A number of commentators have suggested that this gives economics the character of an oligopolistic market 
(Hodgson & Rothman, 2001; Hoover, 2017;  Akerlof in Heckman et al., 2017). Colussi (2018) also points this 
out and adds that, when measured on a Herfindahl index of market power, QJE is over the threshold considered 
to signal oligopoly (0.15) for both scholars employed by Harvard and those that got their PhDs from Harvard or 
MIT. 
135 There may be exceptions. My point is not that being contrary or innovative can never succeed. Rather, that 
the steepness of economics’ hierarchy lowers the likelihood of being successfully contrary, and likely lowers the 
extent to which economists feel able to speak out. 
136 See Gruenfeld and Tiedens (2010) for a review. 
137 The rankings and hierarchies in economics have contributed to real cases in which certain kinds of ideas have 
been marginalised. See for example Lee’s (2009) history of heterodox economics or Bouchikhi and Kimberly’s 
(2017) recent history of economics at Notre Dame. 
 123 
economics if do not feel they will be able to adequately progress through the hierarchy (due to their 
initial position or the kind of work they want to pursue).138 Moreover, given that those on PhD 
programs at higher ranked universities typically come from other well-ranked universities that are 
more accessible to those from privileged backgrounds (Chetty et al., 2017), the economists who 
dominate the discipline are also more likely to come from privileged backgrounds.139 For the reasons 
discussed in chapter 5, this likely makes economic research as a whole less considerate of the interests 
and judgements of significance of less privileged sections of society (H2). 
Given the power that economics has as a profession (see chapter 1), this has important effects. The 
domination of a small section of economists is not isolated to the academy but also plays a role in who 
gets to be involved in policy. Economists from the big universities dominate political and policy 
appointments. Ariel Rubinstein (2016), for example, draws attention to the recently created Booth 
Initiative on Global Markets (IGM). The IGM is a panel of economists that are occasionally asked for 
their opinion on specific policy matters. The IGM declares that it includes distinguished scholars 
familiar to economists and the media. As Rubinstein points out, these distinguished scholars come 
from the same small set of universities that dominate publishing and governance within economics: 
[A]ll fifty-one experts (yes, all of them) come from six universities (and you guessed them 
correctly: Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Yale, Princeton, and Chicago). Rubinstein (2016, p. 166) 
That a small group of economists at a small section of universities dominate governance, 
publication, and discussions within economics also makes it easier for premature consensus to form on 
certain topics. Consensus among experts is an important mechanism by which non-experts can judge 
the reliability of particular propositions, and thus scrutinise the decisions of experts (H3). But 
consensus only speaks to reliability if opinions are reached independently. Both the small size of the 
group of dominant economists and the fact that they were trained at a small selection of universities 
makes the independence of their opinions questionable. Moreover, consensus arrives faster in steeper 
hierarchical structures because people tend to overestimate the abilities of those at the top (Barnard, 
1948), because hierarchies tend to make it harder for a wide selection of members to influence group 
discussions, and because of the aforementioned tendency towards homogeneity of thought in 
hierarchies. This means that the concentration of power in economics undermines an important 
mechanism by which the wider public can judge economic knowledge and thus undermines their 
capacities for providing scrutiny. In the long run, premature consensus is also likely to undermine the 
justification of expert authority. Take the public reactions to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The 
seeming consensus among economists that multiple economies (Ireland, Iceland, the United States, et 
cetera) were healthy prior to the crash, and the regularity with which many economists argued for 
deregulation, jarred after the crisis. This severely undermined the public faith in economists on a wide  
                                                             
138 Again, this is supported by empirical studies showing that organisations with steeper hierarchies tend to have 
members that are less satisfied and more inclined to leave (Anderson & Brown, 2010). 
139 Even where their childhoods are less privileged, the fact that they would have had to go to elite universities, 
and mixed with more privileged students from the age of 18 onwards, is likely to make them less likely to 
understand the positions of those lower down the socioeconomic hierarchy. 
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Hierarchy creates This leads to Which blocks 
   
Perverse 
incentives 
Less maverick-like behaviour: less new 
ideas, disagreement, and criticism 
H1 avenues for feedback 
 Constraints on criticism, which lowers the 
prevalence of debate for the public to witness 
H3 public scrutiny 
   
Concentration of 
power 
The interests of those at the top given greater 
weighting and younger economists following 
those higher up. This constrains new thinking 
and criticism 
H1 avenues for feedback 
 A lower likelihood that those in marginalised 
groups will be heard or make it to the top 
H2 the consideration of 
certain interests 
 A higher likelihood that consensus will be 
reached prematurely, undermining a useful 
mechanism for judging the decisions of 
economists 
H3 public scrutiny 
Table 6. The issues caused by the economics’ hierarchy in general and how they relate to H1-H3. 
range of issues (even those that have nothing to do with finance or the macroeconomy). 
 
In sum, in addition to undermining feedback and public scrutiny via the creation of perverse 
incentives, the general features of economics’ hierarchy cause issues by concentrating power in the 
hands of a small sub-section of economists. Economists at the top end of the disciplinary hierarchy 
accrue benefits that further elevate their positions and give them outsize roles in shaping the field. 
Even if this is meritocratic, it is a problem. It limits space for new ideas, constrains criticism, and 
incentivises economists to follow those high up the hierarchy, which hampers mechanisms for 
feedback (H1) and makes it less likely that the discipline will contain perspectives or come into 
contact with those from less privileged backgrounds (H2). Moreover, it makes it more likely that the 
discipline will come to and/or present consensus earlier than it should (H3). These issues are 
summarised together in table 6. 
 
Conclusion 
Economics puts a lot of store in its top 5 journals. Certain individuals are particularly central to the 
discipline. The governing body of the AEA is heavily dominated by a small selection of universities 
(with 71 of the recent members getting their PhDs at four universities), and those same universities 
dominate the big journals. Lastly, prestige has a strong influence on who gets hired in economics: 
where one gets their PhD or works has a very large impact—larger than any other field—on their 
future career progression, even when controlling for underlying quality. 
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These features of economics make it steeply and consequentially hierarchical. The gradient 
(steepness) of that hierarchy is greater than in other disciplines. The hierarchical structures in 
economics create a number of perverse incentives and lead to a problematic concentration of power. It 
lowers avenues for feedback in the discipline by disincentivising innovation, specialist work, and 
communicating with the outside, and constraining the development of new ideas and criticism in the 
field (H1). It makes it less likely that certain interests (those not well represented by economists) will 
be considered in economic research by disincentivising considerations of significance, specialist work, 
and communicating with the outside, and by concentrating power in the hands of a small group of 
(elite) economists (H2). Lastly, it makes public scrutiny of judgements in the discipline more difficult 
by disincentivising communication with the outside, constraining criticism in the discipline, and 
pushing it towards premature consensus (H3). These issues are summarised in tables 5 and 6. Table 7 
restates these issues to highlight their relation to H1-H3 and the reasons for pluralism. 
Recently, a number of high-ranking economists have started to comment on the dominance of the 
top 5.140 This is to be welcomed. But the solutions they suggest are insufficient because their focus is 
too narrow. Lars Hansen suggests that editors should be bossier, look for good ideas themselves, and 
rely less on referees’ reports (which should mandate less changes). This may lower the amount of time 
it takes to publish in the top 5 and may lower the effect review has on homogenising papers towards 
commonly held ideas, mitigating some perverse incentives. But it misses the issues caused by the 
centralisation of power, and even intensifies the power of journals editors. Angus Deaton suggests that 
big data can offer a way of making the publication process less biased. But Deaton does not give 
details and given the issues with metrics of academic quality (Wilsdon et al., 2015), his suggestion 
seems ambitious and implausible. James Heckman has suggested shifting away from the top 5 to a 
pre-publication arXiv-like model for economics. This has some merit. It would likely speed up review 
time and enable innovative ideas that might not make it through top 5 review to impact the field, thus 
mitigating some of the perverse incentives. However, without equal attention to the other aspects of 
economics’ hierarchy, and the concentration of power in particular, such a model may increase rather 
than decrease asymmetries. Much like journals articles, working papers are not all read. Economists 
use proxies to weed out what is worth attention. One of those is the journal that articles are published 
in. Without this proxy, they are likely to lean on other proxies of quality. Given the widespread belief 
that economics’ hierarchy is meritocratic, this might lead to even more asymmetries of attention to the 
works of those at higher ranked universities (or those with big reputations). This would likely be 
compounded by the abilities of higher ranked universities to market the ideas of their academics.141 
There are problems with peer review, but that all papers are in principle actually read and evaluated by 
someone (even in the case of desk rejections)142 means that everyone gets a shot. This is to be 
preferred to a situation in which the only people read at all are those that dominate by virtue of their 
reputation and institutional backing. 
                                                             
140 All of the suggested solutions discussed here come from a recent ASSA panel (Heckman et al., 2017) or from 
Heckman and Moktan (2017). 
141 Brand, reputation, and marketing are as big a part of what sells in a market as quality of product. 
142 Although there are suspicions that this is not always the case. 
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Why pluralism? Evaluative heuristic Issues caused by economics’ steep hierarchy 
   
(ii) Epistemic 
limitations  
H1: Looking for blocks to 
productive forms of 
feedback 
Perverse incentives that lead to less 
innovation, lower output, less disagreement, 
and less criticism 
 
A concentration of power that amplifies 
biases and incentivise the young to follow 
those higher up. This constrains new ideas 
and criticism 
   
(iii) A variety of 
goals 
H2: Looking for blocks to 
certain kinds of interests 
being considered in 
judgements of significance 
Perverse incentives that lower the 
significance of societally important and 
specialist work 
 
A concentration of power that makes it more 
likely that certain perspectives and interests 
will not be considered and less likely that 
those from marginalised communities will 
make it to the top of the discipline 
   
 H3: Looking for blocks to 
avenues for public scrutiny 
Perverse incentives that marginalise books 
and other forms of external communication 
and lower the prevalence of debate for the 
public to witness 
 
A concentration of power that makes 
premature consensus more likely, 
undermining a useful mechanism for judging 
the decisions of economists 
Table 7. The issues caused by the hierarchical structure within economics and how they relate to H1-
H3 and the reasons for pluralism. 
What might be done instead? I will not offer a complete set of suggestions here. My point has 
been to show how and why the steep hierarchical practices in economics are problematic. But I offer 
two comments. First, in all of the issues discussed above it is the gradient in economics’ hierarchy that 
is the issue. If the steepness of the hierarchy was lessened, the implications would also lessen. A 
weaker prestige factor in hiring would make it easier for ideas to move from lower ranked universities 
to those higher up, diversifying possible ideas in economics. A wider selection of important journals 
would lower the intensity of the perverse incentives caused by the top 5. More diverse governance 
would widen the interests considered in setting the ASSA program. And so on. Changes should be 
made with care, however, because: second, the issues discussed above are not separate. The 
suggestions of Hansen and Heckman for mitigating the perverse incentives caused by the top 5 are not 
useless. The issue is taking them in isolation. It is not only the top 5 that is an issue, but the wider 
hierarchical practices in economics that have manifested themselves in obsession over the top 5. The 
different aspects of economics’ hierarchy serve to reinforce each other. Any solutions should look to 
act on many of them at once. A combination of Heckman’s suggestion of prepublication with some 
method of reducing the dominance of certain universities could, for instance, be a first step. 
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7 Insiders and outsiders 
In the previous two chapters I pointed to issues in the social makeup and internal social organisation of 
economic inquiry. Economics is very male dominated and steeply hierarchical. In this chapter I focus 
on the way economists relate to non-economists. I will argue that economists often assume superiority 
to other social scientists and that they are dismissive to outsiders.  
I will describe how economics relates to those outside the discipline in 7.1. Even though it may be 
argued that the theories and methods of economics exhibit diversity, economists are socially unified 
through their training and internal hierarchy. Economists tend to assume that the technical skills they 
accrue through their common training are more valuable than the skills other social scientists offer. 
This assumption is in part supported by the fact that economists are better paid and employed in a 
number of politically significant roles. Economists’ technical skills also promise universal application, 
have been instrumental in shaping many political decision-making procedures, and create barriers to 
entry. I will argue that the net effect of these factors is that economists form an in-group that regularly 
disregards criticism, ideas, and observations from without. 
I will use H1-H3 to argue that this way of relating to those outside of economics is problematic in 
7.2. It constrains feedback within economics and in wider discussions on economic topics by skewing 
the competitive interplay of ideas in the social sciences, and by blocking the development of 
‘complementary science’, whereby topics not normally tackled within economics can be developed 
(H1). It makes it difficult for those not already well represented in economics to have their voices 
heard in the discipline (H2). Lastly, it undermines the public scrutiny of economic research and of 
decisions made by economists by reducing the prevalence of debate for the public to witness and 
giving a false impression of consensus (H3). 
 
7.1 External hierarchy 
Despite the lack of clear answers to whether or not economics should count as theoretically or 
methodologically pluralist, two factors indicate that the discipline exhibits a kind of social unity. 
Firstly, economists tend to have similar educational backgrounds. Despite some recent debate about 
the content of undergraduate education in the UK, British and North American economics departments 
largely agree on a core set of principles and tools that structure graduate training.143 They also rely on 
textbooks—which tend to be written by faculty from elite departments—to a greater degree than other 
social sciences, and on fairly homogenous standards of evaluations (Lamont, 2009). Since the middle 
                                                             
143 See Post-Crash Economics Society (2014), Cambridge Society for Economic Pluralism (2014), and (Svenlén 
et al., 2018) for the debate on education in the UK. See Fourcade et al. (2015) and Earle et al. (2016) for a 
summary of the literatures on the similarities between economics programs. 
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of the twentieth century economists from mainland Europe and elsewhere have increasingly received 
their training in the United States and Britain.144 In contrast, the share of foreign students going to 
France and Germany has been steadily in decline. This has given the educational core that is common 
in Britain and America global significance. Foreign economists trained in the US and UK have gone 
back to their home countries to reshape economic research and policy. US and UK trained economists 
also dominate a range of international organisations—the World Bank, the United Nations, regional 
development banks, the International Monetary Fund—including posts reserved for foreigners (Coats, 
2005; Fourcade, 2006; Fourcade, 2009). Fourcade argues that this trend has helped develop economics 
into a profession with a unified and global identity (2006; 2009).145 
Secondly, metrics on co-authorship and hiring suggest that economics is dominated by a single 
network and hierarchy. The percentage of authors in economics journals connected by co-authorship to 
a single network grew from 15.6 percent between 1970-79 to 40.7 percent between 1990-99, while the 
second largest network fell from 122 authors to just 30 (Goyal et al., 2006). Given that this data 
includes authors of just one or two papers (who might not normally publish in economics journals) 
and those who only single-author papers, this indicates that most economists are part of a single 
network, without significant rival networks. Moreover, hiring prestige in economics follows a single 
hierarchy (see chapter 6). Academic disciplines tend to have multi peaked prestige hierarchies, 
meaning that different universities are seen as better for certain ways of approaching those disciplines. 
Economics is the one exception. This indicates that economists agree on the top universities regardless 
of their approach or specialisation. 
This social unity is reinforced by the view, common among economists, that the perspective 
economics offers is more valuable than the perspectives offered by other social sciences (Fourcade, 
2009; Fourcade et al., 2015; Lazear, 2000). Not only do economists recognise a hierarchy in their own 
discipline (see chapter 6), they often conceive of a hierarchy within the social sciences, with 
economics on top. David Colander, for example, found that 77 percent of economics graduate students 
agreed that “[e]conomics is the most scientific of the social sciences” (2005, p. 184) (50 percent 
strongly agree, 27 percent agree somewhat). 
This assumption of superiority is supported by economic theory. Economists are paid more than 
other academics in the humanities and social sciences, and even narrowly outstrip engineers. 
Economists in the United States, for instance, are paid around 30 percent more than their colleagues in 
sociology (this applies to both median earners and to the top 10 percent, Fourcade et al., 2015). The 
difference is likely to be higher still as this figure does not account for outside sources of income 
(consultancy roles, sitting on boards, et cetera), on which economists outstrip other social scientists 
(Weyl, 2017). In the UK, economics departments now typically break the national academic pay scale 
                                                             
144 Fourcade (2006) notes that, in 2000, 54 percent of economics graduate students in the United States had 
temporary student visas. Around the same time, only 10 percent of those in top-rated UK economics PhD 
programs where British. 
145 This is in contrast to most other professions that grow within nation states, which partly regulate their 
conditions of entry (Abbott, 1988). 
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to add an “Economics Market Supplement”.146 By teaching that employees are (or should be) paid the 
marginal product of their labour and that value is marginal, economic textbooks, thus, seemingly 
imply that economists are right to assume that what they offer is more valuable than what other 
academics offer. 
Economists typically put the higher value of their work down to their technical skills.147 Skills that 
make them easily employable elsewhere. Even if the inference made from this, that their skills are in 
fact more valuable, could be questioned, the fact that economists are more able to find influential and 
well-paid employment outside of the academy than other social scientists is true. In addition to earning 
lots in finance and consulting, economists are frequently employed in powerful and politically 
consequential roles. As I described in chapter 1, the demand for economists increased dramatically 
after World War II. Economists were brought into every branch of government in the United States, 
and were instrumental in constructing the institutions of the European Union and in readying member 
states for entry (Bernstein, 1995; Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014; Coats, 2005). Elsewhere, 
economists replaced lawyers as the go-to experts for policy and have frequently been used to provide 
cover for governments against internal critics and to provide legitimacy for states on the world stage 
(Bergh, 1981; Christensen, 2017; Clift, 2018; Markoff & Montecinos, 1993; Fox, 2014; Wright & 
Mata, Under review). This growth in demand for economists in positions of power went hand in hand 
with a rise in influence of policy devices and measures designed by economists (Fourcade, 2006; 
Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014). Economics offered universally applicable constructs, and in the 
latter part of the twentieth century it fast became necessary for states, governments, corporations, and 
others in public life to understand and engage in debates via those constructs (targeting growth of 
Gross Domestic Product or utilising cost-benefits analysis, for example).148 
The technical and universal-seeming tools of economics have, thus, helped reinforce the power of 
the discipline and helped justify economists’ assumed superiority. But these techniques and tools are 
not always easily understood by those outside of the discipline. Much of economic reasoning is 
opaque to social scientists unfamiliar with mathematics, and the different notation and labels 
economists use often makes economic techniques difficult to understand even for those with the 
requisite mathematics skills. This protects economics from the ‘anybody could do that’ style of 
criticism that sometimes befalls other social sciences, and also helps to protect economists’ domain of 
                                                             
146 A recently advertised University College London lectureship (an entry level post) in economics, for example, 
added a £15,300.00 per annum “market supplement” to the standard pay. This represented an addition of 29-36 
percent to the salary of an equivalent post in another social science (depending on where in the salary spine the 
appointee would have started). Market supplements are in principle available to all departments. In practice, they 
are regularly advertised as part of the deal in economics, finance, and business departments, but not elsewhere. 
LSE’s market supplement policy even explicitly mentions economists as its target group (London School of 
Economics, 2017). There is evidence to suggest that economists are paid better elsewhere too. Even in social 
democratic and equality concerned Norway, for example, the highest paid academics are economists (Lindqvist, 
2017). 
147 See Lazear’s (2000) claim that the power of economics over other disciplines lies in its rigour, and Freeman’s 
(1999) assessment that other social scientists have less powerful analytical tools and are less able to deal with 
mathematically demanding topics. Also see Fourcade (2009) and Fourcade et al. (2015). 
148 Economic ideas have also played important roles in a number of political shifts (Amadae, 2015; Blyth, 2002; 
Blyth, 2013; Christensen, 2017; Hirschman & Popp Berman, 2014; Mirowski, 2013; Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009; 
Offer & Söderberg, 2016). 
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expertise.149 But it also puts barriers up to those that might want to talk across disciplines. Those that 
might have something to say on topics that concern economics (on labour practices or the reasons for 
migration, for example) are often not up to date enough with economic tools to have their voices 
heard. This is compounded by the disincentives for economists to write books and other forms of 
accessible output that would help communicate their reasoning and ideas to those outside the 
discipline (see chapter 6). The combination of opaque tools and a lack of effort to engage in external 
communication gives economic recommendations the appearance of emerging from a black box and 
undermines reasoned engagement between economists and those outside of the discipline. 
This and the fact that economists assume themselves superior to other social scientists is reflected 
in how little they refer to research outside of economics. Between 2000 and 2009, 40.3 percent of the 
citations in the AER, for example, went to articles in the top 25 economics journals, with only 0.8 
percent and 0.3 percent going to the top 25 political science and sociology journals respectively. In 
comparison, 22 percent of the citations in the American Sociological Review went to the top 25 
sociology journals, with 2.3 and 2 percent going to the top 25 economics and political science journals 
respectively (Fourcade et al., 2015).150 Jerry Jacobs (2014) estimates that in 1997 only 19.3 percent of 
economics citations went to work outside of economics, compared to interdisciplinary citation rates of 
                                                             
149 This concurs with Abbott’s understanding of professionalism as growing out of abstraction, by using it to 
demarcate domains of expert authority: “[P]ractical skill grows out of an abstract system of knowledge, and 
control of the occupation lies in control of the abstractions that generate the practical techniques.” (1988, p. 44) 
150 For the American Political Science Review, it was 17.5, 4.1, and 1 percent to the top 25 political science, 
economics, and sociology journals respectively. 
Figure 3. Citations to other fields as a percentage of total citations from a given field (y-axis) 
and citations from other fields as a percentage of total citations to a given field (x-axis). From 
Haldane and Turrell (2018, p. 221) with data from Van Noorden (2015). 
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51.9 and 58.7 percent in sociology and political science respectively. Similarly, figure 3 highlights that 
the percentages of citations from economics journals to other disciplines between 2001 and 2010 were 
well below those of other social sciences (Haldane & Turrell, 2018; Van Noorden, 2015). This pattern 
is not accidental; 57.3 percent of economists disagree or strongly disagree with the statement “in 
general, interdisciplinary knowledge is better than knowledge obtained by a single discipline”. This is 
compared to 25.3 percent of sociologists and 28 percent of political scientists.151 
The social unity, assumed superiority, societal influence, universal application, barriers to 
outsiders, and insularity described above combine to create an in-group mentality in economics.152 
This mentality serves to further separate economists from other social scientists. They do not only 
isolate themselves; they also often positively dismiss the possibility of criticism from the outside. At 
conferences, in seminars, and in casual discussions economists will often make it known that 
criticisms of the theories or methods of economics from without aren’t to be taken seriously. In a paper 
that is otherwise fairly critical of present practices in economic research, Ariel Rubinstein (2016) 
recently defended such a position while celebrating some mild criticisms of economics from Dani 
Rodrik: 
Critiques by noneconomists often leave the impression that they have misunderstood what 
economists do... One needs to be an outsider to criticize economics, but one needs to be an 
economist to do it sufficiently well so as not to be drawn astray by stereotypes. What I call ‘in-
outsider economists’ are rare and Dani is one of them. (Rubinstein, 2016, p. 163) 
Although difficult to measure, this prickly attitude to external criticism can be seen in the reaction to 
almost any criticism that comes from outside of economics.153 It is also highlighted by Mohsen 
Javdani and H.-J. Chang’s (Under review) recent study on how economists react to statements made 
about their field. Javdani and H.-J. Chang find that the source attributed to quotes significantly affects 
how economists rate their content. Statements about aspects of and common assumptions in economic 
research154 attributed to those seen as outside the ‘mainstream’ in-group or given without a source 
receive considerably less agreement than those from within the ‘mainstream’ in-group.155 
This reaction to external criticism is compounded by some of the internal pressures against 
criticism outlined in chapter 6. But even where internal criticism is tolerated, taking internal debates 
public is frowned upon. Dani Rodrik claims, for example, that behind closed doors economists discuss 
the many different ways that free trade can fail or be problematic, but that they conceal their doubts in 
                                                             
151 This data comes from Gross and Simmons’ 2006 survey of American professors in a range of disciplines 
(2014). Similar results to those in this paragraph have been found by Pieters and Baumgartner (2002), who note 
asymmetric citation patterns between economics and the other social sciences. 
152 Passing comments by economists regularly highlight this. Hamermesh (2008), for example, describes a PhD 
in economics as a “union card” and Rubinstein (2016) comments on the economics profession as “the guild”. 
153 For other examples, see Athreya (2010), Smith (2018), or Jason Collins’s (2013) often shared blog post that 
claims that one of the signs that a criticism of economics is good is that it comes from an economist. Also, see 
Chris Auld’s (2013) popular post outlining what makes a bad criticism of economics. Auld’s 18 signs of a bad 
criticism imply that, unless a critic assumes much of the theory in economics textbooks, they are doomed to fail. 
154 An example of one of the statements they gave was: “Unlike most other science and social science 
disciplines, economics has made little progress in closing its gender gap over the last several decades.” 
155 The economists Javdani and H.-J. Chang classify as ‘mainstream’ fit with my definition of mainstream as 
‘what gets published in the top 20 journals’. 
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their public pronouncements. He recounts exchanges with economists over this disparity in which they 
argue that publicly airing doubts about free trade gives ammunition to “the barbarians” (Rodrik, 2015; 
WEA, 2013). For fear of giving ammunition to those that would go too far (in their view) economists 
hide their doubts over the efficacy of free trade. On this and a number of issues economists present an 
outward facing consensus despite internal debate.  
The internal hierarchical structures in economics encourage this outward facing consensus. As I 
described in chapter 6, the incentives in economics are directed away from any forms of public 
communication, and certainly away from dissenting opinions. Moreover, the organisational studies 
literature suggests that hierarchical structures encourage those lower down the hierarchy to either 
adopt the opinions of those higher up or stay silent (Kish-Gephart et al., 2009; Milanovich et al., 
1998). This is highlighted by Romer’s (Forthcoming) statement that speaking out about 
methodological flaws or criticising renowned economists is frowned upon. Rubinstein (2016) notes a 
similar point. He claims that although “soft” criticism is welcomed in the discipline (from economists 
at least), any open-mindedness recedes if someone is seen as a threat to the profession. Economists are 
often aware of the outward image of their discipline. Their universal-seeming tools and the consensus 
they present makes it appear as though their research is the outcome of cumulative progress 
(Fourcade, 2006). Economists are careful not to undermine this and, in this way, diminish the 
discipline’s power. In doing so they often constrain debate. 
In sum, economists have developed a kind of social unity. They typically see themselves as 
superior to other social scientists, in part due to their higher pay and technical prowess. They are 
employed in a range of politically influential roles (much more so than other social scientists). 
Through those roles and through theory that claims universal domain, they have shaped many public 
debates and decisions. Their techniques have become necessary in order to comment on many socially 
pertinent decisions. At the same time, their techniques form barriers to outsiders. This is reinforced by 
those within economics disregarding the research, views, and criticisms of those outside the discipline. 
This is compounded by the fact that criticism, communication with the outside, and the public airing 
of internal debate are all disincentivized within economics. Taken together these factors suggest that 
economists assume and reinforce a steep external hierarchy in addition to the internal hierarchy within 
the discipline. Economists and techniques practiced by economists sit on top of this hierarchy. Those 
outside of the discipline are marginalised and ignored, both by economists and often in public debate 
on economic issues. 
 
7.2 Why worry that economics assumes superiority and ignores others? 
Economists might respond that none of the above highlights any issues. What is the problem with 
economists forming a socially unified in-group? What is the problem with them assuming their 
techniques are better? If economists thought sociology had more to offer, they’d have done PhDs in 
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sociology. Moreover, given the regularity with which ‘unfair’ or ‘misguided’ criticisms are levelled at 
economics they might argue that dismissing external criticism is justifiable.156 In what follows I will 
use the heuristics developed in chapter 4 to argue that these responses are misguided. 
Recall that social epistemic practices in a given scientific community can be evaluated by: 
H1: Looking for blocks to productive forms of feedback. 
H2: Looking for blocks to certain kinds of interests being considered in judgements of 
significance. 
H3: Looking for blocks to avenues for public scrutiny. 
I will argue that the external hierarchy that economists assume, coupled with the fact that they often do 
not listen to those outside the discipline, cause three issues from the perspectives of H1-H3. It skews 
any ‘marketplace of ideas’, and assumes outside voices can only offer deficient, rather than enriching, 
perspectives (H1). It blocks the cultivation of mechanisms that help encourage public judgements and 
scrutiny (H3). And, it reduces opportunities for those not well represented in the discipline to have 
their interests heard (H2). 
Economists frequently apply the metaphor of a market to the development of knowledge (Coase, 
1974; Director, 1964). The idea of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ is normally traced back to John Milton 
(1644) and Mill (1859), although neither used the phrase. Mill’s position comes as part of his 
argument that criticism plays an important constitutive role for knowledge (see chapter 4). Surviving 
criticism legitimises propositions, and free and open criticism can open knowledge up to new and 
better ideas. This is by replacing whole propositions with new ones and also mixing and synthesising 
what is correct in competing positions. This is seen as an argument for a space for ideas to compete 
and combine with each other under the pressure of criticism—a free ‘marketplace of ideas’. 
Alvin Goldman and James Cox (1996) point out that the relevance of the market metaphor is not 
as obvious as often assumed. They argue that the most favourable interpretation of the metaphor is: 
given that economic theory shows that competitive markets produce superior products, the same must 
go for ideas, with products being propositions and superiority implying more truth. They note, 
however, that the link between markets and superior products is not actually shown by economic 
theory. The welfare theorems of economics show that market-based allocations of goods are (Pareto) 
efficient, given preferences, but not that each individual good will be superior or even preferred to 
alternatives. The relation between a free marketplace of ideas and truth is, thus, not clear. 
I side with Goldman and Cox and am doubtful of the market part of the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor. But there is a slightly weaker version of the metaphor that seems more defensible.157 
Something like: openness and competition can aid scientific progress and the development of true 
                                                             
156 Examples that economists get particular annoyed at include the arguments that they do not engage with the 
real world and that they did not predict the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (Coyle, 2018; Rubinstein, 2016; Smith, 
2017). 
157 I use the metaphor despite doubts because economists often utilise it and because the aspects of economics 
outlined in 7.1 undermine their assumption that economics plays a productive role in any free marketplace. 
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and/or useful propositions. This claim can be defended using two points. First, H. Chang’s arguments 
(outlined in chapters 2 and 4) that competition between systems of practice can spur each other on to 
cover more circumstances and develop new abilities. Second, Mill argues that, even though true 
statements do not always win out in competition, they are at least likely to be revived because people 
will observe the same true features of the world. So, even though a competitive market may not be the 
best model for the development of knowledge, competition can help, and it is important that space 
exists for ideas that might potentially be true to be stated. 
The problem with everything described in 7.1 is that it gives economists immense market power. 
Power that can skew the competitive interplay of ideas. The fact that economic tools and ideas 
dominate policy makes it much less likely that ideas from other disciplines will be heard in public 
debates. This is compounded by the number of roles economists take in public life, by the fact that 
economic tools, ideas, and prescriptions can be quite opaque, and by the fact that economists must be 
employed in some roles for states to have international legitimacy.158 The fact that economists are 
comfortable ignoring other disciplines and criticisms from outsiders makes it even less likely that the 
voices of others will be heard. That economists have a clear idea of accreditation and of their own 
hierarchy, and that they see those with a training in economics as possessing a more valuable skill set 
helps support and reinforce the idea that their market power is as it should be and gives them less 
reason to look elsewhere for ideas. This curtails important avenues for feedback (H1), both within 
economics and in wider policy debates, by narrowing the range of acceptable ideas and criticism. It 
also makes it less likely that economics will be up to date with ideas and observations as they develop 
in other fields. 
Economists might respond to this by reciting Rubinstein’s (2016) argument above. They might 
argue that they ignore ideas and criticism from the outside out of legitimate frustration with the regular 
misguided attacks they face. The idea that it takes an economist to criticise economics effectively is 
common in the discipline. Given the high barriers to understanding what is discussed in economics 
this does seem like a plausible position to take. How should a sociologist or philosopher be able to 
comment on what goes on in economics given that they do not have a fraction of the experience or 
education most economists have? And, if outsiders can’t understand big chunks of what is going on in 
even the generalist economics journals, how are they supposed to comment on economics as a whole? 
This line of reasoning is based on two assumptions. First, that there is a clear outsider perspective 
which is distinct from and deficient to an insider perspective. Second, that deficient perspectives can 
be ignored without problems. 
The problem with the first assumption is that, even if external perspectives are assumed to lack 
some of the technical prowess of internal ones, there can be other ways in which they can offer much 
needed and enriching, rather than simply deficient, critical input. One example is provided by what H. 
Chang’s (2004) calls complementary science: the cultivation of research into questions that scientific 
                                                             
158 See Coats (1981) for the story in European countries and Markoff and Montecinos (1993) for the story in 
Latin America. Also, see my discussion of the power of economics in chapter 1. For arguments that this also 
applies to many other organisations, see Earle et al. (2016) and Kwak (2017). 
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communities assume or ignore (including foundational metaphysical, pragmatic, and value-based 
questions) outside of those communities. 
Regular scientific practice, what H. Chang calls ‘specialist science’, has two features that make 
complementary science important. First, H. Chang uses Kuhn (1962) to point out that the existence of 
most scientific work (from modelling, to experimentation, to measurement) is predicated on taking 
some knowledge for granted. The knowledge taken for granted may not be settled but must be 
assumed in order to generate new observations and abilities. It is necessary to assume, for instance, the 
theories of quantum mechanics for the new standard kilogram measure to be coherent (Kaplan, 2018). 
Critical questions about the knowledge assumed must be suppressed within the specialist community, 
otherwise they would undermine the observations and developments built on it. Second, specialist 
sciences cannot investigate all worthwhile questions, even ignoring ones that need to be held fixed, 
because they have limited resources.  
The history of science suggests that both of these features of specialist science are important. 
Sciences function and develop well when certain aspects of knowledge are held fixed and scientific 
communities choose to focus on some questions at the expense of others (Chang, 2004; Kuhn, 1962). 
This is in part because doing so enables specialist scientists to move on from the early stages of 
science in which basic assumptions are constantly challenged and focus their attention on detailed 
work. However, these two features of specialist science come at a cost. They prevent foundational 
questions and questions outside the main focus of specialist science from being iteratively developed 
(recall H. Chang’s coherentism in which every aspect of a system must be constantly challenged and 
refined or replaced).  
Complementary science can mitigate this by probing foundational assumptions and following up 
on questions that specialist sciences ignore outside of the specialist community.159 This ensures that 
foundational assumptions are challenged and changed in the light of new information, circumstance, 
and goals, but that they can also be assumed and utilised within the specialist community in the 
meantime. Cultivating space for questions necessarily ignored but relevant to specialist science can 
help bring once forgotten ideas back to life in new contexts, ensure specialist scientific knowledge is 
criticised and justified, and offer new paths to developing science (Chang, 2004). The assumption that 
outside perspectives can only be deficient is, thus, wrong. It fails to recognise that they can offer an 
enriching perspective by providing ideas and observations from outside of the norms and assumptions 
of specialist science. The development of behavioural economics first in psychology, then as a sub-
field in economics, and now as a part of almost all sub-fields in economics, is an example of the 
positive influence complementary science can have. Ideas developed outside of economics are often 
relevant to the discipline and can enrich, or even radically alter, what goes on within it given the 
chance.  
                                                             
159 H. Chang has History and Philosophy of Science in mind as the ideal place for the practice of complementary 
science, but different disciplines also seem well placed to play complementary roles to each other. By holding 
different aspects of knowledge fixed, political science and sociology seem well placed to play a complementary 
role to economics. 
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But, for specialist science to benefit from complementary science’s enriching potential, 
complementary science must exist and a path between specialist and complementary science must be 
available. Specialist sciences need not constantly engage with complementary science (to do so would 
defeat the point of it being separate), but the recognition that those not enmeshed in the detail of 
specialist science (and what it takes as given) can offer useful insights is important. The existence of 
some dialogue with those outside of the day to day practice of specific parts of science is an important 
way to keep critical feedback about foundational assumptions and questions not seen as central alive 
without them blocking the development of more detailed economic work. It is this that economics 
closes off by ignoring outside work and assuming external criticism to be misguided.160 This is 
compounded by high barriers to engaging with economic research. This reinforces what I argued under 
the frame of market power above. In its conceited and dismissive relationship to outsiders, economic 
research sacrifices potentially productive feedback (H1). 
Even if we ignore this and assume that Rubinstein’s claim that external perspectives can only be 
deficient, the assumption that there are no problems associated with ignoring deficient viewpoints is 
false. As discussed in chapter 4, external non-expert scrutiny is an important mechanism by which 
expert knowledge can be justified and held to account (H3). But external public scrutiny requires the 
cultivation of practices that aid non-expert judgement of expert knowledge: reliable credentials, 
transparent track records, public communication and engagement, independently formed consensus, 
public debate, and the availability of information on things like funding patterns, the processes by 
which judgements are made, biases, and conflicts of interest. None of these things make for reliable 
judgements in isolation. But together they can lead non-experts to make capable judgements about 
expert decisions and knowledge. 
Thus, to take advantage of the benefits offered by public scrutiny—holding experts to account, 
justifying expert judgements, ensuring expert knowledge is accepted in an informed manner—and to 
ensure that its judgements remain legitimate, economics should encourage rather than block public 
debate and engagement. The features of economics discussed in 7.1 do the opposite. The high barriers 
to entry in economics, the presumed superiority of economists, and incentives against engaging in 
popular communication (outlined in chapter 6) combine to lower the development of a shared public-
expert language for economic issues and lower the public understanding of economic topics. This 
reduces the knowledge and the interactions the public might draw on to scrutinise the decisions and 
judgements economists make. The facts that debate within economics is hidden and that economists 
rarely debate with others curtail the prevalence of debate that the public can witness on economic 
issues and reduces these to a set of often misunderstood soundbites. This absence of debate further 
diminishes the public understanding of economics while also curtailing one of the ways by which 
information about biases, funding, methods, and conflicts of interest come to light. Moreover, attempts 
to hide internal debate create a false image of consensus, thereby undermining consensus as a way of 
judging the reliability of the pronouncements of economists. If the consensus on free trade is in reality 
                                                             
160 According to Sent (2004), this may have slowed down the development of behavioural economics. 
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false, then how is the public to know which other consensus statements from economists to take 
seriously? All of these aspects together—reduced public understanding, not much debate, false 
consensus—serve to undermine the potential for public scrutiny of decisions by economists (H3). 
All of this is also an issue from the perspective of H2. Take the representation of female interests 
within economics, discussed in chapter 5, for example. I argued that the absence of women in 
economics makes it less likely that their interests will be heard in the discipline. One way of partially 
mitigating this is to ensure that the interests of women are able to enter consideration in another way. 
But if economists don’t listen to outsiders, then that becomes more difficult. Without women in the 
discipline or female voices on the outside being listened to, how are economists expected to be aware 
of the interests of women? Something similar might also be said for other sections of society that are 
underrepresented in economics.161 
 
Conclusion 
Economists have a sometimes fraught and often dismissive relationship with those outside of the 
discipline. In developing a sense of superiority and internal unity, economists have formed barriers to 
those outside the discipline. They have also developed a habit of ignoring external research and 
dismissing external criticism, while hiding internal debate. This is reinforced by the fact that 
economists are paid better and that their ideas carry significant weight. All of this blocks important 
avenues for critical feedback (H1), both within economics and in wider public discussions, by 
skewing the competitive interplay of ideas coming from economics and elsewhere. It also prevents 
economic research from benefiting from the feedback that can come from complementary science—
which can help investigate important questions around economic topics without the whole discipline 
having to revert back to foundational debates. The dismissal of internal criticism and the obscuring of 
internal debate also reduce the prevalence of debate for the public to witness and makes external 
public scrutiny more difficult (H3). This is compounded by a lack of engagement with the public and a 
false image of consensus, both of which also undermine the potential for public scrutiny. Lastly, all of 
these issues reduce the opportunities for those not well represented within economics to have their 
interests heard within the discipline (H2). These issues are summarised in table 8. Together they imply 
that both the development of research in economics and the legitimacy of economic expertise would 
benefit from a less conceited and dismissive relationship to outsiders. 
 
 
 
                                                             
161 The data is strongest on gender imbalances, but some data suggests that the situation is worse still for ethnic 
and class diversity (Bayer & Rouse, 2016). 
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Why pluralism? Evaluative heuristic Issues caused by the dismissal of outsiders 
   
(ii) Epistemic 
limitations  
H1: Looking for blocks to 
productive forms of 
feedback 
Skews the competitive interplay of ideas, 
both within economics and in wider 
discussions. Also, constrains the potential for 
complementary science to enrich economic 
research 
   
(iii) A variety of 
goals  
H2: Looking for blocks to 
certain kinds of interests 
being considered in 
judgements of significance 
Constrains the means by which those not in 
the discipline can have their voices heard in it 
  
H3: Looking for blocks to 
avenues for public scrutiny 
Obscures internal debate from public view 
and reduces debate across disciplines, 
diminishes the public understanding of 
economics, and makes it seem like there is 
consensus within the discipline when there is 
not 
Table 8. The issues caused by economics’ relationship to outsiders and how they relate to H1-H3 and 
the reasons for pluralism. 
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8 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this thesis I asked: Is there anything wrong with the way that economic research is 
organised? If so, what are the issues? My answer is, yes, there are at least three problems with the way 
that economic research is currently organised: [a] there are not many female economists (particularly 
high up the discipline), and women face an adverse environment in economics. [b] Economics is 
steeply and consequentially hierarchical. [c] Economists form an in-group that considers itself superior 
to other social scientists, and that has a habit of not listening to outsiders. These features of the way 
that economic research is organised are problematic because they limit: the feedback economic 
research is exposed to (H1), the uptake of certain kinds of interests into economic research (H2), and 
avenues for public scrutiny of economic research (H3). 
My questions were in part motivated by a fraught debate about whether or not economics is 
sufficiently pluralist. What do my answers mean for the debate regarding pluralism in economics? 
Given the significant societal role of economists and economic knowledge, pluralists are right to 
critically scrutinise the organisation of economic research. I am sympathetic to many of the arguments 
they make but have argued that [a-c] offer less ambiguous diagnoses of what is problematic in the way 
that economic research is organised than the claim that it is insufficiently pluralist. 
Those that argue for pluralism in economics typically claim that the discipline needs more of 
certain variables (ontologies, methodologies, schools of thought, et cetera). But there are many 
variables available, many ways of interpreting the boundaries between variables in practice, and 
different ways of interpreting how much of a given variable is sufficient for pluralism. It is hard to 
argue that economics is either insufficiently or sufficiently pluralist because there is a lot of room for 
interpretation, both regarding the ideal of pluralism and how economics scores in comparison. Where 
some see one, others see many; where some see enough, others see a lack. By pointing to [a-c], my 
argument redirects the debate from a fraught and often abstract discussion about pluralism towards a 
set of more easily measurable issues. 
In addition to moving forward the debate about pluralism in economics, my argument is novel in 
two other ways. Firstly, it brings together and supplements what is, at present, a disparate literature on 
the social organisation of economic research. By tying empirical data from various sources together, 
and to social epistemology, I am able to describe three important features of economic research as a 
whole ([a-c]) and explain how and why they are problematic. Secondly, in offering non-ideal 
normative analysis about the existing social epistemic practices of economic research as a whole, my 
argument offers a new way of approaching social epistemology. Although I focus on just three features 
of economics, this approach can also be applied to other aspects of the way that economic research is 
organised (racial diversity or funding patterns for instance) or to pressing issues in the way that other 
sciences relate to society. 
I argued that, although pluralist ideals do not offer clear avenues for change in economics, the 
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reasons given in arguments for pluralism help to highlight how and why the issues I point to—[a] 
gender imbalances, [b] hierarchy, and [c] a dismissive attitude to outsiders—are problematic. I showed 
that the reasons given for pluralism can be categorised into three types based on the way the world is, 
the epistemic limitations involved in scientific practice, and the variety of goals the sciences can have, 
and focused on the last two types of reason to develop three heuristics, H1-H3, for evaluating social 
epistemic practices. I then used these heuristics to evaluate the existing practices associated with [a-c]. 
Arguments that pluralism can help alleviate some of the epistemic limitations involved in 
scientific practice highlight the importance of feedback mechanisms that expose scientific knowledge 
and practices to resistance. Feedback mechanisms can come in many forms, including criticism, 
reasoned elaboration, and empirical testing. Feedback is important in order to ensure that knowledge 
in economics undergoes stringent testing, avoids biases and errors, incorporates new observations 
about a changing world, and progresses. I therefore argued that social epistemic practices can be 
evaluated by: 
H1: Looking for blocks to productive forms of feedback. 
All of [a-c] constrain avenues for productive feedback within economics in some way. The gender 
imbalances in economics block avenues for productive feedback by leaving out female perspectives 
and lowering the overall quality of critical interaction. The steep hierarchy in economics 
disincentivises innovation, specialist work, and communication with the outside. It also creates a 
concentration of power that constrains new ideas and criticism in the field. All of these factors reduce 
feedback. The fact that economists dismiss outside criticism and ignore work in other fields also 
constrains the feedback to which economic research is exposed. Moreover, the dismissive attitude to 
outsiders also combines with an attitude of superiority and the power of economics to limit feedback 
in wider discussions (not just in economics) by skewing how ideas about economic issues interact. 
Taken together, [a-c] thus make it less likely that biases and errors in economic work will be spotted, 
make it less likely that the discipline will incorporate new observations or a range of perspectives, and 
hamper progress. 
Arguments that pluralism is necessary to make economics open to a variety of goals draw 
attention to the choices scientists must make regarding the ends (both epistemic and pragmatic) and 
uses of their work. Instead of determining exactly how open economics should be to different goals, I 
suggested evaluating social epistemic practices based on whether they illegitimately constrain certain 
kinds of goals. This has two aspects: the goals that are considered for selection, and the decisions 
scientists make about which goals to pursue from those that are considered. 
For the first aspect, I drew on Kitcher and deliberative accounts of democracy to argue that certain 
kinds of interests must not be systematically neglected from consideration when scientists and 
scientific communities decide what should be investigated and to what end (i.e., when they make 
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judgements of significance), in order for those decisions to be legitimate.162 As well as satisfying a 
democratic condition for legitimacy, this ensures that the sciences are able to respond to and further 
the needs of those they serve, and that they are more likely to pick up on important information. I 
therefore suggested that social epistemic practices can be evaluated by:  
H2: Looking for blocks to certain kinds of interests being considered in judgements of 
significance. 
All of [a-c] are problematic from the perspective of this heuristic. The gender imbalances in 
economics make it more difficult for the interests of women to be heard in the discipline, meaning that 
economic research is less likely to pick up on issues and observations that are important to them.163 
The disincentives to specialist work and communicating with the outside caused by economics’ steep 
hierarchy, along with a lack of incentives to work on societally significant issues, makes it less likely 
that those not well represented within the discipline (women, minorities, people from poorer socio-
economic backgrounds, workers) will have their interests considered. This is compounded by the 
concentration of power in the hands of a small group of economists. The fact that economics is 
dismissive of outside voices similarly makes it difficult for interests not already well represented 
within the discipline to be heard. Collectively, these factors make economics less able to respond to 
the interests and further the needs of a number of significant constituencies in the societies it serves. 
For the second aspect of legitimacy—how scientists choose their goals—I argued that, in order to 
be legitimate, the decisions economists make must be open to the potential for public scrutiny. Without 
enabling public judgement of the decisions by economists, the discipline risks the public forgetting 
why it granted epistemic authority to economists and withdrawing the acceptance of that authority. 
Scientific communities can enable public scrutiny through a variety of practices: reliable credentials, 
transparent track records, public communication and engagement, independently formed consensus, 
public debate, and the availability of information on things like funding patterns, the processes by 
which judgements are made, biases, and conflicts of interest. I suggested that social epistemic 
practices can be evaluated by: 
H3: Looking for blocks to avenues for public scrutiny. 
Both [b] and [c] block important conditions for public scrutiny in a variety of ways. Both the steep 
hierarchy within economics and the way that economics relates to outsiders diminish communication 
between economists and non-economists, and between economists and the general public (through 
disincentivising non-journal articles and barriers to entry/assumed superiority). This makes it difficult 
for the public to make judgements about what goes on inside economics. This is compounded by the 
facts that economics’ hierarchy puts internal constraints on criticism and that economics dismisses 
                                                             
162 These interests can include both pragmatic and epistemic preferences. They can include pragmatic 
preferences to investigate one thing over another, but they can also include epistemic preferences for one kind of 
knowledge (say abstract models) over another. 
163 This is separate to the argument above that, regardless of the goals of science, women offer unique 
epistemically relevant perspectives that if left out diminish the feedback within economics. Regardless of the 
goals of science female perspective are important, but given that the goals of science are open, female interests 
should be considered in determining them. 
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criticism from outsiders and hides what internal criticism exists from public view. These practices 
lower the prevalence of debate amongst economists and between economists and others for the public 
to witness, limiting another way that the public can garner information by which to judge the decisions 
of economists. The potential for public scrutiny of economics is further undermined by the fact that [b] 
and [c] also hamper the usefulness of consensus as an indicator for reliable knowledge. The 
hierarchical structures within economics make premature consensus more likely, and the hiding of 
internal debate makes it seem like there is consensus in economics when there is not. Collectively, all 
of these factors imply that the decisions economists make about what goals to pursue, and how to 
pursue them, illegitimate. Even if economists don’t care about their relation to the democratic account 
of legitimacy I draw on, they should not ignore this diagnosis. As I argued in chapter 4, a lack of 
potential for informed judgements by the public about the work of economists makes the authority and 
power that economics wields brittle. By not being open to public scrutiny and manufacturing 
consensus, economists risk undermining any trust the public have in them, making their expertise less 
resilient and less likely to be accepted in the future. 
Thus, economic research would be more progressive, representative of the interests of those in 
society, accepted, and legitimate, and less likely to fall into bias if economics admitted more women 
and made the environment in the discipline less adverse for them, if it were less hierarchical, and if it 
had a healthier relationship with outsiders. 
 
Calls for pluralism tend to be based on a number of underlying reasons relating to the nature of the 
world, epistemic limitations, and/or the goals of sciences. The above argument offers a way to 
circumvent the problems that arise when focussing on pluralism, by analysing instead the direct 
implications of these underlying reasons for economic research. By starting with evidence of existing 
practices—rather than pluralist ideals—and by utilising the arguments for pluralism, I am able to offer 
tangible recommendations for change. These recommendations are very much in line with the changes 
pluralists would like to see (more openness to different perspectives, less hierarchy), but they avoid 
getting stuck in a seemingly unresolvable debate about whether economics sufficiently matches the 
abstract ideal of pluralism. Furthermore, because these are social epistemic recommendations, rather 
than recommendations regarding the theoretical or methodological underpinnings of economics, which 
typically stem from a focus on pluralism, they may be more palatable to economists. 
My diagnosis of some of the issues in economics—gender imbalances, a steep hierarchy, and a 
dismissive attitude to outsiders—may not be exclusive to economics. But I offered reasons to believe 
that these issues are more pronounced in economics (see chapters 5-7). Moreover, their negative 
effects are more acute in economics because of the significant power the discipline and its 
practitioners wield in many societies. The fact that female perspectives are often neglected within 
economics can and has led to serious gaps in measurements and policy prescriptions that have had 
significant impacts. The fact that economics is steeply hierarchical slows down the discipline’s, and 
consequently many policy institutions’, ability to develop the ideas and tools required as the world 
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changes (exemplified by the slow pace to recognise the importance of inequality). And the dismissive 
attitude economists have to outsiders limits the uptake of ideas from other areas of research into public 
and political life. Given the societal impact economic research has, economists and those around the 
discipline should endeavour to change the problematic social epistemic practices which I have 
identified. They should restructure the way that research in economics is organised in order to alleviate 
its gender imbalances, flatten its hierarchy, and develop a healthier relationship with outsiders. 
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